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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about eudaimonism in Puritan thought. I am concerned with the 
living strand of Christian eudaemonism within the writings of 16th and 17th century 
English Puritans, which has long tendrils back into the tradition, and which is, more or 
less, neglected by commentators. I will be concerned to show that the notion of divine 
callings as a kind of command from God can sit comfortably alongside this eudaemonism, 
without rendering the Puritans ‘divine command theorists.’ As a sub-category of 
eudaemonism, I will address the Puritan notion of divine callings, showing how this can 
be understood as an aspect of human flourishing. And, further, as a sub-category of 
calling, I will look at how the category of ‘work’ can also be understood as an aspect of 
human flourishing, illuminated from within this tradition of Christian eudaimonism.  
I show within the Christian eudaemonistic tradition a distinction between natural and 
supernatural ends, the latter being only achieved in the vision of God in the next life. With 
this distinction made, I show that earthly happiness is constituted by the right use of reason in 
theoria and praxis, being related to our work places as well as a lifelong engagement in theology 
and philosophy. I then show the relationship between divine command theories and 
naturalism by looking at the emphasis on the development of virtue to character states 
appropriate to humankind as rational animals as a command of God. I then move to an 
examination of more particular commands in the doctrine of calling, arguing that for the 
Puritans the means of achieving earthly happiness vary from person to person and extend 
into our talents and workplaces. Finally, I show that personal earthly happiness cannot be 
achieved without the assistance of friendship in ecclesial and political communities. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Folks are usually about as happy as they make their minds up to be. Abraham Lincoln 
 
Each person has a literature inside them. Anna Deavere Smith 
 
When work is soulless, life stifles and dies. Albert Camus 
Introduction 
This thesis is about eudaimonism in Puritan thought. I am concerned with the 
living strand of Christian eudaemonism within the writings of 16th and 17th century 
English Puritans, which has long tendrils back into the Christian tradition, and which is, 
more or less, neglected by commentators. I will be concerned to show that the notion of 
divine calling as a kind of command from God can sit comfortably alongside this 
eudaemonism, without rendering the Puritans ‘divine command theorists.’ Eudaemonism 
is the central category that I will discuss. As a sub-category of eudaemonism, I will 
address the Puritan notion of divine callings, showing how this can be understood as an 
aspect of human flourishing. And, further, as a sub-category of calling, I will look at how 
the category of ‘work’ can also be understood as an aspect of human flourishing, 
illuminated from within this tradition of Christian eudaimonism. I do not deny that other 
aspects of eudaemonism could also be addressed – but these are some central ones for the 
Puritan writers who I discuss. If the thesis were strictly about ‘Puritan thought’, or even if 
I were writing an introduction to the Puritans, at least half of my material would need to 
be about Scripture and Augustine. We begin this chapter by describing some of the key 
concepts that will be utilized in this thesis. 
Eudaemonism and Ethical Naturalism 
In this section we will look at two of the key concepts that will be engaged 
throughout the thesis: ethical naturalism and classical eudaemonism. The ethical 
naturalism that will be investigated in this thesis is the Aristotelian naturalism that 
Terence Irwin describes as “the fulfillment of human nature, expressed in the various 
	   11 
human virtues.”1 I will follow Irwin and define Aristotelian naturalism, or traditional 
naturalism, as a “holist doctrine, treating human nature as a whole and a system”2 that is 
related to human function.  This will be explained in more detail in chapter 2, but for our 
purposes here, we can say that Aristotle “argues for this account of the human good from 
premises about the nature of human beings as rational animals”3 with certain kinds of 
tendencies, but that not all natural tendencies are to be acted upon. We also emphasize 
that Aristotelian naturalism is teleological in that agents act for specific ends, where these 
ends are ordered to happiness. Accordingly, the particular kind of naturalism that will be 
looked at here is called classical eudaemonism, as it takes happiness to be the organizing 
principle of ethics without equating happiness with something only observable or sensed 
in nature. The Puritans, following in a tradition that includes Aquinas, believed God 
himself to be ‘the good,’ and that happiness consists in dispositions and relations to God 
that encompass the whole of a person. Though pleasure may be an aspect of eudaemonia, 
it is in itself not identical with it.4 The nuances of happiness and its relationship to virtue, 
contemplation, law and friendship, will be explored through out the rest of this thesis. 
When necessary throughout the thesis I will complicate this account, but first we will look 
at the methodology that will be utilized for this thesis. 
Methodology 
Karl Barth comments in his commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism that we do 
not do theology “in a vacuum,” but within a tradition.5 This is not only the case of 
theology in general but also of theological ethics. Christian theologians must investigate 
moral theories within the tradition. Hans Georg Gadamer notes that the tradition is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics. From Socrates to the Reformation, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 4; Also see, Daniel Robinson, Aristotle’s Psychology (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 90. 
2 Irwin, Development, 2007, 1:141. 
3 Ibid., 1:140–1. 
4 There is a possibility of a misunderstanding in my thesis by those in the social sciences that 
should be briefly addressed.  That is, what I mean by happiness and of work related flourishing is not the 
same meaning that is found in studies on Generation Y (emerging adults, born after 1980), a classification 
of which I am a part. I do not want to be misread as arguing for a Generation Y interpretation of happiness 
as it relates to work. This will become clearer thought the thesis. For more contemporary conceptions of 
happiness see, Christian Smith et al., Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood (New York: OUP, 
2011), 72–3; 75; 95–6; 100; 217; Daniele Hervieu-Leger, Religion as a Chain of Memory (Cambridge: Polity, 
2000), 103. 
5 Karl Barth, The Heidelberg Catechism For Today, trans. Shirley C. Guthrie (London: Epworth Press, 
1964), 20. 
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always a part of us, “a model and exemplar.”6 With a “critical attitude” we address the 
truth of tradition but seek to “renew it.”7 Oliver O’Donovan similarly writes that for 
ethics, history is important because ethics looks backwards in moral reflection on history 
so that we can deliberate about how we can do better in the future.8 Knowing our history 
and tradition allows for moral deliberation to take place. Stanley Hauerwas, in the 
context of a narrative or story, argues that common sets of interpretation about history 
provide the “basis for common actions.”9 Similarly, Alistair MacIntyre argues that the 
problem with modern philosophy is that there is a separation from “the story” and that 
there can be no stepping outside of this narrative.10 For these reasons, the method of this 
thesis is to be, to use O’Donovan’s term, ‘traditionalist’ where tradition creates social 
continuity making new beginnings out of old models.11 With this in mind, O’Donovan 
also notes, [t]he history of the modern ethical disciplines in still elusive, and we lack a 
comprehensive account. The development of Protestant Ethics, in particular, is hardly 
studied and little understood.12 This project is an attempt to understand the development 
of a strand of Protestant ethics through the work of the Puritans, while also giving the 
beginnings of an historical account and so address the underpinning moral assumptions 
of these Puritan thinkers.13  
Text, Tradition and Their Uses 
This thesis engages with historical figures and in this way it takes a historical 
shape. I have taken every care to be responsible with the historical texts. In this way I 
hope that there is something of benefit for the historian of the reformation engaging with 
the moral thought of these thinkers. However, in order to draw out implications for our 
own theological reflection from eudaemonism in the Puritans, I will need, at times, to go 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Marshall, 2nd ed. 
(London: Crossroads, 2012), 282–3. 
7 For more from Gadamer on tradition and rationality see, ibid., 280–5; 291. 
8 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and the Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids: 
Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), 55; 58; Oliver O’Donovan, Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of 
Community (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2009), 45. 
9 Hauerwas, Community, 60 Also see, 44; 49-50. 
10 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 126 Also see, 121; 125. 
11 O’Donovan, Common Objects, 32–3. 
 12 Oliver O’Donovan, Self, World, and Time: Ethics as Theology., vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2013), 68. 
13 Baxter may be the exception to the above claim, one recent example being, James Calvin Davis, 
“Pardoning Puritanism: Community, Character, and Forgiveness in the Work of Richard Baxter,” Journal of 
Religious Ethics 29, no. 2 (2001): 283–306. 
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past the primary source literature, interrogating their outcomes and methods and 
drawing upon present-day theological and philosophical work in biblical studies, 
metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. This is in light of the traditionalism as laid out by 
Gadamer and others above. The Puritan authors are a neglected resource whose insights 
can illuminate present-day issues in theological ethics, and by extension dilemmas in 
political discourse. With this in mind, I will be showing that these thinkers are dedicated 
to an Aristotelian-Thomist way of conceiving of the moral life. The question must then be 
answered as to how these Puritans can be considered Aristotelian-Thomists and thus 
eudaemonists. To say that 16th and 17th century Puritans are eudaemonists, is not to say 
that they follow Aristotle and Aquinas in every respect, and discrepancies will be pointed 
out when relevant. What I am claiming is that analyses of Puritan ethics show similarities 
with significant facets of Aristotelian-Thomist thought, eudaemonism being an example. 
We will see later that ancient Greek and Roman thought (namely Aristotle, Cicero and 
Homer) influenced the Puritans. Their eudaemonism is a synthesis of a Christian 
worldview and the adoption of certain elements of ancient and medieval philosophy.14 As 
mentioned above, this thesis is about ‘eudaimonism in Puritan thought.’ If the thesis were 
about ‘Puritan thought’ or if I were writing an introduction to the Puritans, at least half of 
my material would need to be about Scripture and Augustine. 
 Next, I will now address why certain primary texts were chosen for this thesis. We 
will begin by looking at what is meant by Puritan in this research, and why certain 
Puritans were utilized. I will then show why it is that Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas were 
the best choice for representing classical eudaemonism in relation to these reformation 
thinkers. 
Puritans 
Puritanism developed in the second half of the sixteenth century in an attempt to 
‘purify’ the Church of England. ‘Puritan,’ was a term of abuse which first emerged during 
the Vestiarian Controversy in the mid 1560s. This group of feisty English Protestants 
resisted conforming to the rubrics laid down by the 1559 Prayer Book. Ultimately Puritan 
protests to the ecclesial and political concerns above lead them to emphasize pietism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This is similar to the methodology used by Insole on Edmund Burke in, Christopher Insole, 
“Two Conceptions of Liberalism: Theology, Creation, and Politics in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and 
Edmund Burke,” Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 3 (2008): 447–89. 
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This makes defining ‘Puritan’ a challenging task as this designation representing a 
breadth and plurality of beliefs. This thesis will take care in making statements about 
‘Puritans’ generally by noting historical development and differences of opinion within 
the chosen literature.15 It is difficult to define Puritanism according to ecclesiology, or 
theological and political positions. John Coffey writes, “what made [Puritans] stand out 
was their zeal and fervour,” citing Patrick Collinson’s popularizing of the phrase, “the 
hotter sort of Protestant.”16 Coffey and Lim note some of the more objective features of 
what it is to be a Puritan. They note: 
 
Puritan is the name we give to a distinctive and particularly intense variety of early modern 
Reformed Protestantism which originated within the unique context of the Church of England but 
spilled out beyond it, branching off into divergent dissenting streams, and overflowing into other 
lands and foreign churches.17 
 
Another distinguishing feature, as mentioned above, is that Puritans had their origins in 
the Church of England.18 The Puritans separated from, or were thrown out of, the 
English church because they wanted the Church to look less like Catholicism, and were of 
a Calvinist consensus rather than of a Lutheran persuasion, as there were almost no 
Lutherans in England at the time.19 With this said, this thesis, whenever possible will 
stand clear of discussions of predestination and covenant theology. Puritans also took 
scripture as normative in developing forms of devotion and religious customs developing 
distinctive literature laying out the stages of Christian life, illustrating these stages in a 
number of written means such as biographies and journals as well as treatises.20  
The Puritans also form an interesting bridge, not only between medieval and early 
modern thought, but also between early modern, modern and enlightenment thought. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a good summary of the difficulties of defining “Puritan” see, Susan Doran, Elizabeth I and 
Religion, 1558-1603 (London: Routledge, 1994), 23–30; Also see, Owen Chadwick, The Reformation 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), 175–87; Ted A. Campbell, The Religion of the Heart: A Study of 
European Religious Life in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Eugene: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2000), 44–5.   
16 John Coffey, Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions the Mind of Samuel Rutherford (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1997), 83; 17; Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967). 
17 John Coffey and Paul Chang-Ha Lim, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism, 
ed. John Coffey and Paul C. H. Lim (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 1–18. 
18 Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Later Reformation in England, 1547-1603, Second Edition (British History in 
Perspective, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 34–5; 41–51. 
19 Alec Ryrie, “The Strange Death of Lutheran England,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 53 (2002): 
64–92; Chadwick, Reformation; Doran, Elizabeth and Religion, 23; Campbell, Religion of the Heart, 44–5. 
20 Campbell, Religion of the Heart, 45. 
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many recent historical meta-narratives, whether positively or negatively, Puritans are 
painted as the impetus behind modern and enlightenment individualism. We can see in 
Weber a sense that calling and ‘inner worldly asceticism’ lead to the individualism found 
later in Western society. Charles Taylor agrees with Weber: that breaking down the idea 
that there are higher vocations makes everyday activities hallowed.21 Taylor constantly 
comes back to a Protestant, and at times Puritan, explanation of individual spiritual and 
vocational growth.22 He ties calling to the rise of deism, and later makes the connection 
from deism to humanism and eventually to secularism. Reformation, and specifically 
Puritan, calling in effect broke down structures and conflated earthly and heavenly 
flourishing.23 Under the Protestant conception, since we have our own “particular 
providences,” there is individualism within the broader society.24 
In one sense, this thesis confirms these historical narratives given by Weber and 
Taylor in that there is within the Puritan doctrine of calling a strong sense of 
individualism. There seems to be at least a strong precedent for tracing the changes in 
broader historical and theoretical origins of modernity to these thinkers. However, 
Weber’s reading of Richard Baxter exposes a flaw that I hope to exploit. Weber shows 
Baxter to resemble utilitarianism and less the classical eudaemonism that this thesis 
argues the Puritans more closely resemble. As Hannah Arendt has traced, utilitarianism 
descends into scientific naturalism and finally into nihilism.25 But I argue that it is not fair 
to associate this brand of teleological ethics with Puritan thought. This is not the place to 
address this in detail and will be taken up at some length through out this research.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
179. 
22 See, ibid., 80; 129; 165; 230; 266. 
23 Ibid., 49; 104; 106. 
24 Ibid., 81–4; 119; 223. 
25 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 154–9. 
26 The closest form of utilitarianism to eudaemonism is David Brink’s ‘objective utilitarianism.’ 
Brink’s objective utilitarianism resembles eudaemonism, firstly, in that it strongly emphasizes a moral 
realism that is teleological and encompasses objective values. This variety of utilitarianism involves more of 
a standard of rightness than the utilitarianism of Bentham and J.S. Mill, which is more of a decision-making 
procedure. However, Brink’s utilitarianism does not require essential aspects of eudaemonism such as the 
development of prudence and the importance of good character in the moral agent. With that stated, the 
utilitarianism that will be specifically contrasted with eudaemonism here will be of the Benthemite variety 
that takes happiness to be synonymous with pleasure. David Owen Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of 
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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In another sense, in opposition to the narrative given by Taylor, this thesis shows 
an overwhelming emphasis on a communitarianism that does not get reduced to 
majoritarianism. The Puritans are communitarian in that they emphasize that individual 
citizens become better human beings, and develop in a community better than they 
would as individuals away from a community, a position for which Taylor himself argues. 
This will be addressed in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.  These thinkers thus fulfill some of the 
concerns of modern Christian ethicists, for example Stanley Hauerwas, who want to 
move away from individualism in ethics to a more communitarian and ecclesiastical 
emphasis. 
Puritan Authors 
The Puritan texts that were chosen for this research were selected because of their 
influence in the time period. Most of the authors chosen for this research had books and 
tracts that were best sellers in their time going through multiple editions. One of the 
Puritans that will be investigated at length in this thesis is William Perkins (1558-1602). 
Perkins was a successful writer and teacher, both during his life and after. His theological 
treatises draw not only upon the Calvinism that was emblematic of Puritanism but also 
had deep scholastic roots. Along with Perkins, this thesis will look at the works of Richard 
Baxter (1615-1691) who also had success with his writing during his life and after, as well 
as being very familiar with medieval scholasticism. Baxter is still considered to be a 
figurehead for the Puritans, as evidenced by Weber’s use of him in The Protestant Work 
Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. The use of Baxter as ‘Puritan’ was controversial in his time 
because of his retreat from certain views on predestination. I draw upon him first, 
because, despite his other theological views his thought on calling remains consistent with 
other Puritan perspectives; and secondly because he was the focus of Weber’s famous 
study on calling. Another author looked at here will be John Owen (1616-1683) who was 
a major figure and contributor to Protestant and Puritan theology. He too was very 
familiar with medieval scholasticism, and played an influential role at Oxford where he 
was the dean of Christ Church, as well as having close political ties and writing 
substantially in his lifetime. Other Puritans that will be looked at in this thesis are Richard 
Rogers (1551-1618), Thomas Playfere (1561-1609), Robert Bolton (1572-1631), Joseph 
Hall (1574-1656), Edward Reynolds (1599-1676), Thomas Goodwin (1600-1680) and 
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William Fenner (1600-1640). Each of these Puritans doctrines of calling are the result of 
their exegesis of sacred scripture along with the appropriation of a theological and 
philosophical tradition. I must emphasize again: scripture is no doubt vital to these 
thinkers, but this thesis is about eudaemonism in the Puritans and not an outline of 
Puritan thought. 
The use of English, as opposed to American Puritans, in this thesis represents the 
number of treatises on this topic by English thinkers. The authors of these texts were also 
writing to a national church, a settled society and an established community, whereas in 
the American context, they were speaking to their own community and culture that was 
being built from the ground up. Also, the main cut off of the authors chosen does not 
allow for there to be much historical overlap with the American authors discussing this 
topic. 
Along with these numerous Puritan authors, conformists such as Richard Hooker 
(1554-1600) and Joseph Butler (1692–1752) will also be explored throughout the thesis. 
Looking at some of these influential ‘conformist’ thinkers alongside of the Puritans will 
bring out some of the distinctive features that the Puritans bring to our discussion of 
ethics. Along with conformist authors we will also engage with Catholics such as Thomas 
Wright (1592-1676) and St. Alphonsus De' Liguori (1696-1787) to give more historical 
context to the Puritans’ distinctive thought. Drawing upon these thinkers is helpful 
because they utilize many of the same sources and traditions as the Puritans and at times 
coming to different conclusions. 
The texts of Aristotle that will be most often looked at are his Metaphysics, 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics.27 But, given that the Puritans were so well versed in the 
Aristotelian corpus and drew upon his other works, these will also be looked at when 
necessary.  The Summa Theologica will be the central text used for Aquinas, but at times his 
Summa Contra Gentiles and commentaries will also be drawn upon.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This thesis will not make any comment as to whether the Eudemian Ethics or Nichomachean Ethics 
are Aristotle’s mature work. Since the Puritans focused on the EN, this will be the primary text for this 
research. For more on this see, Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship between the 
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 
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Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas function in this thesis as clear proponents of 
eudaemonism in history. Aristotle will be used as the ancient representative of 
eudaemonism, instead of Plato or Epictetus, because of his massive influence in late 
medieval theology and philosophy as well as his essential role in the educational system in 
reformation England. Along these same lines, Aquinas will be drawn upon because of his 
systematizing of Aristotle and Augustine into Christian theology, and especially ethics. 
Fergus Kerr has noted that there is not an historical account of the use of Aquinas.28 In a 
roundabout way this thesis will attempt to show the use of Aquinas, or at least 
Aristotelian-Thomism, in and after the reformation.29 
As mentioned above, an important reason that Aristotle and Aquinas are used in 
this thesis is because of the prominence that they played in the education of the Puritans. 
Aristotle, along with Aristotelian scholastic philosophers, was read at universities in 
reformation England. It was not at all unusual for university educated Puritans to be 
engaging with Aristotle and thus, eudaemonism. Also, Aristotelian medieval scholastic 
philosophy and theology would have been taught and thus percolated into the doctrines 
and beliefs disseminated by Puritans preachers and writers. Many of these Puritans were 
classically educated, drawing both from Greek and Roman influence.30 
 Scholasticism in sixteenth and seventeenth century England was inherited from 
Reformers such as Beza and Zanchi. It was important in academic culture and allowed 
for “doctrine to be explicated with greater precision and orderliness,” while also 
providing vocabulary, sharp distinctions that helped to prevent confusion and enabled 
systematization.31  A scholastic education involved the logic of Aristotle as well as his 
metaphysics and natural philosophy, which were also still prominent. Reformed 
theologians relied on Aristotle until he was gradually unseated by the Cartesian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Fergus Kerr, Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation (London: SCM, 2003), 189. 
29 Stephen William Peter Hampton, Anti-Arminians the Anglican Reformed Tradition from Charles II to 
George I (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 221. 
30 Campbell, Religion of the Heart, 17; James Bowen, History of Western Education: The Modern West 
Europe and the New World, vol. 3 (London: Methuen, 1981), 8; Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1988), 17; Also see, R. Tudur Jones, Rosemary Moore, and Arthur J. 
Long, Protestant Nonconformist Texts, vol. 1 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 75; Howard Hotson, “A General 
Reformation of Common Learning,” in The Reception of Continental Reformation in Britain, ed. Polly Ha, Patrick 
Collinson, and British Academy (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 196–99; 203–4. 
31 Dewey D. Wallace Jr., “Puritan Polemical Divinity and Doctrinal Controversy,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Puritanism, ed. John Coffey and Paul C. H. Lim (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 210. 
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philosophy.32 In a sense, Aristotle defines Protestant scholasticism. Medieval scholastics 
were also drawn upon in Puritan education. Perkins and Ames were happy with utilizing 
scholastic theology.33 Baxter remarked “that he loved to read Aquinas and Scotus and 
could not endure ‘confusion’; rather, he craved ‘distinction and method.’”34 
Aristotle loomed large in the background of the protestant reformation, especially 
with regard to ethics and discussions of the good life. Because of the prominent place 
Aristotle played in the academy in England at the time, nearly all university educated 
Puritans, as well as philosophers and theologians of different denominational leanings, 
used the ancients and mediaevals to hone and shape their own thought. Puritans were 
also indebted to Augustine, but this is outside of the boundaries of this thesis; Aquinas is 
Augustinian enough that the Augustinian moments are well represented in Aquinas 
himself. There will be some discussion of Augustine as he relates to Aquinas in the 
following and in chapter 7. 
As we have seen above, the significance of the Aristotelian logic, and Aristotelian 
and Thomist traditions for Puritan metaphysics is well known, but research into whether 
Puritan ethics followed suit has not been extensively researched. This thesis will also 
contribute to our understanding of the development of ethics within the Puritan period. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 There was one challenger to the use of Aristotle in education, Petrus Ramus (1515-1572). 
Ramus attempted to bring about educational reform in England. From an early age he was fiercely anti-
Aristotelian and argued against the use of scholasticism for his masters examination theme at the University 
of Paris. At the beginning of Ramus’ career he was intensely hostile to Aristotelianism and engaged in a 
number of different polemics to try and supplant Aristotle from University curricula arguing that Aristotle 
was obscure and incomprehensible to students. Despite his many attempts, Ramus could never find a way 
within the University setting to dethrone Aristotle from the universities. However, later in Ramus’ career he 
changes his position admitting that Aristotle, among other things, had variety and a style. 
Ramism is still found amongst many of the Puritans. Williams Fenner’s “Sacra Theologia was 
thoroughly Ramist in method.” This method was further “summarised in his 1584 treatise on The Artes of 
Logicke and Rhetorike.” William Ames was also opposed to Aristotelianism and advocated the Ramist method. 
Though, more typically, reformed theologians were not keen on letting Aristotle out of the curriculum. Paul 
R. Scafer notes, at least for Perkins, it would be a mistake to see too much Ramism in his thought.  Paul R. 
Schaefer, “Protestant ‘Scholasticism’ at Elizabethan Cambridge: William Perkins and a Reformed 
Theology of the Heart,” in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, ed. Carl R Trueman and R. Scott 
Clark (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 150–2; Also see, Richard A Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the 
Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1991), 16–20; Howard Hotson, Commonplace Learning : Ramism and Its German Ramifications, 
1543-1630 (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 3; 43; Bowen, History, 3:3:31; Wallace Jr., “Puritan Polemical Divinity 
and Doctrinal Controversy,” 211; Carl R. Trueman, “A Small Step Towards Rationalism: The Impact of 
the Metaphysics of Tommaso Campanella on the Theology of Richard Baxter,” in Protestant Scholasticism: 
Essays in Reassessment, ed. R. Scott Clark and Carl R. Trueman (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 186. 
33 Campbell, Religion of the Heart, 48. 
34 Wallace Jr., “Puritan Polemical Divinity and Doctrinal Controversy,” 210–1. 
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There has been very little attention given to Aristotelianism and eudaemonism in Puritan 
ethics in the secondary literature.35 
 
* * * * * 
 
This thesis, with regard to scope, moves in the shape of an hourglass beginning, at 
its widest point, in chapters 2, 3 and 4 with a discussion of eudaemonism in the Puritans 
by looking at human nature broadly and what constitutes happiness from the most 
general perspective. That is, what does it mean, universally, for humankind to flourish.  
Chapter 2 will begin to disentangle concepts within eudaemonism with particular 
attention given to ends and nature. I will show that within western Christianity, God is 
recognized as the ultimate telos of human nature and it is here only that humankind finds 
true and eternal happiness. There are, however, conceptions of significantly lesser ends 
and thus ‘happinesses’ that are able to be experienced in this life. This chapter will show 
that according to the understanding of ends in the Puritans, natural ends allow for there 
to be a universal human ethic based on natures that extends beyond the realm of faith; or 
as ecclesial ethics relates with the secular political sphere. However, natural happiness is 
severely diminutive in comparison to the supernatural end that humans are intended for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 There is some recognition that the EN was an important resource for moral education for those 
who were university educated. With regard to reformation education in ethics in the secondary literature, 
there is often at least a mention of the EN and Aristotle’s influence, but this usually is a passing reference. 
For example Euan Cameron notes, right after acknowledging Aristotle’s influence in metaphysics and 
politics, that the EN “was a common requirement for degrees in faculties of liberal arts. Rediscovery of 
classical texts generated interest in other moral philosophers.” Cameron, however, immediately moves on 
to go into more detail about the discovery of Platonism and the adoption of Stoics like Cicero. See Euan 
Cameron, The Sixteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 126; 132; Similarly MacCulloch 
discusses the importance of Aristotelian metaphysics with regard to the scholastic use of it in describing 
transubstantiation and the reformations, especially Luther’s, detesting of the doctrine and “The 
Philosopher.” There are also at points discussions of receptions of Aristotelian biology and views of women 
and reproduction, but there is no mention of Aristotle’s prominence, as we have seen above, in education as 
it relates to physics, metaphysics and ethics. See Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 
1490-1700 (London: Penguin Books, 2003); Also see Owen Chadwick, The Reformation (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1964), 219. Books that do not mention either the Metaphysics or Ethics see Patrick Collinson, 
The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society 1559-1625 (Oxford: OUP, 1984); Robert Scribner, Roy 
Porter, and Mikulas Teich, eds., The Reformation in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994). Also, in the first preface to MacCulloch’s book The Later Reformation in England, 1547-1603, he 
writes that this book is to “give a picture of how recent research has opened up our understanding of the 
later tutor church,” yet there is no mention of Aristotle’s influence in reformation England. See Diarmaid 
MacCulloch, The Later Reformation in England, 1547-1603, Second Edition (British History in Perspective, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). One of the better accounts of Aristotelianism in Puritan ethics can 
be found in Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
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in the next life. By using the work of Henri de Lubac as an organizing principle, I will 
attempt to explain subtleties in the relationship between natural and supernatural ends. 
Once these distinctions have been made, I will turn to sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Puritan authors to show how they relate to the previous ancient, patristic and medieval 
tradition on ends, nature and happiness. 
Chapter 3 begins to make the more explicit connection between eudaemonism 
and work in the Puritans showing why work has a particularly important role in human 
fulfillment. Building on the previous chapter, I will first show that the relationship 
between happiness and rational capacities found in previous eudaemonists is also present 
in the Puritans, through their tripartite view of the soul. Building from an understanding 
of the soul and reason, this chapter will demonstrate that the Puritans, like their 
predecessors, emphasized reason over other human faculties. From here we will continue 
to look at how reason might be conceived to relate to the supernatural end. We will do 
this first by looking at Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ views on contemplation, pointing out some 
of Aquinas’ modifications on the subject. Our intention here is to trace these Thomist 
modifications into Puritan thought by looking at the conceptual similarities between sacra 
doctrina and the category of meditation in the Puritan writers. What we will see is that the 
Puritans have strong views about the use of reason in this life. The chapter concludes by 
looking at the Puritan attempt to ease the said tension between theoria and praxis. 
The next three chapters of this thesis will look at three interrelated components to 
a Puritan doctrine of calling, and thus a naturalist divine command theory. Chapters 4, 5 
and 6, will in turn analyze the three parts of Williams Perkins’ definition of calling: “…a 
certain kinde of life, ordained and imposed on man by God for the common good.”36 I 
will demonstrate in chapter 4 that the language of divine command language does not 
need to be in conflict with the desire of ethical naturalism’s desire to speak to the 
development of character. Engagement with eudaemonism in the Puritans shows us that 
we can conceive of a command to all humankind to flourish by developing in character a 
‘kind of life’ towards a telos that has its natural terminus in the vision of God. 
In chapter 5, the hourglass is at its most narrow point, with the focus on the 
happiness of individual persons as part of the whole of human nature. It is here that we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Perkins, ATV, 2. 
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will look at the relationship between particular divine commands and callings and 
eudaemonism. Chapter 5 focuses on the second part of Perkins’ definition, “imposed on 
man.” This chapter will show that the Puritans, because of an emphasis on a 
metaphysically rich ethic, were able to incorporate in an interesting way the language of 
divine commands within a eudaemonist framework. Here we will look at the dialectical 
relationship between individual and universal flourishing and show that these do not 
create conflict but rather work in tandem.  
Chapters 6 and 7 take a step back from looking at the happiness commanded to 
particular persons and broadens to investigate how the Puritans conceive calling’s 
relationship to the ‘common good’ and wider socio-political institutions.  These chapters 
complete our image of the hourglass, as I will show how for the Puritans calling relates to 
the divinely ordained social positioning of individuals within the whole of a flourishing 
society. This will be done by looking at some of the nuanced specifics of the Puritan 
doctrine of calling, in terms of how people, both Christian and non-Christian, use callings 
to benefit society. This will direct our gaze away from a discussion of the particular 
happiness of the individual back to the universal development of virtue and the 
community’s role in this development. We will do this by looking at two aspects of social 
life that were important for the Puritans, and are still for contemporary theological ethics. 
The first is the importance of friendship. The second is a discussion of the state’s role in 
moral development. Finally in chapter 8, although we have looked at some of the 
contemporary implications of this eudaemonistic doctrine of calling for moral and 
political theology today, here we will look at how the eudaemonism found in the Puritans 
relates three specific moral and political issues.  
The contention of this thesis is that eudaemonism in the Puritans makes a 
distinctive contribution from the history of ideas, bringing a typically naturalist emphasis 
on flourishing and universality, with more Protestant and ecclesial concerns with 
individual calling and community. 
 Chapter 2 
Nature, Ends and Happiness 
 
To me, happiness is Fred’s Horn. James Brown 
 
Happiness is an accident of nature, a beautiful and flawless aberration. Pat Conroy 
 
None of us really changes over time. We only become more fully what we are. Anne Rice 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter we began to look at some of the features of ethical 
naturalism with specific emphasis on classical eudaemonism. I stated that Aristotle 
proposes a holist doctrine that treats the entirety of human nature as related to its proper 
function and that classical eudaemonism is teleological, in that agents act for the specific 
end of happiness. In this chapter, we will begin to extricate some of these concepts and 
make clearer what is meant by happiness and how it relates to natures.  
 I will do this first by looking at what Aristotle means by happiness and the 
ultimate end, as described in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Metaphysics, in order to gain a 
better understanding of classical eudaemonism. We will need to answer the question of 
whether or not, for the Puritans, there are multiple ends and thus multiple ‘happinesses.’ 
We will do this by focusing on a current debate concerning the supernatural in Aquinas. 
By looking at the work of Henri de Lubac, alongside Augustine and Aquinas, we hope to 
become clearer about what the tradition has said about the relationship between natural 
and supernatural ends. Once these distinctions have been made, we will turn our 
attention to sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritan authors to see how they relate to 
the previous ancient, patristic and medieval traditions on ends and happiness. 
 In doing this, three things will come to light. The first is that the Western tradition 
of thought on ends and happiness allows for a conception of natural ends that contribute 
to earthly happiness. The second is that, according to the Puritans investigated here, 
natural ends allow for a universal human ethic based on natures, which is not relegated to 
religious belief but extends to broader socio-political ethics. However, natural happiness is 
diminutive in comparison to the supernatural end that humans are intended for in the 
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next life. Third, this chapter will show that supernatural happiness is only attainable by 
the grace that is provided through Christ. As indicated above, we begin our discussion of 
ends and happiness with Aristotle.  
Aristotle and Happiness 
The objective of this section is to set out Aristotle’s development and exposition of 
eudaemonia in framing and defining the happiness-based ethic that is prevalent in the 
Christian tradition and among the English Puritans. This section will focus on the EN to 
extrapolate what Aristotle means by the happy life. 
The beginning of the EN is concerned with the relationship between means and 
ends. For example, if a person is pressed on why they do anything, say, for example 
recreational swimming they might respond that they do that action ‘to be healthy.’ If 
pressed why they want to be healthy, the answer might be, ‘to live longer.’ If this person 
were asked over and over again the question ‘why,’ they would eventually demonstrate 
that every action they do is for some end. However, most people are not reflective enough 
to realize that their actions are motivated by this train of reasoning.1 Aristotle’s belief is 
that the result of following this train of reasoning is that there is some ultimate end that 
mankind pursues for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else: it is here that 
Aristotle is concerned.2 He is interested in the distinction between instrumental ends that 
are pursued for the sake of something else and superior ends that are desired in 
themselves. The superior end stops this practical reasoning from becoming an infinite 
regress of choosing one thing for the sake of another and so on. The end is ‘the good’ it is 
“what everyone seeks.”3 When someone makes a decision, they are inadvertently 
expressing a desire for an end or object as promoting the final good. To make a decision 
is to show and act on a rational desire to a rational end. We do everything else for the 
sake of that rational ultimate end. “Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue” we 
choose for the sake of happiness, “supposing that through them we shall be happy.” 
Happiness being the “end of the things achievable by action.”4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Annas, Morality, 27. 
2 Anthony Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 1. 
3 Aristotle, EN, 1094a1–4. All citations of Aristotle are from the Barnes edition unless otherwise 
noted.  
4 Ibid., 1097b1–5; 21–22. 
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This highest and most perfect good, “as far as its name goes, most people virtually 
agree; for both the many and the cultivated call it happiness, and they suppose that living 
well and doing well are the same as being happy.”5 The kind of happiness that Aristotle is 
referring to here does not mean what we mean in modern English as some state of mental 
euphoria, but rather has the fuller understanding of ‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being.’6 
Happiness meets the criterion stated above for the ultimate end because happiness, more 
than anything else, is always chosen for its own sake and never for anything else. We 
sometimes choose things like honor and intelligence but, because we choose them on 
occasion as constitutive of happiness, they are not the ultimate end. Happiness is self-
sufficient, requiring nothing. It is not one choice worthy good among others, but it meets 
all other conditions of being an ultimate end.7 
 We have yet to paint a clear, classical eudaemonist picture of happiness. In order 
for us to fully understand what is meant by happiness we must refer back to Aristotle’s 
metaphysics to “grasp the function of a human being.”8 The good is not something that is 
external to the moral agent, but is the perfection of its nature. The acorn grows towards 
an end that is in accordance to its function and the laws of its nature, and it becomes a 
perfect tree, realizing the end of its existence by attaining ‘its own good.’9 Because 
happiness is active rather than passive and includes the activity of the agent, this rules out 
wealth, for example, from being happiness. At the very least, happiness cannot just be 
wealth but must involve what you do with wealth.10 Aristotle concludes, “the human 
function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason.”11 Just as it is the 
function of a good harpist to play the harp well, the human function is a “certain kind of 
life” that is “activity and actions of the soul that involve reason.” The “function of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid., 1095a15–20; Also see, Josef Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, 2nd ed. (South Bend: St. 
Augustines Press, 1979), 15–17. 
6 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” As will be made clearer throughout this chapter, 
‘happiness’ as used in English is not an acceptable translation of eudaemon. The English word ‘happiness’ is 
derived from Middle English and carries with it connotations of chance occurrence, good fortune or luck. 
Hap is found in contemporary usage in words like happenstance or happens. 
7 Julia Annas, “Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness,” in Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy 
Sherman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 36; Aristotle, “EN,” 1097a25–b21; Robin Barrow, 
Happiness (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 20. 
8 Aristotle, EN, 1097b25–1098a21; Jean Porter, Nature As Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural 
Law (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 158. 
9 J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 3. 
10 Annas, Morality, 45. 
11 Aristotle, EN, 1098a7–9. 
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excellent man is to do this well and finely.”12 Functions are completed well by being 
completed in harmony with the virtue proper to that kind of thing, which is activity of the 
soul in accordance with the most complete virtue. 
In conclusion, for Aristotle, happiness is the end that all mankind seeks. A happy 
and flourishing life is always chosen for its own sake and includes instrumental goods and 
ends in trying to achieve it. We have also looked at Aristotle’s dependence on metaphysics 
in his ethics. The question remains as to how Aristotle’s ethics relates to those found in 
the Christian tradition leading to the Puritans. As seen in the previous chapter, Aristotle, 
Cicero and other prominent medievalists were drawn upon in reformation theology and 
philosophy. The question that we will need to address in the following section is the 
amount of Aristotle utilized over other Christian thinkers like Augustine when thinking 
about penultimate and ultimate ends. At this point, it is necessary to become aware of a 
recent debate concerning natural and supernatural ends. 
The Debate Over the Supernatural 
 We need to momentarily put aside the discussion of happiness and focus on the 
topic of ends. Later in this chapter, we will begin to see a distinction arise in the Puritans 
between natural and supernatural ends. In order to make clear what is being addressed in 
these terms, we here turn our attention to a contemporary debate over Thomas Aquinas’ 
view of nature. By looking at the work of Henri de Lubac on the supernatural, we will be 
able to make the necessary sorts of distinctions within Puritan thought. This section is not 
an attempt to add anything to this debate over the natural and supernatural, but rather to 
give our current discussion shape and to see where it is that Puritans land on the issue and 
how, or if, they make the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Also, by 
using this debate as the organizing principle for the rest of this chapter, we will already be 
illuminating an aspect of the discussion of the vision of God in the next chapter.13 
De Lubac argues that the medievals, specifically Aquinas, thought that humans 
had been given the promise that they would see God. The desire to see God is in us, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 1098a10–15. 
13 When I have presented this portion of my research, the relationship between the natural and 
supernatural in the Puritans, as it relates to this debate, is the most frequently asked question. I add this 
debate not only because it is a helpful organizing principle for talking about nature and ends in Puritan 
thought but also because of the frequency of questions I have received about it. 
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we are creatures and it requires the free gift of grace in order to do this.14 The problem 
arises when one asks how it is that the human natural end is to see God, but that it 
requires something outside of our natures—grace—in order to achieve it. It is a mystery 
how something can be our natural and good end and not be achievable without 
assistance. Because of this discord, the supernatural has been blurred and neglected. De 
Lubac insists that this seeming contradiction is a mystery, and it is not something that is 
intellectually graspable in this life. Once one has accepted the idea of a transcendent, 
personal God, this form of rationality and mystery is perfectly acceptable. This is because 
the truth we receive from God is beyond our grasp and should be beyond our grasp.15 
Unhappy with this tension, and longing to create a solution, theologians and philosophers 
have either stressed that seeing God is “fundamental” or “that it is a totally free gift,” thus 
sacrificing one of the positions. 
One of the theologians, according to de Lubac and Milbank, unwilling to hold to 
‘mystery’ was Thomas Cajetan (1468-1534). He made a distinction between what is due 
to humanity by nature and what is a free supernatural addition. In order to make 
Aquinas consistent, Cajetan had to elaborate a “doctrine of ‘pure nature’ which would 
alone do justice to the latter’s doctrine of the gratuity of grace and his repeated distinction 
between what is due to humanity by nature and what accrues to him by free supernatural 
addition.”16 Unlike Aquinas, Cajetan “explicitly says that human nature in actuality is fully 
definable in merely natural terms.” The implication of this is that there is an entirely 
“natural and adequate ethics, politics, and philosophy and so forth. Man might even 
offend the moral law and yet not be guilty of sin.”17 The result would be, 
 
…the speculation about ‘pure nature’—in a quite different sense from that given it by the 
scholastics of old, as we have seen—a speculation ever more pervasive and widespread. And, 
where there has not been great care, this has even led to a certain compromising of the 
gratuitousness.18 
 
Aquinas, as de Lubac reads him, believes that the moment we say “I,” we have 
existence and supernatural finality, meaning it is impossible to disassociate personhood 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural (New York: Crossroad, 1998), 167; 175. 
15 Ibid., 171. 
16 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 17. 
17 Ibid. 
18 de Lubac, Supernatural, 176. 
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from teleology.19 Everything seeks beatitude, and humanity is no exception. The desire 
for the end is part of the human being.20 God made us “open and questioning” so that 
God, by speaking to his creatures, could bring them to him. It is necessary that “a call 
comes from God’s initiative, and it sounds from within the creature as a first natural 
response.” Creation has a unique final end in which it is “creation as effected by God 
precisely with the object of giving himself to it; that creation as finally illuminated for us 
by the good news announced to mankind one night at Bethlehem.” Man was not created 
to exist in the realm of nature. Ancient philosophers could sense that there was something 
beyond this ‘nature’ but could not interpret it, because they did not have “the means to 
interpret what they felt,” namely the longing to see God.21 
What do we do with the accusation that if our nature is to see God, then God is 
obligated to see us through to that perfection, that beatific vision? De Lubac answers that 
there is a difference between the gift of creation and the gift of deification. There can be 
no free gift if the giver cannot withhold it.22 Within our created natures there is a desire to 
see God, but the attainment of that is dependent upon the grace of God. There can be no 
movement of the will towards beatitude unless a supernatural agent moves it.23 We see 
here, as John Milbank summarizes, “deification is not there because of creation; rather 
creation is there because of deification, as the apex and microcosmic summation of 
created glory.”24 
Thus for de Lubac, justification is not properly a miracle.25 This is because it is 
not done “above the natural potency.” The soul is naturally capable of grace.26 For 
Thomas it is a miracle for a man to be given a vision of God in this world, but it is not a 
miracle to see him in the next. Late medieval interpreters of Aquinas, like Cajetan, think 
that salvation is a miracle, because we do not have a natural capacity for supernatural 
ends. For Aquinas the soul has a natural capacity for grace, because God created us to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 79. 
20 Ibid., 53–6. 
21 Ibid., 130–1; 137–8. 
22 Ibid., 73–6. 
23 Aquinas, ST, I 12.5; 62.2; I–II 114.2. 
24 Milbank, Suspended, 52; de Lubac, Supernatural, 95; 96. 
25 Aquinas, ST, I–II 113.10; de Lubac, Supernatural, 24. 
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with him.27 The supernatural end is natural: we are disposed to it, but we still need 
infused grace, as grace perfects nature.28 Just because humankind was created for the 
supernatural end does not mean that God has to give us that beatitude.29 
What begins to come out in de Lubac’s analysis of the supernatural in Aquinas is 
that the distinct Aristotelian movement in Aquinas is subordinate to Augustine.30 Even 
with the reemphasis favoring Augustine over Aristotle, de Lubac recognizes that Aquinas 
held both the secular and the Christian concept of nature. The question we must here 
answer is: if this is the case, then how is it that Aquinas uses Aristotle, a philosopher who 
is constrained to reason alone without revelation? We must here understand how 
Aristotelian Aquinas is according to de Lubac. 
De Lubac, Aristotle and Aquinas 
 As we will see later in this chapter, the Puritans are committed to a strand of the 
Christian moral tradition through Luther and Calvin that takes Augustine seriously in 
theological discourse. We will also see that they hold to Aristotle when thinking through 
happiness and ultimate ends. Thus a worry emerges as to the compatibility of Augustine 
with Aristotle, firstly within Aquinas and secondly in the Puritans. By continuing to use de 
Lubac as a resource, we will begin to investigate how it is that Aquinas was able to draw 
upon both Augustine and Aristotle, which will help us to shape our understanding of the 
Puritans later in this chapter. 
Aristotle was helpful for Aquinas because he gave Aquinas a deeper reckoning of 
this worldly nature; this is “indisputable.”31 For Aquinas, only mankind is directly 
subordinate to the infinite, a framework laid down by Aristotle and also present in 
Augustine,32 but, it is true, as de Lubac insists, that Thomist nature is not Aristotelian 
nature. Both philosophy and theology talk of natures, but differently.33 Medieval, 
theological nature is destined for the highest nature, the final end of seeing God himself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., 98; 145; Aquinas, ST, I–II 3.8.1. 
28 de Lubac, Supernatural, 33; 84–6. 
29 Ibid., 80; Aquinas, ST, I–II 3.6q5a3. 
30 Milbank, Suspended, 19. 
31 de Lubac, Supernatural, 154; Milbank, Suspended, 23; 24. Though Aquinas is Aristotelian in his 
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 32 de Lubac, Supernatural, 105–6; Aristotle, DA, 429a. 
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Whereas with Aristotelian nature, it is possible for one to find the ultimate end in this 
world, hence Aristotle’s ‘magnanimous man,’ who will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 4. The study of creatures is for philosophy and theology, but in different ways. 
The philosopher considers their own nature, while the theologian considers it according 
to first principles ordered to their last end, God.34 When it comes to spiritual nature, 
 
…and especially to man who is neither merely a living being, nor a pure spirit, this word ‘nature’ 
will have two partially different meanings, according to whether it is to be applied to this particular 
species which we form, among the other species in the universe, or to the nature of spirit in so far 
as this is something which goes beyond any particular species because it is innately opened to the 
universal and directly related God.35 
 
However, Aristotelian principles are still in play here. The discussion of the “natural 
desire for the supernatural could not, in divine justice, be disappointed, without violating 
the Aristotelian principle that a natural impulse to an end cannot… be frustrated.”36 
Aristotle’s discussion of ends is still relevant because our natures are the kinds of natures 
that seek natural ends. Human natures seek supernatural ends and thus God.37 Humans 
are created to see the vision of God; this is in our natures, with which advocates of a pure 
nature would agree too. If this is the case, then the interpretation of Thomas that states 
that we have purely natural ends is guilty of taking Augustine out of Aquinas, in that if all 
other natures in the world are able to pursue their natural ends, humans are only able to 
attain a condition that is not their true and final end.38 
 What we have shown above is that the Thomist model that de Lubac sets forth 
prioritizes Augustine in that the ‘natural’ end of man is to see God, but this teleological 
move is made in an Aristotelian framework. Thus to read Aquinas without one or the 
other of these influences is to misread what he is trying to accomplish, theologically as 
well as philosophically. 
Augustine and Happiness 
If Aquinas is more Augustinian than Aristotelian, it will now be prudent to 
investigate what Augustine writes concerning happiness and ends, in the hope of looking 	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36 Milbank, Suspended, 29. 
37 de Lubac, Supernatural, 111. 
 38 Ibid., 148–9. 
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at points of continuity with Augustine and Aristotle. In this section, we will look at 
Augustine’s thought on natural and supernatural ends. What we will find by looking at 
Augustine’s ideas of self-love and the ordo amoris is not only that Augustine is a 
eudaemonist but also that there is room in his thought for both natural and supernatural 
ends. By looking at book XIX of City of God (COG), we will see that Augustine does have 
the same varieties of ethical concerns in mind as did the culture that was pervasive at the 
time, and in which he grew up.39 Though his formulation of happiness (i.e. peace in 
eternal life) differs from Aristotle and Aquinas, it does so only slightly, and it still has the 
same concerns and emphasis. All three of these thinkers emphasize a kind of self-love that 
leads to ends and flourishing that are appropriate to the nature of the thing striving for 
the end. The end of self-love for a human is happiness and the divine.40 This 
triangulation between Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas will put us in a better position to 
understand the Puritan position on nature and ends. 
Augustine writes in COG that if a person knows how to love him or herself, then 
an end has been established for them. The final good of the ancient philosophers is “our 
Good,” and cleaving to him whose “spiritual embrace” fills “the intellectual soul and 
makes it fertile with true virtues.” Book XIX is an attempt to bring Christianity and 	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City of God, ed. John O’ Meara, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), XIX.4. 
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classicism together.41 Though Augustine does not mention Aristotle directly, the presence 
of self-love that is expressed by Augustine is represented in the EN. Aristotle writes that a 
person is her own best friend and should love herself most. However, people define self-
love in different ways. Negatively, people define self-love as having wealth, honors and 
bodily pleasures, and these are considered objects of competition and are related to the 
lower parts of the soul. Positively, self-love is in accordance with right reason and desiring 
what is “noble rather than what is advantageous.” The good person should be a lover of 
self, for she will benefit herself and her fellows,42 and sacrificing for a friend is good. 
These same themes seen above in Aristotle’s description of self-love are what Augustine is 
attempting to synthesize with Christianity. 
For Augustine, in directing our course towards God with love, we find our rest 
“and attain our happiness because we have achieved our fulfillment in him.”43 He says 
elsewhere, “no man lives as he wishes, unless he is happy; and no man is happy, unless he 
is righteous.”44 Life will only be truly happy, Augustine believes, when everything is loved 
for the happy life and must wish the happy life to be eternal.45 We see here, rather 
paradoxically, that there is no way that God can be loved without the lover loving herself. 
There must be love for both the self and God, not just love for God.  
 
For in order that a man may know how to love himself an end has been established for him to 
which he is to refer all his action, so that he may attain a bliss. For if a man loves himself, his one 
wish is to achieve blessedness. Now this end is ‘to cling to God.’ 
 
The ‘end’ of humankind is to be happy, because anyone who loves herself wants nothing 
more than to be happy. In Augustine’s view, self-love is the quest for happiness without 
which no ethics can be envisioned. Persons that are “granted eternal life with God live in 
complete happiness.”46 If loving ourselves is the highest end, then how is it that man is to 
achieve that end? For Augustine, loving God is the way to achieve that end; this is the 
only locus by which man can attain true rest and happiness. Man is “slave to that by 
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which he wishes to find happiness,” and it is the seeking of authentic happiness that drives 
a person to God.47 
Thus in order to be happy, we must love God and learn to love ourselves. Since 
we have a natural tendency to seek our own happiness and love ourselves anyway, we 
need to learn to do it well.48 True self-love is nothing other than loving God, which needs 
to be educated. “Thus the desire for happiness, like self-love, is equivalent to the love of 
God when it is taught, but has a natural non-moral area of reference in which it is 
common to all men.”49 We do not need a command to do something naturally, but we 
need one to know how to do it properly. 
Along with Christ’s summary of the law, in which he gives the command to love 
God and to love one’s neighbor, comes the presence of a third love, self-love. Here we see 
the indication that love of God and love of one’s neighbor are to be conceived 
eudaemonistically. “In saying that self-love finds its expression in love of God, Augustine 
is formulating in one of the possible ways a principle fundamental to his metaphysical and 
ethical outlook, namely that all moral obligation derives from an obligation to God which 
is at the same time a call to self-fulfillment.”50 This is accomplished by having the right 
ordo amoris, or order of love. 
Augustine writes that every “immortal power, however great its importance, will 
have no other wish, if it loves us as itself, than that we, for our happiness, should subject 
to God, seeing that it is such subjection that gives that Power its blessedness.”51 It is 
important not to place things that are of lesser importance above those that should take 
precedence; man must have the proper order of loves. The paradox of this line of 
thinking is that the one who loves herself and does not love God does not love herself, but 
the one who loves herself will love God and not herself. C.S. Lewis summarizes this when 
he writes, “you can’t get second things by putting them first. You get second things only 
by putting first things first.”52 	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51 Augustine, COG, X.3; Margaret R Miles, Desire and Delight: A New Reading of Augustine’s Confessions 
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We have seen thus far that there are a number of substantial aspects of 
Augustine’s ethics, as found in the COG, that support a eudaemonistic tradition. One 
more aspect is Augustine’s view of justice, which follows the classical philosophy that 
justice is a virtue, or a ‘habit of the soul,’53 whereby each individual is given her due.54 
One must love one’s neighbors in order to live justly and enable them to love themselves. 
Justice is understood as the ‘ordo amoris’ and expresses a series of right relationships which 
escalate in value in proportion to the order willed by God. In this context, Augustine 
defines justice as “love serving God alone and thus ruling well those things subject to 
human beings.”55 In the Christian sense, justice means to “stand in right relationship to 
God and, therefore, to obey God and his commandments,” and justice is transposable 
with love (caritas). “When Augustine says that true self-love is love of God, he is saying 
something not unlike what he means by the claim that God is man’s happiness. Both 
express the principle that duty and self-interest ultimately coincide.”56 The Romans’ 
weakness (infirmitas) to reason effectively only allows them to recognize that the happiness 
they seek depends upon the divine, but they do not know the name of the God of 
happiness, so they “turn Happiness into a god.”57 This flips the right order upside down. 
For Augustine, self-love can also have its sinful and negative effects. It is evil when 
the self is understood imperfectly and envisaged as independent apart from the universe.58 
What this means is that “true self-love, a self-love based on the true self-knowledge, must 
coincide with love-of-God because it involves a love of the whole of which self is 
understood to be part, the love of Being itself instead of love restricted to the self’s 
artificially individuated being.”59 Love follows knowledge, and right knowledge of the 
world brings right love: “A true knowledge of the universe brings with it love that is 
perfect in every respect.”60 Love must not lose its proper grasp of the order of things: first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Dodaro, Just Society, 4.“[T]he second comes to Augustine from the New Testament and Latin 
patristic writers and equates the virtue with the love which is due to God and to one's neighbour; the third 
sense follows logically from the second and is sometimes translated ‘righteousness'. It describes the Pauline 
notion of dikaiosune, the condition of the soul whereby it stands in a ‘right', because properly ordered, 
relationship with God, its Creator.” 
54 Augustine, COG, XIX.3. 
55 Dodaro, Just Society, 5. 
56 O’Donovan, Self-Love, 145. 
57 Dodaro, Just Society, 49. 
58 This will be discussed in Chapter 4 with regard to different kinds of friendships and loves. 
59 O’Donovan, Self-Love, 147; Dodaro, Just Society, 162. 
60 O’Donovan, Self-Love, 60; Self-love is not original sin, ibid., 105. 
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comes love of God, and then love of self. Disordered love puts second things first and first 
things second. “The obedient believer, by contrast, has a love that is perfectly ordered to 
the proportions of reality. He has the ‘perfect justice,’ which is ‘to love the greater objects 
more and the lesser less.’”61 
Aquinas demonstrates elements of Augustine’s self-love, even as he is commenting 
on Aristotle’s self-love. As we saw above, Aristotle makes a distinction between negative 
and positive self-love. Aquinas comments that the good self-love is different from the bad 
in two ways. First, on the part of activity, the good person loves herself in accordance with 
reason, while the person who loves herself in the negative way loves according to her 
passions. The second difference is in regard to motive, the good person who loves herself 
seeks the absolute good, not what is useful.62 But after commenting on Aristotle, Aquinas 
makes a connection with Augustine. As seen above, Augustine identifies good self-love 
with the love of God, thus declaring that no one can hate him or herself, and Aquinas 
believes that all operations of the will express the quest for beatitude. For both Augustine 
and Aquinas, all love is an operation of the will, and “can be explained in terms of the 
quest for beatitude—in that St. Thomas and St. Augustine are at one.”63 
Augustine’s theology played a significant part in the doctrinal development of the 
reformation.64 What we have established above is the relationship of ends and happiness 
in his thought, specifically in COG. What looking at Augustine along with Aquinas (which 
will be done in more detail throughout this research) allows for is a brief historical tracing 
of eudaemonism into the thought of sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans. We will 
continue to address, via de Lubac, this discussion of ends to see the overtones of Puritan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 O’Donovan, Self-Love, 64. 
62 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics,” trans. C. J. Litzinger, New edition 
of Revised edition (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 1873, p 568. 
63 O’Donovan, Self-Love, 146–8. O’Donovan notes that there are some differences between 
Augustine and Aquinas. He writes, “the whole Thomist construct of a natural tendency which, as much in 
its inchoate as in its achieved form, is at the same time love-of-God and love-of-self is left without an 
essential supporting pillar.” He also notes that “nowhere in Augustine’s pages do we see a classic 
‘psychological egoist’ argument” that is found in Aristotle and Aquinas. With that said, “Augustine and 
Thomas are both ‘eudaemonists,’ but there is a wide difference in the way that their eudaemonism is 
worked out.” Aquinas is concerned more with an analogy of being, while Augustine is concerned with the 
datum of revelation. 
64 For more on the importance of Augustine to the Reformation, see MacCulloch, Reformation, 
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eudaemonism. We thus begin to look at how the Puritans answer this question of nature 
and supernature. 
Natural Ends and Earthly Happiness 
The first question that we will attempt to address here is whether, for the Puritans, 
happiness is attainable in this life or if it is only in the afterlife that our telos is realized. We 
will begin this investigation by again looking to Augustine. We will see that, even with his 
high view of supernatural ends and ultimate blessedness, there is still a place in his ethics 
for an earthly, but lesser happiness. We will then begin investigating a number of 
sixteenth and seventeenth century English Puritans on the topic of the telos of human life 
and action. There will be some engagement with the Puritans and Aquinas, but a fuller 
description of Aquinas’ thinking on ends and happiness will be explored later, in the 
‘supernatural ends’ section of this chapter, as the supernatural is Aquinas’ primary focus. 
Augustine and Natural Ends.  
Augustine writes in COG book XIX, “when anyone reaches the Ultimate Good it 
immediately brings him happiness.”65 In Chapter 4, he continues to state that the 
Christian answer to the Ultimate Good and the Ultimate Evil is that “eternal life is the 
Supreme Good, and eternal death the Supreme Evil.”66 The peace that is an ‘ordered 
obedience in faith’ and happiness, are found only in God. We are saved in a hope 
through which “we have been made happy.” We do not enjoy a present happiness, but 
look forward to happiness in the future, looking forward ‘with steadfast endurance’67 to 
the Ultimate Good. Justice, which is caritas (love) and being in right relationship with 
God, “is only acquired gradually in this life, never completely, and the lack of its 
perfection in an individual must not be taken to indicate its absence altogether.”68 The 
Christian’s possession of peace is through faith, is theirs in this life and will be theirs 
forever through open vision. Many times in Chapter XIX Chapter 4, Augustine argues 
that “those who have supposed that the Ultimate Good and the Ultimate Evil are to be 
found in this life, placing the Supreme Good in the body, or in the soul, or in both…all 
these philosophers have wished, with amazing folly, to be happy here on earth and to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Augustine, COG, XIX.2; Ayres, Trinity, 278. 
66 Augustine, COG, XIX.4. 
67 Ibid. Also see XIX.13. 
68 Dodaro, Just Society, 76. 
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achieve bliss by their own efforts.” Peace here and now, “whether the peace shared by all 
men or our own special possession, is such that it affords a solace for our wretchedness 
rather than the joy of blessedness.”69 Even our genuine righteousness through virtue 
towards the ultimate good only consists in the forgiveness of sins rather than in the 
perfection of virtues.  
It sounds as if Augustine is here stating that there is no happiness outside of the 
obtaining of God himself. However, Augustine maintains that justice in this life exists 
when God rules and man obeys, or “when the mind rules and the body and reason 
governs the vices.”70 What Augustine is saying here is that if someone lives and sets their 
hearts on the next life, then they “may without absurdity be called happy even now, 
though rather by future hope than in present reality. Present reality without that hope is, 
to be sure, a false happiness.” This is the case because the present does “not bring into 
play the true food of the mind; since no wisdom is true wisdom if is not directed towards 
the ultimate state, which is God.”71 
 On de Lubac’s reading of Augustine and Aquinas, what has been formulated 
above concerning an incomplete but natural happiness is an acceptable reading. There is 
a natural happiness, or first perfection, which is an order of natural morality. However, 
earthly happiness should not be considered the same thing as the happiness only attained 
in the next life, but they should also not be too separate.72 We get a clear statement of this 
in Aquinas when he writes, “a certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: 
but perfect and true happiness cannot be had in this life.”73 De Lubac suggests a “link 
between the paradoxically necessary (for human nature) vertical supplement of grace and 
the paradoxically necessary (for human nature) horizontal supplement of culture (event 
and design).”74 Augustine and Aquinas allow for a natural morality. In this way, it is not 
impossible to conceive of a two-fold end. “It is not the ancient concept of natura pura, but 
the system which has grown up around it in modern theology and profoundly changed its 
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71 Ibid., XIX.20. 
72 de Lubac, Supernatural, 34–6. 
73 Aquinas, ST, I–II 5.3. 
74 Milbank, Suspended, 54. 
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meaning, which it seems to me could be set aside without any loss.”75 De Lubac cites 
Bonaventure in favor of this reading, stating that creation is two-fold: one aspect of which 
is in the being of nature, while the other is in the being of grace: “The first creation gives 
being to nature; the second gives being to grace.” God first created humanity on the earth 
so that he might be the second creation, which is the being of grace which also makes us 
good.76 It is of the utmost importance, however, that these two ends are not made so 
distinct that they become somehow separate. De Lubac writes, “if we begin by 
dissociating the two orders completely, in order to establish the existence of a natural 
order that could be fully and finally self-sufficient, we are all too likely to end up by seeing 
not so much a distinction as a complete divorce.” Thus the supernatural order “loses its 
unique splendor” and becomes a “shadow of that supposed natural order.”77 “Nobody 
can attain happiness in the present life,” but, if “anyone accepts the present life with firm 
hope of the afterlife,” they may be called happy even now.78 Jean Porter notes that there 
must be something to natural ends and not only to supernatural ends, or else we would 
not be a part of nature.79 
 We have seen in Augustine that there is some semblance of earthly happiness that 
can be achieved as long as the attempt to achieve earthly happiness does not replace the 
seeking of true and fulfilling happiness found in God. The above discussion opens up 
conceptual textures on the topic of ends by bringing out the sorts of distinctions that we 
will see in the Puritans, which are investigated below. We can now turn our attention to 
our target literature and see how it is that the tradition after Augustine drew upon this 
aspect of his ethics. 
Two-Fold End 
Aristotle’s investigation of the perfect life leads him to the conclusion that the final 
end of man is a life of contemplation. Anthony Kenny notes that under this “dominant, 
intellectualist interpretation” of Aristotle, “theoretic contemplation possesses all the 
qualities which, according to book I, were properties of happiness.”80 Given that there is 	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76 Ibid., 92. 
77 Ibid., 35. 
 78 Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” 211. 
79 Porter, Nature, 380; also see, Taylor, Secular Age, 44. 
80 Kenny, Perfect Life, 19; Annas, “Virtue and Happiness.” 
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quite a lot of debate as to whether Aristotle intended to have a ‘dominant’ conception of 
happiness (as Kenny has laid out), or an ‘inclusive’ one, meaning that happiness is made 
up of a number of separate ends, Aquinas and the Puritans seem to be interpreting 
Aristotle as describing a dominant position. There is only one ‘final end’ that is perfection 
and true happiness, and it is in the vision of God.81  
Aquinas, true to his Augustinian tradition, takes Aristotle a step further, arguing 
that the contemplative life is the beatific vision and that this life of pure contemplation 
can only be achieved in the afterlife. Aquinas calls the above distinction natural ends and 
supernatural ends.82 Natural ends, as we saw above, are a certain participation in 
happiness that can be had in this life, but not the perfect and true happiness that is 
brought about by the achievement of supernatural ends.83 Aquinas writes that “happiness 
is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the 
vision of God.” For natural ends [happiness], “the body is necessary.” He continues, 
stating that the “happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either 
speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a 
phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ.”84 This kind of happiness is connatural with 
the human person and is achievable without the help of divine grace, though it is an 
imperfect penultimate happiness.85 Aquinas states, “[i]mperfect happiness that can be had 
in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in 
whose operation it consists…but man’s perfect happiness,…consists in the vision of the 
Divine Essence.”86 So we can see that for Aquinas, imperfect happiness does not require 
grace as it does for Augustine. Supernatural happiness, or perfect happiness, is not 
attainable in this life.87 We are capable of it in the sense that we can “grasp with the mind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 An interesting difference between medievals, early moderns and Aristotle is that they are 
historical in a way that Aristotle is not. For these Christians, movement towards the good is a movement in 
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82 This concept is not absent in Aristotle, but is rather explored in more detail theologically by 
Aquinas. Aristotle, EN, 1101a19. 
83 Aquinas, ST, I–II 5.3. 
84 Ibid., I–II 4.5. 
85 Ibid., I–II 5.5, 7; 62.1; 63.3. Aquinas notes, “All virtues are in us by nature, according to 
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the universal and perfect good and will it,” but we are “incapable of achieving it.”88 The 
“glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with 
God.”89 It is only through God alone that man is “made happy, if we speak of perfect 
Happiness.”90 This kind of end, found in the beatific vision, “is not connatural to us, 
because it presupposes grace.” It is still imperfect because it is not the “perfect happiness 
of the beatific vision.” Even so, there is happiness apart from the beatific vision.91 These 
two ends should not be thought of as two separate ends; rather, one end is natural and the 
other supernatural. Aquinas writes of “a single end which is two-fold, which is realized at 
both a natural and a supernatural level.”92  
What we have seen in the tradition is that there is a place for natural ends, and 
these ends contribute to earthly happiness. But this is not the full picture. Christian 
eudaemonism affirms that natural ends are not the final ends of mankind, but rather the 
ultimate end is the supernatural end. Finally, the possibility for supernatural happiness is 
only attainable by the grace that is provided through Christ. We can now turn to the 
Puritans to see if these same themes and distinctions are made in their own thought. 
Puritans and Two-Fold Ends 
One of the essential aspects of Puritan ethics, like the tradition before them, is that 
all motivation for actions is directed towards an end. This will be addressed in more detail 
later in the chapter, but it has been generally agreed that the end that all humankind 
seeks is something akin to the concept of happiness used by ancients and medievals. That 
is to say, in Aristotelian terms, the Puritans were eudaemonistic. However, where 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas used the word ‘happiness’ (εὐδαιμονία, beatitudo) to 
represent the end (τέλος, finis) of action and human life, Puritans used a variety of terms 
including ‘happiness,’ ‘peaceable disposition’ or ‘rest.’93 Nevertheless, the teleological and 	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91 Porter, Nature, 157.  
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much more substantial and stable. With that said, the term ‘happiness’ will be used throughout this chapter 
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eudaemonistic underpinning remain consistent. Though different terms are being used to 
signify the telos, the same conceptual eudaemonistic framework is being utilized.94 
Happiness is akin to the perfection of our being, a perfection that represents an 
ontologically rich concept that involves the whole of a person, both body and soul. In 
happiness, we act and feel like humans are supposed to act and feel. It is important to 
emphasize that this happiness is a disposition that involves the possession of virtues. We 
will discuss the relationship between the virtues, happiness and the emotions later in 
Chapter 4. 
Drawing upon Milton’s Paradise Lost, Weber notes that there is an acceptance of a 
person’s task in this world as it relates to happiness that could not have “come from the 
pen of a medieval writer.”95 We have seen above that this is not necessarily the case. In 
Augustine and Aquinas, there is a potential for an imperfect earthly happiness. Weber is 
right, however, in noticing the above feature in the Puritans, and we will investigate this 
further here. This section will begin by showing that Puritans in sixteenth and 
seventeenth century England still had a strong teleological emphasis in the way they 
conceived natural life and right action. We will then begin to see that there was a strong 
account of natural ends that, if attained, would lead to some amount of happiness. We 
first start with identifying a teleological structure of action in sixteenth and seventeenth 
century England. 
Earthly Happiness 
Puritans were not only teleological in their view of ethics; many also agreed that 
there is a practical result from reaching a natural happiness. Aristotle and Aquinas 
thought that we could be deceived as to the goodness of a particular end,96 but that we as 
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by committing a ‘root fallacy’ that does not account for the change of words over time. I hope to show 
below that classical eudaemonist principles are in place in these Puritans regardless of the term they 
associate with the end; see Carl R. Trueman, “A Small Step Towards Rationalism: The Impact of The 
Metaphysics of Tommaso Campanella on the Theology of Richard Baxter,” in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays 
in Reassessment, ed. Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark (Cumbia: Paternoster Press, 1999), 181–95. 
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moral agents are incapable of not willing happiness.97 When we do any action, even a 
wrong action, we see it as a perceived good that will lead us down the path to flourishing. 
As we will see, this is something that the Puritans, and especially Richard Baxter, will also 
emphasize. 
For Aquinas, the desire for happiness is for the will to be satisfied in the end it has 
willed.98 We saw above that there is a certain participation in happiness that can be had 
in this life, but it is not the perfect and true happiness that we will speak of later in this 
chapter. Imperfect happiness can be acquired by man by his natural powers, but it can 
also be lost,99 unlike the happiness that consists in the vision of the divine essence.100 
Like Aquinas,101 some sixteenth century Puritans think that there is some amount 
of happiness that is achievable in this life. Richard Rogers notes that some people have 
happiness for only “an instant.”102 He also notes that there are times when God’s 
providence has people fall from happiness, but they can be lifted up to a happy and joyful 
state.103 This comment may refer to happiness in this life because we can fall from it and 
then get it back again. The final happiness in God cannot be taken away. Joy and 
happiness in this life are also signs of salvation.104 Robert Bolton’s Discourse about the State of 
True Happinesse begins like EN, with ends and explicitly uses the term ‘happiness’ as the 
end, as the medievalists do. We will see later that Bolton has a high place for the vision of 
God as the ultimate end, but he also wants to emphasize that the “godly man, may even 
flourish in this life.”105 Williams Perkins also sees that happiness can be achieved at some 
level here in this life. He writes in A Godly and Learned Exposition of Christs Sermon in the 
Mount, “that true happinesse before God, is ever injoyed, yea concerned many times, with 
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the crosse in this world.”106 Commenting on Matthew 5:3, where Jesus is discussing the 
poor in spirit inheriting the kingdom of heaven, Perkins describes the kingdom as an 
“estate of man” because God is the king who rules in this kingdom, and man obeys God 
as his subject. “This happie estate consists in Gods gracious ruling of man, and mans holy 
subjection unto God.” Few see this felicity, “but the truth is, mans whole felicity stands 
herein.”107 
Perkins believes that St. Paul teaches, in Romans 14.17, first that when God's 
spirit rules in a person, there is righteousness; second, that there is peace with God; and 
third, “the ioy of the holy Ghost, which [is all] unspeakable comforts, passing all worldly 
ioy whatsoever.” These three set out the state of a “happie man.”108 
 Interestingly, the emphasis on the two-fold end is more explicit and optimistic in 
the Puritan writings in the sixteenth century than in the seventeenth century. Richard 
Baxter does discuss a kind of ‘rest’ that is in this world, but he has a very low opinion of it, 
comparing it to the soldiers that rest in the midst of a battle and mariners that choose to 
make the sea their home.109 We get the sense from Baxter, in the precarious situations 
described, that the little bit of rest that is gotten in these cases is not rest at all. We will 
explore this aspect of Baxter in more detail later in this chapter. We will also see in more 
detail later in this chapter that John Owen too makes a distinction between natural and 
supernatural ends, but, like Baxter, he takes a more pessimistic perspective on this than 
the sixteenth century authors mentioned above do. What we have seen here are the 
beginnings of a discussion of the possibility of earthly happiness. More will be said on 
earthly happiness as it relates to the Christian as well as to those without grace in the 
chapters to come, as these themes relate to political flourishing and people’s vocations. It 
is here that we run into a problem. If one holds to a robust view of total depravity, how is 
it that one can reason good ends? We will look at the Puritan answer to this query next. 	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Reason and Total Depravity 
How is it the case that mankind, with reasoning faculties that do not function 
properly, fully comes to recognize good ends? With a strong sense of original sin, it would 
seem that our reason would fail us, and we would always direct our actions and affections 
to penultimate goods.110 
Within the western tradition, the concept of original sin is quite strong. Original 
sin, or more specifically total depravity, could cause problems for the concept of 
happiness laid out above, because it assumes that we are able to use our reason enough to 
decipher good ends and obtain earthly happiness. One of the strongest proponents of this 
position in history, John Calvin, defines original sin as “a hereditary depravity and 
corruption of our nature, diffused into all parts of the soul, which first makes us liable to 
God's wrath, then also brings forth in us those works which Scripture calls “works of the 
flesh” (Gal 5:19).”111 If sin has touched every part of our natural faculties, shouldn’t it 
have affected our reason as well? How can we say that the unregenerate person can use 
their natural reason to recognize and seek good ends? 
The answer to this conundrum is found by looking at the degree by which sin has 
affected each aspect of the human. The Christian concept of total depravity is not to be 
taken to mean that the sin of Adam has now made human nature as evil as possible. 
Rather, each of mankind’s natural faculties is touched by original guilt and thus do not 
function to their full capacity as they would with original righteousness. Despite our fallen 
state, which is corrupted by habits of vice,112 for Aquinas, our reason is able to have a 
“natural grasp of certain common principles which should direct our acts”113 and help us 
to discern good and evil.114 We are able to partake of eternal law, which is imprinted on 
us by way of knowledge and the inward principles that move us towards actions, however 
knowledge of the good is imperfect.115 The divine mind is not only able to be made 	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known to us by revelation, but also though reason.116 Calvin himself agrees with this 
understanding of total depravity with regard to reason. 
 
Since reason, therefore, by which man distinguishes between good and evil, and by which he 
understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be completely wiped out; but it was partly 
weakened and partly corrupted, so that its misshapen ruins appear.117 
 
Calvin is here stating that reason is only partly weakened by inherited guilt. 
Puritans similarly thought that the understanding is corrupted by original sin, 
which is embedded in our natures.118 Williams Perkins wrote that original sin is 
“corruption ingendered in our first conception, whereby every facultie of soule and bodie 
is prone and disposed to evill.”119 Perkins shows his similarities with Calvin (and 
Melanchthon) in that original sin has touched every aspect of the human person, but it 
only makes the person ‘prone’ to sin and not totally evil. “We see that sinne is not a 
corruption of mans substance, but onely of faculties: otherwise neither could mens soules 
be immortall, nor Christ take upon him mans nature.”120 The remnant of the image of 
God is still in the mind: 
 
…certaine notions concerning good and evill: as, that there is a God, and the same God punisheth 
transgressions: that there is an everlasting life: that we must reverence our superiours; and not 
harme our neighbors. But even these notions, they are both generall and corrupt, and have none 
upther use, but to bereave man of all excuse before Gods judgement.121 
 
Humankind received from Adam first, “ignorance, namely, a want, or rather a 
deprivation of knowledge in the things of God, whether they concerne his sincere 
worship, or essential happiness” (1 Cor. 2.14); second, “impotencie, where by the minde 
of it selfe is unable to understand spirituall things, though they be taught” (Luke 24.45); 
third, “[v]anitie, in that the minde thinketh falsehood truth, and truth falshood” (Eph 4.7, 
Prov. 14.12); and finally, “the natural inclination onely to conceive and devise the thing 
which is evil (Gen 6.5).”122 We can see here that Perkins is not taking original sin and its 	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effects lightly; there are severe consequences. However, Perkins, along with Aquinas and 
Calvin, is stating that the reason is not so far gone that it cannot reason about natural 
ends and goods. Perkins here seems to be well within his tradition with regard to the 
extent of Adam’s sin.123  
Baxter believed that “every good agrees with every nature.” He continues, stating 
“rest is suitable to the Saints Necessities also, as well as to their Natures and Desires.” 
Rest contains whatever the moral agent truly wanted: “not supplying them with gross 
created comforts, which now they are forced to make use of.” 124 What Baxter is stating 
here is that though we “have now a mixed nature,”125 one being sinful, the other not, we 
still seek out the natural desires towards fulfilling our nature’s end. Rest, however, is only 
suited to one of these natures. We are drawn to the vision of God just like every other 
creature seeks unity with God. As all things are made for God, humans are no exception; 
we were made to enjoy God. We will see later in the chapter that Owen does think that 
reason helps people to identify happiness in this life, but that this only comes if one 
possesses grace. 
For our purposes in this thesis, with regard to the Puritans, De Lubac notes that 
even in the sixteenth century there was no modern concept of “pure nature.”126 Perhaps 
the main concern of original sin is that man cannot achieve perfect righteousness without 
grace. Whether or not this is the case will be addressed further in the next section as well 
as in Chapter 4. 
What we have seen above is that there is within the Western Christian tradition 
that extends into the sixteenth century the possibility for a penultimate earthly happiness. 
But this is, in fact, an incomplete happiness and a penultimate end. True happiness, 
flourishing, rest and peace are found in the next life. We now take up this focus.  
Supernatural Ends 
The Puritans conceive of ends in quite the same two-fold manner as Aquinas. As 
seen above, there is an end and thus a happiness, that is achievable in this life, but the 	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ultimate end or good is found in the next life. As mentioned above, the term used by the 
Puritans to identify the end may vary from ‘happiness’ to ‘peace’ or ‘rest,’ but the same 
eudaemonistic structure is consistent in their thought. 
The influential Anglican priest and theologian Richard Hooker had a strong 
conception of ends in his Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, and he identifies these ends as 
happiness. For Hooker, God needs to be the final end that we seek, and pursuing any 
other end besides Him is evil. God is the only infinite end.127 Concerning happiness and 
perfection, Hooker writes, 
 
Happiness therefore is that estate whereby we attain, so far as possibly may be attained, the full 
possession of that which simply may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is 
to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sort of contention of our desires, that highest 
degree of perfection.128 
 
For Hooker, we may acquire perfection but are not capable of this perfection in this life. 
As A. J. Joyce notes, Hooker’s thought here is eudaemonistic and is consistent with 
Aristotelian and Thomist conceptions of happiness, ends, virtues and the good life.129 
Church of England Clergyman Thomas Playfere sees a teleological structure to 
delight and contentment and draws upon a conception of nature. Everything in life has a 
proper good that concerns its end. Playfere writes, “what a sweet friend is God our good 
friend which onely feedeth and filleth the heart? He only feedeth it in earth, & filleth it in 
heauen: feedeth it with grace, and filleth it with glorie.” By using the example of food, 
Playfere shows that the end of a thing is natural to it and that nothing can be satisfied with 
anything that is contrary to its created nature. “For everything have a kind of foode 
proper to it. Offer a lyon grasse, he will neuer eate it. Offer him flesh, he will eate it. Why 
so? Because that is unnaturall, this naturall to him….”130  
As we have seen above, Robert Bolton’s teleological structure of action and 
comfort ends in “matchlesse happinesse” and even in this life the godly man may 
“flourish” to a certain degree.131 Bolton is drawing upon the eudaemonistic tradition 
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when he speaks of natural, but penultimate ends. However, true happiness is for those 
whose sins have been forgiven. 
 
Full sweet is the comfort, and great the happinesse of that Christian, who hath his corruption so 
farre mortified, and the remission of his sinnes so surely sealed vnto him; that the thoughts of his 
former pleasing sinnes can neither tickle him with delight and new desire, nor affright him with 
horrour.132 
 
The end of the children of God, he writes, is something different; it is peace and endless 
happiness, “…God with whom alone is he higheft perfection of bliffe, and riuers of infinite 
pleafures…”133 Discussing the earthly struggle of the Christian, he writes, “this is the way, 
the race, and the euening in the world; but ioy comes in the morning, their end is peace, 
their reward is a bright morning starre, their haven is endlesse happinesse and life 
eternal.”134 As we have seen in Aquinas and Augustine, the happiness that Bolton is 
concerned with is different from the joys of profane men and ancient philosophers; it is 
not something that is fleeting, but is something that is being perfected. True happiness 
comes from the grace of God. It is the one who fears God and keeps his commandments 
who is truly happy. 
Concerning material possessions, Bolton argues that even if every possible gift 
were given to a person, they would still not be satisfied. Material possessions cannot get us 
into eternity. There are no material contentments in this life. Drawing on the young rich 
man in scripture, Bolton argues that riches do not make you happy.135 They die at our 
deaths. It is impossible that any absolute joy may be found in possessions. 
In Richard Baxter’s popular devotional classic The Saints Everlasting Rest, the main 
concept of rest is unapologetically Aristotelian and eudaemonistic.136 Baxter states, 
“happiness consists in obtaining [the End] where I mean the ultimate and principle end, 
not any end secundum quid so called, subordinate, or less principle.” This is not an end 
regarded in time, “but the end of Intention, which sets the Soul a-work, and is its prime 
Motive in all its Actions. That the chief enjoyment is this End.”137 This is what Baxter 	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claims the book is about. Happiness must consist in the obtaining of an end, not just the 
promise of it.138 Mankind is geared towards achieving an ultimate end; we are always in 
motion towards that end, and persons in motion seek rest. It is only in God that one finds 
true rest.139 It is “gross idolatry to make means our ends.”140 
Baxter uses Aristotle—the Philosopher—as a conversation partner to talk about 
the nature of happiness. Aristotle affirms these principles, and so does the Christian. 
Baxter believes that Aristotle fits, and is consistent with, Christian doctrine. These are 
principles that can be proved by reason. “That which is desired and sought for it self, is 
better than that which is desired for something else: or the End, as such, is better than all 
the means.” Baxter continues, stating that the “salvation of our souls, is the end of our 
Faith, our Hope, our Diligence, and all Mercies, of all Obediences, as before is proved: it 
is not for themselves, but for the Rest, that all these are desired and used.” All good 
moves towards perfection, and Christ is the means and end to that perfection and rest.141 
Baxter, who is well read in medieval scholastic theology and philosophy, 
resembles Aquinas in that he makes a distinction between natural ends and supernatural 
ends. We saw this above in the discussion of the precariousness of earthly rest for Baxter. 
But the real force of Baxter is that happiness is not in this life: it “is only in the full 
obtaining of our ultimate end: But that is not to be expected in this life; therefore, neither 
is Rest to be here expected.”142 Rest contains “a sweet and constant Action of all the 
Powers of the Soul and Body in the fruition of God.” Baxter calls rest 
 
[T]he estate of a Christian, (though Perfection consists in Action as the Philosopher thinks) to note 
both active and passive fruition, wherein a Christians blessedness lies, and the established 
continuance of both. Our Title will be perfect, and perfectly cleared; our selves, and so our 
capacity, perfected; our possession and security for its perpetuity, perfect; our Redemption from, 
perfect; our motion or Action in and upon him, perfect: And therefore our fruition of him, and 
consequently our happiness will then be Perfect.143 	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Baxter continues,  
 
Rest is [the end and perfection of motion.] The saint’s rest here in question is [The most happy 
estate of a Christian, having obtained the end of his course.] Or, It is the perfected endless fruition 
of God by the perfected Saints according to the measure of their Capacity, to which their souls arrive 
at Death: and both soul and body most fully after the Resurrection and final judgement.144 
 
As shown above in our discussion of Aquinas, there are perceived ends and goods 
that do not satisfy. Baxter agrees: “[a]n End toward which he moveth for Rest: Which 
End must be sufficient for his Rest; elses when ‘tis ordained, it deceiveth him.” There is a 
distance for this end, “else there can be no motion toward it.” This distance is because of 
the fall. We saw above that sin did not take away our full being (or ‘natures’ as Baxter put 
it earlier), or our motion, but our well-being and our rectitude of motion.145 The rational 
moral agent is constantly in motion towards a perceived end. Baxter writes: 
 
Here is presupposed the Knowledge of the true ultimate End, and its excellency; and a serious 
intending it. For the Motion of the rational creature proceedeth: An unknown End, is no End, it is 
a Contradiction. We cannot make that our End, which we know not: not that our chief End which 
we know not, or judge not to be the chief good.146 
 
What Baxter is communicating here is that it is impossible for one to have motion if the 
intended end is not decided on. It is a contradiction to say that one seeks an end without 
knowing what end it is that is being sought. It is at this point, for Baxter, that we discover 
the distance to our true end.147 
  God is the superior moving cause towards the chief end. Like previous 
eudaemonists, Baxter conceives of God as the “first mover.”148 God first moves in a 
person by giving her life thus qualifying her to move herself in subordination to the first 
mover.149 The rational creature freely moves towards its desired end, and if one is not in 
motion towards his or her rest, they “loose… heaven.”150 He writes, “[l]ook to your 
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hearts and duties (in which God is already with assisting grace), and he will see that you 
lose not the reward.”151 
As we can see, rest in heaven is related to conceptions of becoming perfect agents 
based on natural capacities. Baxter writes elsewhere, “the ungodly in their loss of Heaven, 
do lose all that glorious personal perfection, which People of God there do enjoy,” and 
talks of the blessed partake of “Moral Perfection.”152 Not only is imperfection removed, 
but we also receive our purified natures. Our spiritual bodies undergo an ontological 
change that does not resemble that of the previous body. We do not have the same 
dependencies that we used to. Our natural capacities grow (e.g. passions), and so does our 
enjoyment of happiness.153 “Therefore will God, as a special part of his saints Happiness, 
perfect themselves as well as their conditions.”154 
Our happiness and perfection are first by faith in Christ, and then by our 
actions.155 The “ultimate end” after all the “means” is rest.156 “Much less shall there be 
any need of labouring for the inferiour ends, as here we do; seeing they will all devolve 
themselves into the Ocean of the Ultimate End, and the lesser good be wholly swallowed 
up in greatness.”157 “The excellencies of this rest is this; as it will be reasonable, so a 
suitable rest: suited, 1. To the Natures, 2. To the desires. 3. To the necessities of the 
Saints.” Our rest will be “absolutely Perfect and Compleat; and this both in the Sincerity 
and Universality of it.”158 
 With regard to Christ and the ultimate end, Baxter writes: 
 
...the ultimate end is necessarily the first intended; and the Divine Essence is principally the 
ultimate end; yet not excluding the humane Nature in the Second Person; But Christ as Mediator 
in the way to that end; and throughout the Gospel is offered to us in such terms, as import his 
being the means of making us happy in God.159 
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In SER, the beginning of Part III is about happiness, and how those without Christ do not 
have it and will not have it. Christ is mediator; he is not the end but the means to an end, 
which is God. Christ is not the Ultimate end, “[for] the end is still supposed and implyed, 
when we determine of the Means; and the Means confirm, not deny the excellency and 
necessity of the end.”160 “Every Soul that hath Title to this Rest, doth place his chiefest 
happiness in it, and make it the chief and ultimate End of his Soul.”161 As the unsaved 
lose God, “so they lose all those spiritual delightful Affections and Actions, by which the 
Blessed do feed on God.”162 We have alluded to the nature of this ultimate end. More will 
be said as to the specifics of the Thomistic and Puritan supernatural happiness in the 
section on meditation on contemplation in the next chapter.163  
John Owen also conceived of human nature and ethics as teleological.164 The 
desire for the final good is part of being human.165 In Owen’s Of Communion with God, he 
writes that “the souls of men do naturaly seek something to rest and repose themselves 
upon, something to satiate and delight themselves with all, with which they hold 
communion,”166 communion being, among other things, dispositions and actions towards 
a good (God) or evil, sinful, object.167 In opposition to the end of sin, which is the 
dishonor of God, “in The Lord Jesus there is the manifestation of another, and more 
Glorious end,” the praise of God's glorious Grace in the pardon, forgiveness and 
acceptance of it.168 It is reasonable to think that when he states that learning and 
prudence without Christ are "insufficient for compassing and obtaining of those particular 
ends whereunto they are designed,” he has the ancients in mind. Learning and Prudence, 
Owen argues, do not get people to the wisdom that is their true end.169 Owen also states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Ibid., 421. 
161 Ibid., 406, 407. 
 162 Ibid., 274. 
163 For More on Happiness as supernatural end see, Baxter, CD, 10; 17; 18; 54; 81. 
164 For Owen God himself has an end, the “advancement of his own Glory.” Owen, Comm., 147. 
165 See, Terence Irwin, “The Metaphysics and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Essays 
on Aristotle, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 45. 
166 Owen, Comm. 67. When Owen says “natural,” he does not mean, “the light of which he speaks 
was a necessary, structural part of being human, but he argues that it can be called natural because it relates 
to the original righteousness which Adam possessed and the end for which he was designed.” Trueman, 
John Owen, 2007, 69. 
167 Owen, Comm., 4. 
168 Ibid., 67; 133; 201. 
169 Ibid., 148. 
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that the end in respect to our lives “is three-fold, honour, peace, usefulness,” which 
Aristotle associates with the goods of politics.170 
Obedience, for Owen, is a relationship between means and ends. He notes that 
the incarnation was a means to an end: God’s glory and our salvation. If you take away 
the end, Christ’s death and obedience, then you destroy the means, or in other words, the 
incarnation. The end of our obedience in respect to God “is his glory and honour.”171 
Furthermore, the “two ends that Christ sends his spirit to us” are, “Sanctification” and 
“Consolation.”172 Owen argues that Psalm 116.7 is David’s statement that God is the 
ultimate end and our delight. “[David] makes God his rest; that is, he in whom his soul 
doth rest, without seeking further, for a more suitable and desirable Object.”173  
We have seen above that Owen is also very teleological with regard to the moral 
life. Owen also continues within the mediaeval tradition of making a distinction between 
natural and supernatural ends.174 For Owen, union with God is two-fold in that God 
receives from us and we receive from him a two-fold union. (1) Of supernatural ends we 
receive from him “perfect and compleat, the full fruition of his Glory, and total giving up 
of our selves to him, resting in him, as our utmost end, which we shall enjoy when we see 
him as he is.” And, of natural ends, he writes (2) they are “[i]nitial and incompleat, in the 
first fruits and drawing of that Perfection, which we have here in Grace, which only shall 
handle.”175 Owen also writes that we are: 
 
…creatures, made for supernatural and Eternal ends, and bound to answer the whole mind and 
will of God in Obedience required at their hands Now it bring before discovered to them, that 
both these are beyond the compas of their own endeavors, and the assistance which they have 
formerly rested on, if their eternal condition be of an concernment to them, their wisdom is to find 
out a righteousnes that may answer both these to the utmost.176 
 
Here Owen is saying, as mentioned earlier, and in disagreement with some Christian 
theologians and philosophers, that both natural and supernatural ends need the assistance 
of grace in order to come to fruition. “Thus the knowledge of our selves in reference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Ibid., 251; Aristotle, EN, honor is the end of the political life, 1095a23, 1095b33; peace, 
1177b5; useful, 1155b33, 1143b28. 
171 Owen, Comm., 221; 250. 
172 Ibid., 201. 
173 Ibid., 30. 
174 Owen did not try to change the Patristics and Mediaevals. See, Trueman, John Owen, 2007. 
175 Owen, Comm., 6. 
176 Ibid., 137. 
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our supernatural end, is small portion of our Wisdom.”177 Wisdom is required in order for 
one to be righteous and to satisfy both ends, and true wisdom leads to supernatural 
ends.178 Knowledge of ourselves with reference to our “supernatural end” is to use 
wisdom to attain the five requirements so that we can walk together with God: “1. 
Agreements, 2. Acquaintance, 3. Strength, 4. Boldness, 5. An aiming at the End. And all 
these with the Wisdom of them, are hid in The Lord Jesus.”179  
God “from Eternity” lay “in his own bosom a design for our happiness.”180 Being 
in communion with him brings about this happiness that God has laid out. “Communion 
is, the mutual communication of such good things as wherein the Persons holding that 
Communion are delighted, bottomed upon some Union between them.”181 The complete 
communion “with [God] herein, holds some Analogie with his Love in this; for it is a 
Love also of rest and Delight.” Owen believes that “Adam’s righteousness in creation is 
natural, not supernatural,” yet righteousness is “more than an essential property of 
human nature.” Adam’s “natural endowments were not adequate” to achieve 
supernatural ends.”182 
Reason and prudence outside of Christ is “darkness and folly.” Owen believes that 
Paul, in his letter to the Romans, says, “all of these became fools.” These philosophers 
who were deemed to be happy were fools because they were not with Christ.183 Here we 
see Owen in agreement with the ancients with regard to the idea that wisdom and 
prudence are necessary for happiness. Owen simply takes it a step further, stating that the 
wisdom required for happiness is only found in Christ. 
Conclusion 
Though there are many different ways in which these thinkers analyze and put 
into practice eudaemonistic concepts and principles, there are still two massive 
continuities, natural and supernatural ends. Whether a thinker conceives of happiness as 
part of our terrestrial natures, which can be known and perused by reason without grace, or, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Ibid., 140. 
178 Ibid., 124. 
179 Ibid., 141; 147, emphasis mine. 
180 Ibid., 40. 
181 Ibid., 5, emphasis Mine. Owens is citing Romans 1:21-2. 
182 Trueman, John Owen, 2007, 70. 
183 Owen, Comm., 150. 
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according to the other extreme view represented by Owen that happiness is not 
achievable in this life and is a product of God’s working, the distinction still stands. There 
is a two-fold end, and these two ends equate to something like the ancient model of 
happiness. 
So, what does Puritan eudaemonism look like? Firstly, there is a place for natural 
ends, and these ends contribute to earthly happiness. These natural ends allow for there 
to be a universal human ethic based on natures that extend beyond the realm of faith. I 
have not gone so far at this point to say whether or not grace is needed to enjoy some 
modicum of happiness in this life, but I will affirm that grace is certainly a significant 
contributor to achieving this end. I will say more about this in Chapters 4 and 5, but it is 
awkward to suppose that those without grace who find enjoyment and fulfillment in their 
work and family, for example, are not experiencing something of a natural happiness.184 
However, the eudaemonist can affirm, along with Baxter, that natural rest is a 
significantly diminished rest from the attaining of the final and supernatural rest that is 
conducive to our created natures. This leads to my next point of observation. 
Secondly, what we can affirm about eudaemonism in the Puritans thus far is that 
natural ends are not the final ends of mankind. The ultimate end is the supernatural. The 
happiness that is found in our work and our station in life is not the ultimate happiness. It 
is not the happiness that directly corresponds to our created nature. That is only found in 
the next life in the vision of God.  
Thirdly, the possibility for supernatural happiness is only attainable by the grace 
that is provided through Christ. There is a natural, ontologically rich good in which we 
can base our lives and actions here in this world, but this is not the whole story. In order 
for one to reach their full human potential, one must be seeking God. When we make 
something besides the Son of God our end, we will inevitably become unhappy.185 In the 
next chapter, we will further investigate the relationship of earthly and eternal happiness 
in the terms of theoria and praxis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 See, Nigel Biggar, “God in Public Reason,” Studies in Christian Ethics 19 (2006): 9–19. 
 185 Helpful discussion of this is provided by Timothy Keller, King’s Cross: The Story of the World in the 
Life of Jesus (New York: Dutton Adult, 2011), 30. 
 Chapter 3 
Theoria vs. Praxis 
 
Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking that makes what we read our. John Locke 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we began to grasp the shape of the Puritan notion of the 
perfection and happiness of humanity. We also began to get a glimpse of what happiness 
looks like in particular: the supernatural end as the vision of the divine essence. This 
chapter picks up from the discussion of supernatural ends and the form this takes for the 
Puritans. It also begins our investigation into the relationship between eudaemonism in 
the Puritans and the doctrine of calling with special emphasis on a theology of work.1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There have been a number of interesting studies on theology and work. For examples see, 
Miroslav Volf, Work In the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work (New York: OUP, 1991); Darrell Cosden, A 
Theology of Work: Work and the New Creation (Waynesboro: Paternoster, 2004); John Hughes, The End of Work: 
Theological Critiques of Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007); Armand E. Larive, After Sunday: A 
Theology of Work (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2004). Generally though, theology of 
work is an overlooked topic within theology. Most of these studies do not give this topic scholarly attention 
and keep the discussion at a popular level making sweeping claims about the history of work, see for 
example, Hugh Whelchel, How Then Should We Work? Rediscovering the Biblical Doctrine of Work (Bloomington: 
WestBowPress, 2012); Lee Hardy, The Fabric of This World: Inquiries Into Calling, Career Choice, and the Design of 
Human Work (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990); Douglas James Schuurman, Vocation: Discerning Our Callings in 
Life (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2004); R. Paul Stevens and Alvin Ung, Taking Your Soul to 
Work: Overcoming the Nine Deadly Sins of the Workplace (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans Publishing Co, 
2010). There are, however, a few bright spots in the literature that looks at work. From the perspective of 
the social sciences, Robert Jackall’s fascinating book Moral Mazes looks at the ethics and decision making of 
managers in corporate bureaucracies, which is related to Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil, and people’s 
“proper” roles within a system, while remaining blind to moral consequences, see Robert Jackall, Moral 
Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (New York: OUP, 1988); Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1994). These texts however are more descriptive of 
moral problems in the workplace and in social groups than prescriptive or constructive, and are not chiefly 
theological. 
 Theological texts on work that discuss happiness are typically concerned with a more emotive or 
utilitarian interpretation of the term rather than the full-bodied metaphysically rich flourishing proposed by 
ancient, medieval and early modern eudaemonists. The use of language like well-being, flourishing and 
happiness, in the words of Patrick Riordan, “is capable of serving the distinctive methodological purposes of 
the relevant disciplines, from economics to theology, while at the same time being open to the 
considerations raised from other perspectives,” see Patrick Riordan, “Human Happiness as a Common 
Good,” in The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing, ed. Ian Steedman, John R 
Atherton, and Elaine Graham (Taylor & Francis, 2010), 2008; Also see Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons 
from a New Science (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).  
There has also been a growing interest in theology of work in the wake of liberation theology that 
leans on the discussion of Marxism in anthropology, meaning that work is internally related to the worker. 
The result of the work affects the worker, thus the work that one produces defines the one doing the work. 
Work for the liberation theologian is an impersonal commodity like tools, see Jose ́ Mi ́guez Bonino, Doing 
Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); But, just like Volf, these theologians 
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Our first task is to answer the question, what is the relationship between earthly 
and supernatural happiness and being rational animals? In order to answer this question, 
we will look at what it meant for the Puritans to be rational animals, by showing that the 
Puritans adopt an Aristotelian conception of a tripartite soul. Showing the relationship 
between reason and work brings to light another potent historical and theological tension. 
If we are rational animals and find our happiness in being rational in contemplation, as 
Aristotle and Aquinas agree, what then is the relationship between study (doing theology 
and philosophy) and our daily work? To go even further, what is the relationship between 
contemplation and work as it relates to supernatural ends in the next life? Should a 
person in this life spend their time in study, meditating on scripture and nature as a 
means of character development, or serving one’s neighbor through one’s vocation? In 
order to answer these queries, a number of topics will need to be addressed. As we will see 
here, the Christian tradition before the reformation, drawing upon Greek thought, 
answers this question by subordinating the vita activa to the vita contemplativa. After the 
reformation, through to post-enlightenment thought, the opposite was emphasized.2 
In this chapter, we will also investigate how the Puritans attempt to hold together 
these two forms of life: the life of theoria and the life of praxis. Like Aristotle and Aquinas 
before them, the Puritans put high value on meditation and the contemplation of divine 
things. However, they also place high, if not higher, value on a political life of serving 
one’s neighbor through work. This chapter will look at some of the continuities and 
discontinuities between earlier eudaemonists and the Puritans with regard to a life of 
contemplation and the active life. 
This chapter presents an argument, through the Puritans, that there needs to be 
an appropriate moderation of theoria and praxis. I will show that the ultimate end, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
throw out the tradition in order to construct new perspectives. There are other Catholic, more 
traditionalist, perspectives on work that will be addressed later in this thesis such as Compendium of Catholic 
Social Teaching, as well as John Paul II’s influential encyclical Laborem Exercens, see John Paul II, “Laborem 
Exercens” (Catholic Truth Society, London, 1981); This thesis will not be able to discuss how it is that work 
develops person’s moral dispositions. For more on development in the workplace see, Malcolm Brown, 
“Happiness Isn’t Working, but It Should Be,” in The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and 
Wellbeing, ed. Ian Steedman, John R Atherton, and Elaine Graham (Taylor & Francis, 2010). 
2 Weber, Protestant Ethic, 80; Larive, After Sunday, 23–4; Miroslav Volf, Work In the Spirit: Toward a 
Theology of Work (New York: OUP, 1991), 70; Herbert A. Applebaum, The Concept of Work: Ancient, Medieval, 
and Modern (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 324; Thomas, Ends of Life, 10. 
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supernatural happiness, is, at the fundamental level, related to reason in that to see God is 
to contemplate him. This should be emphasized in Christian belief and practice. Also, 
being rational animals requires something of us in this life: a moral development that 
comes with theology and with doing intense thinking on philosophy or on the nature of 
God’s creation. Finally, being rational animals and being in this world do not conflict 
with our daily work and activity. Here we begin a discussion that will be taken up further 
in Chapter 5: there is a certain amount of earthly happiness that is obtained through our 
vocations. 
In the first section of this chapter, I will show that the Puritans adopt a view of the 
tripartite soul from the Greek and medieval tradition. The Puritans, like their 
predecessors, emphasized reason as mankind’s highest distinctive feature and valued it 
higher than the senses. From here, we will continue to look at how reason relates to the 
supernatural end. We will do this first by looking at Aristotle and Aquinas’ views on 
contemplation, pointing out some of Aquinas’ modifications on the subject. We will then 
trace these Thomist modifications into Puritan thought by looking at the conceptual 
similarities between sacra doctrina and meditation. 
I will then look at the Puritan conceptions of contemplation in previous Christian 
thought. What we will see is that the Puritans have strong views about the use of reason in 
this life. This of course brings out the tension that I drew attention to above. In order to 
answer this query, we will look at how the Puritans attempt to ease said tension between 
two ideal lives based on theoria and praxis. 
Reason and the Soul 
This section will begin an ongoing discussion of human beings as rational animals, 
a theme that will be picked up again in the following chapter. We will see here that an 
important component of Aristotle’s eudaemonism is the attention he gives to humanity’s 
rational faculties, more specifically the intellectual virtues alongside the moral virtues that 
are related to the right ordering of the passions by the reason. This also will be addressed 
at length in the chapter to come. For our purposes here, to show how reason affects the 
whole of the person in this life and in the next, we must look at how the Puritans adopt 
the tripartite soul from earlier eudaemonists. 
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 For Aristotle, a soul is made up of, first, “nutrition and reproduction.” The 
“nutritive soul,” as Aristotle calls it, is in all living things and is the “most primitive and 
widely distributed power of soul.” Self-nutrition is the “only psychic power that plants 
possess.” The acts in which the nutritive soul manifests itself are “reproduction and the 
use of food.” Aristotle takes a very theological perspective regarding this part of the soul, 
stating that this is the way in which the natural agent may “partake of the eternal and 
divine,” which is the goal towards which all things strive.3 
Sixteenth century English Catholic theologian Thomas Wright adopts the 
Aristotelian structure of the soul when he states that there is a “triple appetite, natural, 
sensitive, rational.” He continues, noting that the natural appetite is “found in plants and 
elements,” and the natural is also “in beasts and men.”4 Popular preacher and bishop of 
Norwich Edward Reynolds similarly states in TPFS that the “externall” or nutritive 
vegetable soul is “common to Beasts, Men, and Plants,”5 and is the “peremptorie and 
uniforme order” in the agent’s natural course, “governed by an immutable, most wise, 
and most constant Law, proceeding form the Will” in which there is no change.6 
Sensitive Soul 
Before discussing the second part of the soul, it is important that a definition of 
passions is given. Once a proper characterization is specified, it will be easier to discuss 
how it is that rational animals properly use the passions. This will be important for our 
discussion of meditation here as well as in the following chapter on the virtues. 
The sensitive passions, as Reynolds portrays them, are thoroughly Aristotelian. 
For Aristotle, it is sensual desire, not sensual as in sexual but as in appetites (ἐπιθυμία) to 
which Aristotle attributes anger, fear and confidence and that which moves an animal.7 It 
is the sensitive part, which is in all animals, that gives movement. Local movement “is 
always for an end” and, because of this, cannot be in the nutritive part. Plants are 
deficient in this kind of movement because they lack “imagination” and do not have the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Aristotle, DA, 415a23–30, 413a32–35.   
4 Wright, PM, 12. 
5 Reynolds, TPFS, 61–2. 
6 Ibid., 33. 
7 Aristotle, EN, 1105b21; Aristotle, DA, 433b13; Robert C. Roberts, “Emotions Among the Virtues 
of the Christian Life,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 20, no. 1 (April 1, 1992): 41. 
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“organs necessary for carrying this out.”8 Local movement must issue in both the 
practical thought and the appetite. However, “thought is never found producing 
movement without appetite” and “appetite can originate movement contrary to 
calculation, for desire is a form of appetite.” As will be seen later in this chapter in the 
discussion of meditation, the thing that is the object of the ‘appetite’ for the rational animal 
is the “stimulant of practical thought,” which may be a real or apparent good.9 
Reynolds defines Passion as follows: 
 
…those naturall perfective, and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of 
their Natures, which they are by the Wisdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their 
own severall spheres, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a 
regular inclination to those objects, whose goodnesse beareth a naturall convenience to Vertue of 
satisfaction unto them, or by an antipathie to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and 
destructive, and by consequent, odious to their natures.10 
 
The passions are perfective motions of an agent towards natural ends that were put in the 
agent by the providence of God according to the capacities of the agent’s natural desires. 
Desire or distaste for a thing either encourages us towards or moves us away from certain 
ends. Reynolds notes, “the root and ground of all passions is principally the good; and 
secondly, or by consequent, the evill things.”11 Robert C. Roberts writes that, “while 
emotions can be morally evaluative in themselves, many can also be evaluative as 
producers of actions.” An emotion such as compassion “has moral significance in virtue 
of motivating compassionate actions.”12 The idea of having a specific ‘object’ that moves 
a moral agent is quite prominent among sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans. 
Passions having an object can have a number of senses. Martha Nussbaum gives a 
number of helpful examples of how passions can have an object. First, for emotions to be 
“about something, they [need to] have an object.” Having fear must come from something 
of which someone is scared. Second, “the object is an intentional object” because the 
emotion is “seen or interpreted by the person whose emotion it is.” Emotions are not 
merely about their objects, but the aboutness is a way of seeing. Third, beyond being a way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Aristotle, DA, 432b15–6. 
9 Ibid., 433a16–26. Rational animals share with non-rational animals both imagination and 
appetite. However for the rational animal, when calculating the means to a particular end not only uses 
‘appetite,’ but also ‘thought.’  
10 Reynolds, TPFS, 31–2, Italics mine. 
11 Ibid., 32. 
12 Roberts, “Emotions Among the Virtues,” 38. 
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of seeing the object, emotions also entail beliefs about the object. One must believe that 
“bad events are impending.” Finally, there must be a particular sort of value given to the 
object.13 
Reynolds describes the passions as “those motions of Perfections or flight, which 
are grounded on the Fancie, Memory, and Apprehensions of the common sense: which 
we see in brute beasts; as, in the feare of Hares and Sheepe, the fiercenesse of Wolves, 
and anger or flatterie of Dogs, and the like,” which are the “impulsions of Nature.”14 It is 
also important to note that Reynolds’ definition of passion is similar to Aristotle, in that 
we see the same passions that motivate: “feare” and “anger.” 
We can also see similar aspects of the Aristotelian definition in Thomas Wright. In 
his PM, he writes that passions “are internal acts or operations” of the “sensitive power, 
or facultie of our soul,” through the “imagination of some good or ill thing.” They are 
called affections because “they affect some good or bad.” Passions must follow either the 
sense or the reason.  
Church of England clergyman and writer William Fenner is generally happy using 
the ancient schema for the passions, but is notably more Platonic than Aristotelian.15 In 
agreement with ancients generally, Fenner gives a eudaemonistic conception of the 
emotions, stating that every creature seeks out its own good, and our affections give us 
signs into our true happiness.16 The affections are the forcible and sensible motions of the 
heart, or the will, to an end, according to whether it is apprehended “to bee good or to 
bee evill.”17 The affections are the “feet,” the “wings,” the “inclinations,” the “passions” 
and the “perturbations” of the soul.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Martha Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance,” in What Is Emotion?,, ed. 
Robert C. Solomon, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 275–6. See also, King, Peter. 
“Aquinas on the Passions.” In Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, edited by 
Scott MacDonald and Eleanor Stump, 101-32. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. The idea of the 
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of the rebuttles with regard to the object and emotions, see Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language 
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14 Reynolds, TPFS, 37–8. 
15 See Plato, The Republic, trans. H. D. P. Lee and Desmond Lee, 3rd edition (London: Penguin 
Classics, 2007), Bk IV. 
16 Fenner, TA, 1. 
17 Ibid., 29. 
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Just as the affections are in the forcible motions of the will, they are also in the 
sensitive appetite. Where Aristotle and scholastics would situate the affections only in the 
sensitive appetite, Fenner places them in both the sensitive and rational. He writes: 
 
As the affections are motions, so they are the motions of the will. I know Aristotle and most 
Divines too, doe place the affections in the sensitive part of the soule, and not in the will, because 
they are to be seene in the beasts. But this cannot be so, for a mans affections doe most stirre at a 
shame or disgrace; which could not bee, if the affections were in the unreasonable sensitive part: 
the unreasonable sensitive part of a man is not sensible of credit or offense...the affections must 
needs be in the heart: the scripture places that affections in the heart or the will.19 
 
For Aristotle, Fenner notes, the “virtues are nothing more than the right ruling of the 
affections,” but Fenner writes, “with little alteration,” the “ruling of the affections” is the 
main “worke of grace.” Thus grace rules the affections.20 This slight change in Fenner 
towards a necessity of grace, though a move away from the ancients themselves, puts him 
closer to Aquinas. We will see the details of this more clearly in the following chapter. 
What we have seen above is that Reynolds’, Wright’s and Fenner’s definitions of the 
passions have all of these aspects that are also found in the ancient’s as to why local 
movement is in, or at least starts with, the sensitive appetite.  
Rational Soul 
Aristotle writes that it is in the possession of sensation that we call living things 
animals.21 Reynolds, agreeing with Aristotle, states that the sensitive appetite is “common 
to Men and Beasts.”22 However, in humans it is ordained to proceed naturally from the 
government of Reason; and therefore may properly be called an “Humane Appetite, as 
being determined, restrained, and made conformable unto Mans Nature.”23 
Rational Passions are not simply “acts of reason” or “immaterial motions of the 
soul” but are a “participation and dependence by reason of their immediate 
subordination in man unto the government of the Will and Understanding, and not 
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20 Ibid., 53–4. 
21 A.A. Howsepian, “Sin and Psychosis,” in Limning the Psyche, ed. Robert C. Roberts and Mark R 
Talbot (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 274–5. 
22 Reynolds, TPFS, 62. 
23 Ibid.; Aristotle, DA, 415a7–12. 
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barely of the Fancie, as in other creatures.”24 As for calling these governed passions 
reasonable, he writes that he has Aristotle on his side:  
 
…who, though the sensitive Appetite in man be of it selfe unreasonable, (and therefore by him 
contradivided to the Rationall powers of the Soule) yet by reason of that obedience which it oweth 
to the Dictates of the understanding, whereunto Nature hath ordain’d it to be subject and 
conformable (thought Corruption have much slackened and unknit that Bond) hee justly affirmeth 
it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie, not in trinisically in it selfe, but by way of participation 
and influence from Reason.25 
 
The sensitive soul in a person is in a sense reasonable, but it is still obedient to the dictates 
of the understanding. The principal acts of the human soul are either reason or discourse, 
which proceed from his understanding, of which imagination is an assistant: or “of Action 
and Morality, from his Will.” These capacities proceed from the physical organs and 
“faculties of the body.”26 It is in the soul that God “fastened a perfect knowledg of his 
Law and Will.” 
Though “most kindes of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertility” and 
many animals “have greater activity and exquisitenesse in their senses than wee,” the 
“reason therefore is, because Nature ayming at a superior and more excellent end, is in 
those lower faculties lesse intent and elaborate.” Reynolds takes David in Psalm 139 to be 
saying that these lower faculties are the groundwork “for the better notice of mans greater 
perfections, which have ever some connexion and dependance on them” and are 
instrumental to humankind’s happiness.27 Baxter, as well, writes that humans are 
animated with an “invisible rational soul,” and that reason is what sets us apart from 
other animals.28 All spiritual knowledge passes into the affections.29 Now that we have 
shown that the Puritans, with few exceptions, adopt an Aristotelian tripartite soul, we can 
continue on to show how reason relates to the entirety of a person. We will do this first by 
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28 Baxter, SER, 115; 421. 
29 Ibid., 121; The three parts of the soul was even an aspect of philosophy that Calvin found 
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relating reason to the supernatural end, that is, happiness found only in the vision of God 
in the next life. 
Theoria 
To this end we will look at four elements of contemplation and show the 
similarities from Aristotle through to Christian theology and into the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. These criteria are drawn from Thomas Bénatouïl and Maura 
Bonazzi. 
The first criterion is “an ethical justification of the superiority of knowledge over 
other human activities.” The thinkers investigated here follow a long tradition of 
advocating a life in search of understanding. The second criterion is a “psychological and 
epistemological elucidation of contemplation, assigning it to a separable and immortal 
faculty, νοῦς.” This distinguishes understanding as the highest faculty from other, lower 
faculties like “sensation, opinion, experience, practical reason, etc.” In the third criterion 
the entities contemplated must be ontologically and cosmologically superior divine beings, 
“which are both objects of knowledge and models to be imitated.” The fourth criterion is 
that there must be an analogy between the intellectual activity “defined by the first three 
aspects and the witnessing of a religious and cultural spectacle or festival.”30 This fourth 
criterion will not be discussed at length here, but will be investigated further in Chapters 5 
and 6. We begin our investigation of the first three criteria with Aristotle. 
Aristotle on Contemplation 
The number of words dedicated to debating the relationship between eudaemonia 
and the contemplative life in Aristotle’s thought is nothing short of astounding, generally 
putting scholars in two categories: inclusive or dominant. The ‘inclusive’ view holds that 
happiness includes a number of goods, whereas the ‘dominant’ view argues that 
happiness consists of only one thing. It is not my intention to add to this ongoing 
discussion. However, it is the case that the Christian tradition has been adequately clear 
in its interpretation of this controversial aspect of ‘the Philosopher’s’ thought, reading 
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Aristotle as holding the ‘dominant’ view. For our historical purposes here, we will assume 
this position for the rest of this research.31 
Aristotle famously begins The Metaphysics with the statement that “all men desire to 
know.”32 It is a natural part of humanity to develop our rational faculties, “and if we do 
not, then we might be living men, but we are not living as men; we might enjoy ourselves 
while living, without enjoying living.”33 The best possible life for a human is to do 
specifically human kinds of things. Based on Aristotle’s tripartite soul, as described earlier, 
the use of reason is what makes humans distinct from other things in nature. Happiness 
for a human is contemplation (θεωρἰα) because happiness “must be a life of reason 
concerned with action: the activity of the soul in accordance with reason.”34 A life of 
studying universal truths best fits the criteria laid out in book one of EN because it is the 
“highest excellence” in us; it is our “natural ruler and guide.”35 Those who ‘know’ and do 
philosophy enjoy pleasures more than even those who inquire do. Contemplation fits the 
criteria for happiness because it is loved for its own sake.36 It also fulfills the two 
conditions of eudaemonia; it is perfect and it is self-sufficient. Theoria is perfect, because 
nothing else needs to be added to it, and self-sufficient, because the happy man can 
theorize alone even if a person can do it better with colleagues and the necessities of life.37 
The use of the intellect (νοῦς) is the best activity, first because “the objects of 
intellect are the best of knowing objects” and second because it is the most continuous 
activity. We can contemplate more than we can do anything else. The happy life must be 
pleasurable, but with the kind of pleasure that comes from wisdom. Contemplation and 
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32 Aristotle, Meta, 980a22. 
33 D.S. Hutchinson, “Ethics,” in Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: 
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the use of the intellect are distinguished from other faculties like sensation, opinion, 
experience and prudence.38 
The practice of philosophy is a theological matter for Aristotle, because the best 
and most divine thing for humankind is understanding;39 it is the divine element in us. 
The most important contribution we can make to life is the study of philosophy,40 and 
first philosophy is theology, “as it has to do with the highest cause of being.”41 
Contemplation is the “highest fulfillment of our nature as rational beings; it is the sort of 
rational activity that we share with the gods, who are rational beings with no need to 
apply reason to practice.”42 Aristotle admits that this kind of life is too high for 
humankind, “for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as 
something divine is present in him.” It is not the place of man to think of mortal “human 
things,” because we share reason with the divine. We must make ourselves immortal, in 
the sense that we should “strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in 
us.”43 
Contemplation, as the most complete happiness, becomes most clear when we 
consider that the gods, who are the most blessed and happy, do not do acts of justice, are 
not brave or liberal or temperate, but only contemplate. “That which is most akin to this 
must be the nature of happiness.”44 The gods, who are higher and supreme beings, are 
objects of knowledge and models for imitation. The gods contemplate but have no need 
for external goods as we do.45 A life of contemplation is higher than human. “It is 
achievable not in virtue simply of being a man, but in virtue of being something divine in 
which men partake.” We have a divine element to us that gives us the ability to think 
about things higher than ourselves. This “is the highest aspect of our souls,” and should 
not be neglected or overlooked for “lower matters” unless it threatens to make 
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40 Aristotle, “Fragments,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes, trans. Jonathan Barnes and Gavin Lawrence, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University 
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“contemplation impossible.”46 It is by virtue of our capacity to become like God that we 
find eudaemonia. This is why we can call Aristotle a “spiritualist.”47 
We can see that Aristotle ticks all of the boxes that Benatouil and Bonazzi lay out 
for us concerning the prioritizing of contemplation. We will now see if Aquinas does the 
same. 
Aquinas on Contemplation 
As we have seen, for Aristotle, contemplation of universals is the highest and most 
god-like activity and is worthy of imitation. We now begin to sketch Aquinas’ view of 
contemplation. But a more thorough and detailed picture will be continued when 
discussing the similarities between Aquinas and the Puritans later in this chapter. 
Happiness for Aristotle is in this life, but according to Aquinas, if happiness is in 
this life, it must be imperfect because it is in this life.48 “‘We call men happy but only as 
men.’ But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be ‘as the angels…in 
heaven.’”49 Aquinas, drawing upon Aristotle and passages of scripture like Matthew 5.8 
(Blessed are the pure of heart: for they shall see God), 1 John 3.2 (We shall see him as he 
is) and 1 Corinthians 13.12 (For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face), 
comes to the conclusion that contemplation, and more specifically the vision of God (visio 
Dei), or beatific vision, is the end goal of human striving.50 We will focus our attention on 
Benatouil and Bonazzi’s second and third criteria in respect to Aquinas here. But there is 
a little more nuance to Aquinas’ position that should be drawn out. 
Aquinas writes, “the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect.”51 
Humankind’s basic craving is to see and to attain insight, to set our eyes upon our 
ultimate good by means of our intellectual capacities. It is through these intellectual 
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48 There is a debate as to whether Aquinas takes Aristotle’s happiness as maximal, in that nothing 
can be added to something that is complete, or the moderate interpretation, in which nothing can be 
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the vision of God. Contemplation, however, is not merely an investigation of truth “but a 
consideration and delight of a truth already grasped.”52 It is not directed to the practical 
life but to the delight of gazing at truth. From this, Aquinas distinguishes between two 
kinds of contemplation: contemplation ‘principally’ (principaliter) and ‘dispositively’ 
(dispositive).53 Contemplation principally takes place in the next life and is the 
contemplation of truth in the vision of God. The emphasis here is on seeing that does not 
take place while we have other “bodily senses.”54 Interestingly, given our discussion on 
Richard Baxter in the previous chapter, Aquinas defines “rest” as having no inward or 
outward disturbance.55 The vision of God is the creator’s intended perfection of human 
existence in an act of the perfected human intellect that is beyond humankind’s terrestrial 
dependence on the senses.56 The speculative intellect, rather than the practical intellect, is 
where humankind’s perfect happiness resides. This is the contemplation of truth.57 
On the other hand, contemplation ‘dispositively’ is in this life and is the 
contemplation of first principles. This contemplation is the activity of gazing at the truth, 
and all other activities, such as “reception of principles” or “deducing principles,” 
culminate here.58 Aquinas writes, “the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally 
completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity.”59 
Just as in contemplation principally, this kind of contemplation is concerned with the first 
principle, which is God. However it is imperfect and a “stepping stone to things 
imperishable.”60 Aquinas’ view is that neither the life of contemplation as Aristotle 
conceives it nor the life of moral virtue will end in ultimate happiness if confined to this 
life, since “happiness can consist only in the vision of the divine essence.”61 Whereas 
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55 Ibid., II–II 181.2. 
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contemplation in the next life is about ‘seeing,’ this earthly contemplation is about 
‘hearing.’62 This will be further addressed later in this section and the next.  
What we have seen thus far is that, for Aquinas, the use of the intellect is an 
essential aspect of his thought. He makes a distinction, however, between contemplation 
in this life (natural), and contemplation in the next (supernatural). Both of these 
contemplations express delight because the rational being is using reason and because this 
being contemplates what it loves. Contemplation is continuous, starting in this life and 
continuing in the next, 63 and supernatural contemplation is a development of grace that 
ends in perfection. We will see this more in the following chapter on infused virtues. We 
have highlighted this departure from Aristotle in Thomist thought, but there are further 
discrepancies and continuities that should be looked at regarding the reason, 
contemplation and happiness.  
When Aquinas first discusses happiness in the ST, he identifies it with “the 
ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature,” a “collection of all goods.”64 But 
this perfection is not attainable by those who keep philosophy apart from faith and divine 
revelation. For Aquinas, philosophy apart from theology can only go so far. Through 
sensory cognition, one can prove that there is a first universal cause and confirm that this 
first cause is the origin of existence, but one cannot reason about what God is. There is a 
cap as to how high into the realm of God philosophy can reason on its own. Theology, on 
the other hand, does not have this specific limitation.65 
Just as Aristotle believes that it is in all humankind to desire to know, for Aquinas, 
when we see an effect, we must inquire into its cause. This begins the process that 
ultimately must lead to the divine essence. There “resides in every man a natural desire to 
know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men.”66 
Philosophers see and ‘wonder,’ but they are incapable of truly knowing that first cause. If 	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the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God 
than “that he is,” then the perfection of the intellect does not yet reach the first cause. 
Nevertheless, it retains the natural desire to seek the cause.67 The knowledge of the 
philosopher can never rest or achieve completion. The Christian who contemplates and 
does theology does not have the same kind of ‘reason cap’ as the philosopher. This will be 
discussed in more detail below. The teaching of Christian faith is concerned with the 
vision of God and is directly related to the human’s natural desire to know. Faith is the 
perfection of our intellectual nature. As we will see in Chapter 4, the attainment of the 
supernatural end of happiness is through grace and God’s gifting. It is only by faith, 
which is infused by grace, that our natural light of reason is able to break through the 
reason cap that inhibits philosophy.  
Divine revelation attributes to God “that which natural reason cannot attain.” 
Complete happiness cannot be made up of theoretical, philosophical knowledge.68 As 
pointed out above, however, the person with faith has a reason cap between 
contemplation in this life (hearing) as opposed to the next (seeing). Knowledge that is 
attained through faith cannot be genuine knowledge, in as much as the “intellect is 
determined by faith to some object.” Such knowledge causes the mind to assent via what 
is seen by means of an understanding of first principles.69 What we are beginning to see is 
that even the theologian has a reason cap of sorts. As mentioned above, theology is a 
discursive theological reasoning or investigation of truths revealed by God and made 
known to humankind through scripture and tradition. Therefore, the theologian uses the 
same discursive reason that the philosopher does, but by faith, which is a kind of hearing 
rather than seeing and is attributed to contemplation. The Christian theologian moves 
past the limit that the natural philosopher possesses, but hits another limit by virtue of still 
using discursive knowledge in this life and drawing upon certain principles by revealed 
faith. 
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We are beginning to see that, for Aquinas, as far as earthly reasoning capacities 
go, there is a distinction between the use of philosophical reason and theology (sacra 
doctrina). Theology is the highest of all the sciences and involves specifically dealing with 
divine things. Theology takes a special place above strict philosophical reasoning and can 
assist the “philosophical sciences” but is not in need of them. Philosophy makes the 
teaching of scripture clearer; theology “accepts its principles not from other sciences, but 
immediately from God by revelation.”70 Theology is above human wisdom. 
 
For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be 
judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers 
the highest principle in that order in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of 
God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and 
end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science.71 
 
Sacred doctrine, and thus theology, is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is 
especially humankind. Theology makes use of the authority of philosophy with regard to 
matters where truth can be known by natural reason.72 “Those who use the works of the 
philosophers in sacred doctrine, by bringing them into service of faith, do not mix water 
with wine, but rather turn water into wine.”73  
So how is it that natural reason, such as that of Aristotle, and the divine reason 
that the Christian possesses through grace are related? Jan Aertsen helpfully sets out the 
relationship between the natural reason of philosophy and its relation to the revealed 
reason of theology. There is harmony between philosophy and that which is revealed by 
God. Theology and philosophy cannot contradict each other. In addition, “[f]aith 
presupposes natural knowledge, as grace presupposes nature.”74 Natural knowledge is 
fundamental although theology should not be reduced to this. And finally, “grace does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid., I 1. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. “Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science.” Theology, because it is 
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not destroy nature, but perfects it.”75 That is to say that faith is the perfection of 
philosophy. 
As with Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes the intellect over and above sensation, 
opinion, experience and practical reason. As seen in the previous chapter, for Aquinas 
complete happiness is the supernatural end of the vision of God, which can only be 
achieved in the afterlife. We will see, in further chapters, that happiness in this life 
includes the moral virtues, but is ultimately incomplete. As has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, the greatest virtues that accord with human nature are without 
difficulty because they are conducive to our nature. Thus contemplation is effortless and 
not burdensome.76 
Our happiness is essentially in the uniting of ourselves to “the Uncreated Good,” 
with which we cannot be united by the senses and goods of the body.77 The lower parts of 
man (senses) are perfected by the overflow of the higher part, namely the rational part. 
“The operation whereby man’s mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.”78 
But what is the relationship between knowing, or the contemplative actions, and seeing 
(vision)? Knowing is a kind of loving, and “seeing itself is only stirred to full realization by 
love. Seeing is an act of the intellect. Both seeing and knowing are a kind of togetherness 
and intimate presence. “Only the presence of what is loved makes us happy, and that 
presence is actualized by the power of cognition.” It is not mere seeing; it is having, 
possessing and partaking of. 79 
We have very briefly laid out the conceptual ground for theoria in Aristotle and 
Aquinas. In both of these cases we have begun to see an ethical justification for the 
superiority of the intellect over the senses, but in Aquinas there is still an emphasis on 
faith, a theme that will be picked up in more detail later in this chapter and in Chapters 4 
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76 Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Gerald Malsbary (South Bend: St. Augustines 
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77 Aquinas, ST, I–II 3.1;4; Pieper, Happiness, 58. 
78 Aquinas, ST, I–II 3.4. 
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to whether one can have perfect knowledge of God in the beatific vision. “What is perfectly seen is perfectly 
understood, but what is imperfectly understood is still totaliter, albeit imperfectly.” God can be seen as he is 
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and 6. The thinkers investigated here follow in a long tradition of advocating for a life in 
search for understanding. We have also seen that there is an emphasis on the elucidation 
of contemplation, assigning it to a separable and immortal faculty of νοῦς, the intellect. 
This distinguishes understanding from other, lower faculties. We have also seen, in both 
cases, that the entities contemplated must be ontologically and cosmologically superior. 
The major difference in these cases is that Aquinas is quite sensitive to the particular role 
that philosophy plays in human flourishing. Without theology, which is beyond 
philosophy, the supernatural end of rational animals cannot be achieved. 
We now turn our attention from the discussion of ancients and medievals to the 
Puritans, where the medieval conception will be made clearer and the Puritan position 
explicated. 
Sacra Doctrina and Meditation as Theology 
Contemplation and meditation are prominent fixtures in Protestant spirituality, 
and this is due in no small part to the influence of Puritan writers on the development of 
Protestant thought. As sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans draw upon Aristotle 
and Aquinas to make theological distinctions while also drawing upon other scholastics 
for exhortations and methods.80 It is prudent for our discussion to look at these two 
theological influences together. In this section, we shall assess the conceptual relationship 
between Aquinas’ understanding of sacra doctrina, meditation and contemplation and the 
Puritan practice of contemplation and meditation. By looking back at Aquinas, we hope 
to enhance our understanding of the Puritan concept of reason in meditation and 
ultimately to show the relationship between the moral development that comes with 
meditation and leads to the beatific vision; which is reasoning in the next life. What we 
will see is that the Puritans are very traditional in this regard.  
Most Puritans make a distinction between meditation and contemplation. John 
Downame writes, “in nature there is a small difference between Meditation and 
Contemplation, yet as the Schooles define it, there is some in degree; Meditation being an 
exercise of a lower and meaner nature, within the reach of all Christians which will put 
out their hand unto it.” Contemplation, however, is “more highly and heavenly, fit only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Louis Lohr Martz, The Poetry of Meditation; A Study in English Religious Literature of the Seventeenth 
Century. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 113. 
	   74 
for such as by long exercise have attained to much perfection.”81 Thomas White notes 
that Contemplation is like “the beatificall Vision which they have of God in Heaven, like 
the Angels beholding of the face of God; Meditation is like the kindling of fire, and 
Contemplation more like the flaming of it when fully kindled: The one is like the Spouses 
seeking of Christ, and the other like the Spouses enjoying of Christ.”82 Thus 
contemplation is the end of meditation.83 
Meditation or meditatio, can either mean “thinking over or contemplating 
something, or a practice or exercise.”84 The medieval technical application of meditatio is 
distinguished from contemplation.85 The Puritans maintain this distinction, following the 
medieval concept of contemplation put forth by Aquinas, Richard of St Victor, Bernard 
of Clairvaux and others.86 We will see that the Puritans generally hold that contemplation 
is “more highly and heavenly than meditation, fit only for such as by long exercise have 
attained to much perfection,”87 a distinction that Aquinas also represents.88 Aquinas 
identifies the second activity (‘understanding of principles from which one proceeds to 
contemplation of truth’) with meditation, which we will return to later. For now, this 
analysis has given us a sense of meditation’s technical application. Meditation is discursive 
reasoning that proceeds from principles. It is a process that leads to the contemplation of 
truth through investigation. In order for the soul to rest in contemplation, the theological 
discursus must be ceased. We will now proceed to look more closely at the Puritan 
understanding of meditation by comparing it to Aquinas’ thought on sacra doctrina and 
meditation. 	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 84 Alec Ryrie, Being Protestant in Reformation Britain (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 166; 222–7. 
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We should acknowledge that while Aquinas does not devote much space in the ST 
to meditation explicitly, he does, as we have noted above, affirm the same conceptual 
understanding of meditation that we have laid out. Aquinas, quoting Richard of St. 
Victor, writes, “meditation is the investigation of a mind occupied in the search for 
truth,” that is, reasoning from certain principles to some truth.89 This is in conjunction 
with Prima Pars, where Aquinas notes that sacra doctrina “does not pronounce on God and 
creatures as though they were counterbalancing, but on God as principal and on 
creatures in relation to him, who is their origin and end.”90 Thus the focus of sacra doctrina 
is on God, but it does not seem that meditation needs to be focused on God in order to be 
meditation. Meditation is a process that leads to “contemplation of some truth,” but 
contemplation is gazing at the truth. 
Later in the Prima Pars, Aquinas establishes that the search for knowledge of God 
in sacra doctrina must move through sensible things to arrive at knowledge of the unknown 
God because we are corporeal beings.91 This movement of sacra doctrina through the 
sensible world explains, according to Aquinas, why God reveals himself through 
Scripture. As he says, “Holy Scripture fittingly delivers divine and spiritual realities under 
bodily guises. For God provides for all things according to the kind of things they are. We 
are ‘of the kind’ to reach the world of intelligence through the world of sense, since all our 
knowledge takes its rise from sensation. Congenially, then, holy Scripture delivers 
spiritual things to us beneath metaphors taken from bodily things.”92 To this affirmation 
of Scripture’s fittingness, Aquinas adds that God “has taught that the knowledge making 
us blessed consists of two objects, namely, the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of 
Christ.”93  
In his elaboration on the Trinity and the humanity of Christ in ST, we learn, as 
we do also in the Puritans (specifically in John Owen), that it is through the humanity of 
Christ that we are led to a knowledge of the Trinity. This movement of what is known 
(Christ) to what is unknown (the Trinity) is the movement of sacra doctrina, and it 
demonstrates that sacra doctrina is, as Torrell notes, theology as “an expression of a God-	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informed life, an activity in which the virtues of faith, hope, and charity are given full 
scope.”94 Thus even though Aquinas concludes in the first question of the Summa that 
theology is more theoretical than practical, he is insistent that sacra doctrina shapes the life 
of the theologian through her search for truth. Aquinas writes,  
 
Whereas some among the philosophical sciences are theoretical and others are practical, sacred 
doctrine takes over both functions, in this being like the single knowledge whereby God knows 
himself and the things he makes. All the same it is more theoretical than practical, since it is mainly 
concerned with the divine things which are, rather than with things men do; it deals with human 
acts only in so far as they prepare men for that achieved knowledge of God on which their eternal 
bliss reposes.95 
 
What we have seen above is that it is common for Puritans to separate meditation and 
contemplation. Contemplation of God is in the next life and is the life found in the 
beatific vision, or vision of God. What is beginning to come to light here is that, like 
Aquinas, there are some Puritans that place the telos of reason not just in the doing of 
philosophy and theology here in this life, but also in the next. We will further investigate 
this later in this chapter. Also like Aquinas, the Puritans looked at thus far have a priority 
of reason that is in this life and that Christian conceptions of meditation resemble. We 
will now continue to address in more detail the Puritans’ conception of meditation and 
contemplation. 
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Puritan Contemplation and Meditation 
Alec Ryrie notes that with regard to prayer and, by extension for our purposes, 
meditation and contemplation, there is considerable variation with regard to how 
Reformed Protestants discuss these topics.96 There are also variations and discrepancies 
among the sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans themselves. At times painting with 
broad strokes, we will attempt in this section to draw out these similarities and differences 
within themselves as well as with Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ conceptions of sacra doctrina 
while attempting to be sensitive to changes over time. We will start in the sixteenth 
century and look at Richard Rogers and William Perkins. 
Rogers, in his Seven Treatises, dedicates the entirety of the seventh treatise to 
arguing that we need to be daily thinking on and reading scripture while also being in 
prayer. His definition of meditation is the separation of “our selves from all other things, 
where we consider as we are able, and thinke of some poynts of instruction necessarie to 
leade us forward to the kingdome of heaven, and the better strengthening of us against 
the divel and this present evill world, and to the wel ordering of our lives." In meditation 
"we must set our minds on worke, about the cogitation of things heavenly, by calling to 
rememberance some one or other of them which we knowe."97 One of the best ways to 
know that you are saved “is the desire to study. The desire to study the word is a sign of 
ones assurance.”98 Christians “should give all diligence to muse and conferre on the 
things which [they] have heard, examining them by the scriptures." This is how to 
warrant true blessing.99 
Perkins, a contemporary of Rogers, sees the importance of wisdom in ordering the 
affections through the act of meditating on God. He argues that newness of life is three 
things: (1) true wisdom, (2) good affections and (3) good works. True wisdom is to advise 
and to use good means. This arises from “faith in the Word of God.” Citing Psalm 98, 
Perkins notes that it is from the meditation on God’s testimonies that good affections 
come. From meditation comes the right ordering of the soul.100 The relationship between 
meditation and the ordering of the soul is to bring together the senses, the emotions and 	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the intellect.101 Perkins sees meditation on the example of Christ as crucial for preparing 
for the next life.102 What we see in both of these sixteenth century thinkers is that 
meditation either is a means or directs people to the means of ordering their lives and 
souls to the telos, this being “heaven.” There is still a eudaemonistic structure here, and it 
mirrors what we have seen in Aquinas in the relationship of discursive reasoning in 
meditation towards an end of contemplation in the next life. In our discussion of the 
virtues in the next chapter, we will see that the means that bring about the ordering of the 
soul are taken very seriously in considering the good spiritual and moral life. 
In the seventeenth century, there is still a very eudaemonistic emphasis 
concerning meditation. Like Perkins nearly a century before, White notes that meditation 
is not just studying. Studying may make one a smart individual, but meditation makes 
one holy.103 We will now move from looking at authors in the sixteenth century to looking 
at those in the seventeenth. 
Reynolds makes an interesting distinction between thought and meditation. The 
distinction is based upon the object of thought, as seen above. Reynolds, drawing from 
Aristotle, notes that the object of the appetite is the “stimulant of practical thought,” which 
may be a real or apparent good.104 Reynolds writes, 
 
[B]y reason of all their quickness and volubility, and withal, their continuall interchanges and 
successions, are the most numberlesse operations of the Soule of man: where, by thoughts, I 
understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of 
sundry different objects; for when the Minde begins once to be fixed and standing, I call that 
rather Meditation than Thought.105 
 
This multiplicity of thought is grounded “first upon the abundance of their objects and 
quicknesse and activity of Apprehension.” Abundance of thought “includes all the variety 
of species belonging to other faculties,” which is called prima philosophia, drawing in and 
sorting objects, or, as Aristotle would put it, discerning and studying particulars.106 
With regard to contemplation, Reynolds makes a very Aristotelian move, dividing 
the rational part of the soul into two further parts. In Aristotle these parts are the scientific 	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(ἐπιστημονικὸν), “whose principles cannot be otherwise,” and calculative (λογιστικός), 
which contemplates about “variable things.”107 This first part of the rational soul 
Reynolds calls the “mental” part, which is the “high, pure, and abstracted delights, or the 
like agitations of the supreme part of the Understanding.”108 Reynolds writes that 
“Aristotle calleth nous, the Latins, Mens, or Apex amini; which are the most simple actions of 
the Mind, where in is the least intermixion or commerce with inferior and earthly 
faculties.”109 These motions are “grounded first on an extrodinarie knowledge, either of 
Vision and Revelation, or of an exquisite naturall apprehension,” which are beyond “usuall 
industrie.” 
Vision however, Reynolds calls with the “schoole-men extasie and rapture,” 
which is what the authors of scripture had when they were inspired with heavenly 
revelation. The joy of this vision is “unspeakable” and gives “peace past understanding.” 
The mind, the purest and most abstract part of the soul, is where men can get a glimpse 
of the “future Glory.” This is where “Aristotle hath placed his greatest fellicitie in the 
contemplation of the highest and divinest Truths; which he makes to be the object of that 
supreame part of the Soule.”110 He further states, 
 
[A]ll bodily cognoscitive Faculties doe suffer offence and dammage from the too great excellency 
of their object… But understanding on the contrary side is perfected by worthiest contemplations, 
and the better inabled for lower enquiries. And therefore Aristotle in his Ethicks, placeth the most 
compleat happinesse of man in those heavenly intuitions of the mind, which are fastened on the 
divinest and most remote objects; which in Religion is nothing else, but a fruition of that beatificall 
vision (which, as farre as Nature goes, is call’d the contemplation of the first cause) and an eternall 
satiating the soule with reholding the Nature, Essence, and glory of God.111  
 
The category of ‘mental’ is more like the understanding, in that the understanding is no 
longer in process, as reason is still moving towards something, namely knowledge and 
understanding. Subjects that are wider than those concerning the body are moral and 
contemplative actions of the mind, are able to be relieved from sense and are therefore 
capable of the purest delights.112 As with Aquinas, Reynolds believes that this 	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contemplation is “always endued with the greatest wisdome.”113 As we have seen in 
Aquinas, wisdom is a central concept in the doing of theology, a theme we saw in the 
sixteenth century and will continue to see in the seventeenth century. Reynolds, in 
agreement with another seventeenth century voice, Joseph Hall, states, “He is the best 
scholler that reasons least, and assents most.”114 A contemporary of Reynolds, William 
Fenner, thought that one becomes zealous—has all one’s passions to the furthest 
extreme—through frequent meditation, thus showing a relationship between 
contemplation and the lower parts of the soul.115 
Moving slightly later in the seventeenth century, Richard Baxter too sees the 
object of thought as an important aspect of meditation and further relates it to the lower 
sensitive part of the soul, as does Fenner above. In meditation, there are distinctions 
between the act and the object. The meditation that Baxter is encouraging his readers 
towards “is discerned from all other sorts of Meditation…and the difference is taken from 
the Act, and from the Object.”116 Through sanctified dispositions, habits and powers, by 
the “supernatural renewing Grace of the Spirit,” a person is “enabled to action.”117 This 
meditation is “the acting of the powers of the Soul.” As with Reynolds and Fenner, 
Baxter is integrating meditation and the parts of the soul. The soul is rational and differs 
“from the cogitations of the Soul as sensative; the sensative soul hath a kind of meditation 
by the Common sense,” but all powers of the soul must be engaged. This is not the 
meditation of students, “which usually the meer imployment of the brain.” It is not just 
thinking, inventing and memory. It is the “business of a higher and more excellent 
nature.” The understanding is not the whole soul, and can therefore not do all the work. 
“As God hath made several parts in man, to perform their several offices for his 
nourishing and Life; so hath he ordained the Faculties of the Soul to perform their several 
Offices for his spiritual life.” The understanding must take the truth, “prepare [it] for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Ibid., 37. 
114 Hall, MV, 140. 
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can have, but this not the wisdom that is given at baptism (conversion). See, Aquinas, ST, I 45; I–II 111 1 
and 5; II–II 45.5; Aumann, “Appendices,” 112–3. 
116 Baxter, SER, 655. 
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will, and it must receive them, and commend them to the Affections.”118 But, as we saw 
earlier, much like Reynolds, such meditations could not be without their object of 
contemplation, which is heavenly rest, “the most blessed estate of man in his everlasting 
enjoyment of God in heaven.”119 In fact, help for meditation is to “be convinced once 
that thou hast no other happiness [than heaven], and then be convinced that happiness is 
there.” We must believe that heaven is the “chiefest good” and this must “sink into our 
affections.”120 
Baxter’s position seems very similar to Augustine’s, as found in Contra Faustum 
Manichaeum, where he defines sin as a transgression of the eternal law, which is the divine 
reason or will of God. In order for man’s soul to stay superior to the body, Augustine 
describes the traditional three-part soul. Contemplation is through faith, in this world, but 
through sight in the afterlife. To keep the natural order (the eternal law) is to restrain the 
moral affections and keep them within the limits of reason.121 We should also draw 
attention to the similarity between Baxter and Aquinas in terms of faith and sight, as 
looked at above. 
Also like Aquinas, for Richard Baxter and Joseph Hall meditation is spiritual, not 
philosophical. The soul “must bee purged in order to meditate.”122 Everyone meditates; 
we can either do it well or not. Some people meditate on the sea or on things that grow 	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meditate of the goodness; That when the Judgment hath determined, and Faith hath apprehended, it may 
then pass on to raise the Affections.” The “first affection to be acted is Love,” which has goodness as its 
object. The next Grace or Affection to be excited is Desire. “The object of it is Goodness considered as 
absent, or not yet attained.” This is related to love. The next affection is hope. After hope, the next affection 
is courage, “[w]hich leadeth to resolution, and concludeth in Action.” And finally, the last affection is joy, 
which "is the end of all the Rest, love, Desire, Hope, and Courage, do all end to the resting of our joy. This 
is so desirable to every man by Nature, and it so essentially necessary to the constitution of happiness.” 644; 
687-98. 
120 Ibid., 638; 639. 
121 My discussion on Augustine here is indebted to Giovanni Catapano, “Leah and Rachael as 
Figures of the Active and the Contemplative Life in Augustine’s Contra Faustum Manichaeum,” in Theoria 
and Praxis, and the Conteplative Life after Plato and Aristotle, ed. Thomas Benatouil and Mauro Bonazzi (Leiden: 
Brill, 2012), 215–28. 
122 Hall, ADM, 24–5; 65. Hall, at least twice in this treatise notes that what he is writing is drawing 
upon the tradition.  He cites an unknown monk “112” years earlier as well as Origin, Augustine, Bernard, 
Hugo, Bonaventure and Gerson. Baxter, SER, 26. 
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out of the earth, some others meditate on politics, but “[w]hile they would bee acquainted 
with the whole world, they are strangers at home; and while they seeke to know all other 
things, they remaine unknowne of themselves,” and the God that made them.123  
However, like Aquinas, Baxter is happy to say that meditation and study need not 
to be confined strictly to theological topics, as long as those topics bring the one 
meditating back to theology. Just as there is a difference between rational animals and 
sensitive animals, there is a difference between a “noble” and a “base” man. The noble 
Christian man differs from the world because of his consistent meditation on higher 
things, “this lies especially in a higher and more heavenly frame of Spirit.” He continues: 
 
[S]o is he the most choice and goodly Christian, whose head and heart are thus the highest. Men 
of noble birth and Spirits, do mind high and great affairs, and not smaller things of low poverty: 
Their discourse is of Counsels and matters of State, of the Government of the Common-wealth 
and publick things: and not of the Country-mans petty imployments.124 
 
The above statements by Baxter resemble Aristotle. First, because it is the place of 
nobility and those of higher social position to meditate and be contemplative; second, 
because of the kinds of things that are contemplated by these kinds of nobility, namely 
God and politics. Baxter does say a few pages later that it is a dishonor to God when we 
only meditate on the things of this world or with the reason of this world. It is a dishonor 
to him when we feed only on this world.125 This statement sounds like what we have 
already seen in Aquinas, that reason can only get humankind so far. “There is nothing 
worth our minding, but Heaven, and the way to Heaven.”126 Baxter anticipates the 
question of meditating on church and state and replies that “they are considered, as the 
providences of God, and as they tend to the settling of the Gospel, and the Government 
of Christ, and so to the saving of our own, and our posterities Souls, they are well worth 
our diligent observation? But these are only their relations to eternity.”127 	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126 On this same page, in a footnote, Baxter tilts his Aristotelian-Thomist hand by making 
reference to the fact that those “divers religions, and manners of serving God, which are or may be in the 
World, they seem to be the most noble, and to have the greatest appearance of truth, which without great 
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127 Baxter, SER, 616. 
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Hall does not quite seem to be in agreement with Baxter here. Philosophy, even 
political philosophy, it seems, cannot be the primary means of meditation because of how 
closely Hall relates meditation to prayer.128 The disagreement between Baxter and Hall is 
that, where Baxter leaves some room for meditating on creation and politics to be a good 
subordinate to heavenly meditation, Hall sees only heavenly meditation as the only 
proper means of meditation. For Hall, the most direct and best-fitting way of exercising 
meditation is to think upon “those matters in Diviniitie, which can most of all worke 
compunction in the hart, & most stirre us up to devotion.” Hall gives an extensive, two 
and a half-page list of things appropriate to meditate on, all of which are theological 
concerns. His list encompasses everything from Christology and soteriology to 
ecclesiology and angelology.129 Richard Rogers, nearly a century earlier, also gives a list 
of appropriate things to meditate on, which includes “any part of Gods word: on God 
himselfe, his wisdome, power; his mercie, or of the infinite varietie of good things which 
we recieve of his free bountie; also of his workes and iudgements; or on our estate, as our 
sinnes, and the vilenes of our corruption, that wee yet carrie about us, our mortalitie, of 
changes in this world, or of our deliverance from sinne, and death.”130 In both these 
sixteenth and seventeenth century thinkers, there is an emphasis on wisdom.  
When meditation is done correctly, it is the means by which one obtains 
wisdom131 and is a step towards contemplation132 in which we shall see God. Hall 
continues stating, 
 
Yet neither could this glory make us happy, if being thus absolute, it were not perpetual. To bee 
happie, is not so sweet a state, as it is miserable to have been happie. Lest ought therefore should 
bee wanting beholde, this felicitie knoweth no end, feareth no intermission, and is as eternall for the 
continuance, as hee that had not beginning.133 
 
As in the previous chapter and above, Hall is stating here that happiness is the vision of 
God and that happiness would be miserable if we thought that it could be taken away. 
But we are assured that it will last for eternity, as God himself is eternal. The fruits, or 
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132 Ibid., 26. 
133 Ibid., 117–8. 
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end, of meditation are joy and happiness.134 
John Owen seems to agree with Hall when he challenges his readers not to 
contemplate on things that are perishing but rather on the “astonishing dispensation” of 
Christ in the incarnation: “its Excellency, Glory, Beauty, Depths, deserve the flower of 
our enquireies, the vigor of our spirits, the substance of our time; but when withal, our 
Life, our Peace, our Joy, our inheritance, our Eternity, our ALL lies herein, shall not the 
thoughts of it always dwell in our hearts, always refresh and delight our souls?”135 
As seen above in other seventeenth century Puritans, meditation begins in the 
understanding, but for Hall it “endeth in the affection; It begins in the braine, decends to 
the heart; begins on earth, ascends to Heaven; Not suddenly, but by certaine staires, till 
we come to the highest.”136 Though meditation is more about affections than 
understanding, both are necessary.137 The use of reason in meditation makes its way to 
our sensitive soul and emotions. “A man is a man by his understanding part: but hee is a 
Christian by his will and affections.” Here we see Hall drawing upon a three-part soul to 
make sense of how meditation begins with our minds and makes its way to our passions. 
He continues stating, 
 
[A]ll our former labour of the braine, is only to affect the heart, after that the minde hath thus 
traversed that point proposed thrugh all the heads of reason, it shall indevour to find in the first 
place feeling touch, and sweete rellish in what which it hath thus chewed; which fruite, through the 
blessing of God will voluntarily follow upon a serious Meditation.138 
 
Meditation is never done without the passions; by them we get more light to our 
knowledge and more heat to our affections, more life to our devotion.139 Hall even notes 
that meditation is a matter of continence, that is, the reasons right ruling over the 
passions. Our reason needs to stay focused and cannot be distracted.140 
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It is clear that meditation and contemplation, with God’s help, contribute to 
happiness.141 For Richard Baxter a joyful mind is a heavenly mind. If people neither 
sincerely meditate nor live a life of heavenly contemplation, then he thinks that it is right 
to wonder whether they walk uncomfortably, live in sorrows and “know not what the Joy 
of the Saints means.” A person cannot have comforts from God and never think of 
him.142 Close meditation on the matter and cause of our joy is God’s way for us to 
procure our solid rational joy. “Learn the art of heavenly mindedness, and thou shalt find 
increase an hundred fold, and the benefit abundantly exceed thy labor.”143 Meditation is 
not only a means to an end; it motivates us towards that end. “The diligent keeping of 
your Hearts on Heaven, will preserve the vigor of all your Graces, and put life onto all 
your Duties. It is the heavenly Christian, that is the lively Christian; It is our strangeness 
to Heaven that makes us so dull: it is the end that quickens all the means: And the more 
frequently and clearly this end sincerely beheld, the more vigorous will all our motion 
be.”144 
In conclusion, with regard to the development of meditation in Puritan thought, 
we can see that Puritans in both centuries emphasize contemplation on the vision of God, 
which is the object or telos of meditation. We have also seen that in both centuries, 
Puritans accentuate meditation as a means to the end of contemplation. In addition, 
meditation that takes place in the rational soul makes its way down to the sensitive soul to 
effect and affect the passions. Baxter emphasizes that our natures want worship and 
knowledge of God.145 As Perkins puts it, the glory of heaven consists, in part, in that we 
shall “behold the face of god, which is his glorie and maiestie.”146 In some cases, like 
Rogers and Hall, the same methodological principles are encouraged. 
There are some differences within Puritan thought. Baxter believes that reflection 
on nature along with scripture is an acceptable help while others, like Hall and Owen, 
disagree. We can also see that the seventeenth century thinkers become much more 
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systematic in their discussion of how the parts of the soul interact in meditation and of the 
specific effects that this interaction has on the movement towards the end. 
 We have seen that there are many important similarities between Aristotle, 
Aquinas and the sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans in their thought on 
contemplation in the good life. First, there is the drawing upon the parts of the soul to 
make distinctions regarding how meditation affects the whole of a person. Second, 
contemplation in heaven is the telos of reason, and is thus a significant part of the telos of 
humankind, because we are rational animals and need to do things that are fit for our 
natures and contemplation is central to good reasoning. Third, we have also seen that for 
both Aquinas and the Puritans, meditation is theological formation. Rather than being 
divorced from theological reflection, the life of meditation is the life of theology. Puritans 
certainly place high value on the importance of meditation and contemplation in the 
Christian life. The blessed life, notes Perkins, consists in the knowledge of God through 
God himself and his works.147 What should be noted is that Weber’s broad-stroke 
assessment of the Puritans as not valuing inactive contemplation in light of daily work is 
false,148 an issue that will be brought up in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
While all these authors focus on the importance of meditation and contemplation, 
they are also mindful of the potential interpretations and outcomes of their teaching. 
These protestant writers do not want to be understood as saying that people should leave 
their vocations to live a contemplative life. SER, as we have seen, has a strong emphasis 
on meditation and the mystical life,149 but when Giles Fermin accused Baxter of 
encouraging people to leave their work for the contemplative life, Baxter had to make a 
few clarifications to his work and thought.  
 Controversially, Baxter writes that meditation “is not for any man in an Active 
life, because not everyone has time for it.” An appeal to moderation, which will be 
addressed further in the next chapter, is made when Baxter argues that extremes are to be 
avoided.150 One should not leave labors and responsibilities in order to meditate. No such 
duty is a duty at all times. One should only do as much meditation as one’s labors and 	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callings allow.151 Meditation is not necessary for salvation. The amount of meditation is 
related to the availability of the person to do it, but there is still a duty in certain aspects of 
the practice.152 It is important to spend enough time in meditation so that one can reach 
one’s telos.153 “Heavenly mindedness is essential to holiness,” and meditations and self-
reflection are “much the exercise of heavenly mindedness.” Though people should not 
leave their jobs to become monks, it is every person’s duty to exercise meditation.154 
Hearts and souls need time to habituate meditation.155 
We are beginning to feel a tension in Puritan thought of which Weber is at some 
level aware. It should seem strange that these theologians, who emphasize so fervently the 
importance of the active life, insist so much on a life of meditation and contemplation. 
This leads us to question whether the Puritans can hold the tension between the theoria 
described above in their thought and the praxis for which they are so well known. Does 
contemplation take precedence, like theological and philosophical thought prior to the 
Reformation, or does the Puritan emphasis on the place of work and practical action thus 
become the impetus for much Modern thought on the topic? This question will motivate 
the next portion of this chapter. Do the Puritans emphasize the theoretical life over the 
practical or vice versa? Or do they attempt to sustain a balance? 
Praxis 
 We have seen throughout this chapter that reason and contemplation are an 
important aspect of the moral life for the Puritans. M. M. Knappen notes in the 
introduction to Two Elizabethan Puritan Diaries that the first Puritan duty was “spiritual 
meditation” which seemed “to have been stressed more than any other.” However, all 
duties “were considered important.”156 We will see that these include duties within one’s 
calling and vocation. This presents our investigation with a problem. What is the 
relationship between the active and the contemplative life in Puritan theology? 
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 This section will first look at this relationship in Aristotle and Aquinas to see how 
these very influential voices in Puritan thought saw the relationship between these two 
forms of life. We will then look at the Puritans themselves to see what they have to say 
about the relationship between the active and contemplative life. Finally, this chapter will 
finish with a discussion of the circumstances under which, for the Puritans, people may 
stop the active life. 
Work in Aristotle and Aquinas 
 In the thought of both Aristotle and Aquinas, there is an attenuating of the 
practical life. For Aristotle, and the Greeks in general, work is not of high value. As 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, a life of simply chasing pleasure only is not sufficiently 
human, and as mentioned above, the human person most fulfills their natural telos by a 
life of thought and speech, a life that is in its nature higher. A life dedicated to war and 
politics is a very high life, but it cannot be happiness because they require trouble and 
further ends which deprive us of leisure.157 
 As seen above, for Aquinas, the beatific vision, which can only be achieved in the 
next life, is the true telos of intellect: reason being the chief feature of humanness. True 
felicity is only in contemplation.158 Productive work in this life only meets the needs of this 
life and has no lasting spiritual value and hinders people’s relation to God. Meditation 
requires a quiet life apart from the active life related to neighbors and other virtuous 
activity.159 It is impossible for a person to be part of both the active and the contemplative 
life.160 Giving oneself to the contemplative life and not to the service of neighbors is proof 
of one’s love for God.161 The supererogatory life of contemplation is not required unless a 
person binds it upon him or herself, and the persons who do not bind themselves to this 
life are not in danger of forfeiting their perfection. One can reach an end by many means. 
Christians can lawfully engage in secular business, choose a life of manual labor or not.162 
 An active life can have a number of dimensions, for Aquinas. There is a certain 
active aspect to the contemplative life that is the activity of “quieting and directing the 	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internal passions of the soul.” This is, however, not the kind of active life associated with 
secular business and vocation, but an active life oriented by the theoretical life. There is 
also the active life that comes along with the giving of oneself to certain religious orders. 
The activities of these religious orders are to serve one’s neighbor. In Aquinas, we can see 
that the active life is not altogether a negative life: there is in fact some optimism related 
to labor and the service of one’s neighbor. However, priority is definitely given to a purely 
contemplative life, as all human functions subserve contemplation.163 Though it was 
acceptable to be part of a ‘secular priesthood’—those monks who dealt with ordinary 
people and their lives—a life of contemplation, free from material concerns, was 
considered the best kind of life because it prepared them for their encounter with God.164 
Puritans 
 The Puritans strive as much as possible to achieve moderation between the 
contemplative and active life. It is in the relationship between these lives that we begin to 
see a slip happen between the Puritans and their predecessors. The Puritans, with their 
emphasis on the development of virtue through reason, meditation culminating in 
contemplation in the beatific vision, are also striving to reach a balance with an emphasis 
on the active life. In this section, we will seek to investigate the Puritan perspective 
between these two kinds of lives. 
The contemplation that will be discussed here in the Puritan context is that of 
meditation as discussed above, not in the sense of the beatific vision that is found in the 
afterlife. For the Puritans, work and earthly labor cannot be contrasted with the work of 
the heavenly vision of God, which they hold to be vastly superior. The comparison in the 
discussion to come is between the people’s daily work and vocation and the meditation 
and study that the doing of theology requires. 
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Howard Curzer’s reading of the debate between dominant and inclusive ends is 
helpful for giving texture to the Puritans’ position between theoria and praxis.165 For 
Curzer, the “secondary happy life” of courage, temperance and liberal acts, together with 
appropriate passions, desires and beliefs, is an ethical life. What is contested between 
intellectualists who hold the dominant view (Kenny) and those who hold an inclusive view 
(Ackrill, Irwin) is the supreme happy life. Curzer thinks that the “contemplator feels and 
does just what the ethical person feels and does, but also strives to understand things just 
for its own sake.”166 The person who contemplates does not have a life that is less morally 
virtuous; rather, it is a life in which the virtuous person is more mindful of universals as 
well as being an ethical person. Both the ethical person and the contemplative person are 
the doers of morally virtuous activities. 
For example, take P1, who does a number of virtuous activities and has habituated 
certain dispositions of their intellect and passions by the use of reason. However, this 
person likes to spend ‘all’ (the use of ‘all’ here will be important later in this discussion) 
their leisure time playing video games and watching films. Take that P2 does all the same 
virtuous activities and has habituated all the necessary dispositions just like P1. However, 
the difference between these two people is that P2 contemplates while doing the virtuous 
activity and also in their spare time “because trying to understand things is what makes 
them happy.”167 P1 is more concerned with knowledge as far as it is useful; P2 cares about 
useful knowledge, but also cares about ‘theory,’ even if it is not practically useful.  
There is a sense of recognition in P2 that is not present in P1, which Josef Pieper 
illuminates. Pieper emphasizes that all practical activity serves something other than 
itself.168 This is not to say that the active life has not felicity of its own which is the 
practice of prudence, but this practice is not the end.169 The whole of political life is to 
attain contemplation.170 P1, according to Pieper, inverts the right order of things, making 
praxis the end. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 My use of Curzer here is not to promote his interpretation of the debate as it relates to Aristotle, 
but rather to give some clarity to the Puritans’ position.  
166 Howard J. Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 15; 394–401. 
167 Ibid., 394. 
168 Pieper, Happiness, 93. 
169 Ibid., 95. 
170 Ibid., 94; MacIntyre, After Virtue, 158. 
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The views of Curzer and Pieper above help to give some structure to the Puritan 
position that we will see below. What both of the above authors are trying to emphasize is 
that there is a reading of Aristotle and Aquinas that allows for one to be Aristotelian, or 
Thomist, and have a working relationship between theoria and praxis. We will also see 
below that the Puritan position resembles what Curzer is arguing for above. 
 To begin our discussion on the relationship between the active and the 
contemplative life for the Puritans, we will look at Richard Baxter’s response to criticisms 
raised against Saints Everlasting Rest by Giles Firmin. Baxter’s short work Duty of Heavenly 
Meditation is a reply to Fermin. 
 Baxter argues the priority of work over meditation and that people should do as 
much meditation as their labors and callings allow.171 Baxter even goes so far as to say 
that a life of meditation is not for everyone, because not everyone has time for it.172 This 
resembles a very similar comment made by Aquinas in the Summa Contra Gentiles: some 
people are unable to pursue truth because of “the necessities imposed upon them by their 
daily lives.”173 A person should not leave their labors and responsibilities to meditate. “No 
such duty is a duty at all times,”174 writes Baxter. 
 In order to clarify his position, Baxter describes the relationship between 
meditation and the active life. Firstly, “[h]eavenly mindedness is essential to holiness” and 
it is meditation that exercises the heavenly mind. The order of meditation is 
understanding, then application. Prayer is a duty, but there are limits to the frequency 
with which one should do it, based upon other responsibilities, for example family.175 A 
life devoted to meditation is not for everyone, it is every person’s duty to exercise 
meditation, but, as mentioned above, Baxter does not think that meditation is necessary 
for salvation. The amount of meditation one should do is related to one’s availability to 
do it, even though there is still a duty in certain aspects of the practice.176 This is a matter 
of degrees: everyone should meditate, but some should do it more, depending on their 
availability. 	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172 Ibid. 
173 Aquinas, SCG: God, 1.IV.3. 
174 Baxter, DHM, 4. 
175 Ibid., 13. 
176 Ibid., 7–8. (Gives more detail on p. 7) 
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 The duty of meditation is to spend enough time in meditation to habituate 
ourselves to reach the ‘telos.’177 This closely follows the discussion in the following chapter 
on using reason to habituate dispositions and states towards our final end, and, as we 
have seen above, the object and profitableness of meditation is that it guides to “ultimate 
ends” that are loved for themselves; meditation is our ‘light.’178 By extension, part of 
meditation is self-examination, to ‘know thy self’ (in the more Greek vernacular). In this 
way, it is even profitable for the unbeliever to practice meditation. Also, as we will see in 
Chapters 4 and 5, meditation needs to be moderated. Even though it is a duty, too little 
or too much of it is a sin.179 Wolterstorff comments that the distinguishing feature of the 
Christian life is the “rhythmic alternation” between worship and work.180 This view is 
most representative of Baxter, and broadly of the Puritans. 
 Baxter’s response to Fermin here frames well the rest of Puritan thought on the 
relationship between contemplation and meditation, with very few exceptions. We will 
now begin to broaden our discussion to look at other authors, while also looking at how 
meditation and vocation interact in daily life. 
 For Perkins, prayer is important for sanctifying our calling. We should not only 
pray for the pardon of sin but also for the blessing of God on our work.181 Treatise 7, in 
Chapter 4 of Richard Rogers’ Seven Treatises, is dedicated to the relationship between 
meditation and work. For Rogers, meditation and work are inextricably tied. One goes 
with the other. Concerning daily meditation getting in the way of our daily work and 
callings, thus leading to less work and greater poverty, Rogers writes,  
 
Godly thirst, and Christian gaining, and lawfull prospering in the world, doe arise from hence: 
when a man doth so goe to worke in the world, and follow his dealings, that he be sure, that he 
goeth about them with a minde which is at peace with God, and well ordered, this is, guided by 
him; and when he doth faithfully and devoutly commend himself and his affaires everyday to Gods 
providence, and rest therein quietly; & when he doth as it were arme himself with circumspect 
heed-taking and wise regard, that he behave not himselfe prophanely in the world, nor after the 
manner of men, but according to that which is written.182  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Ibid., 16; 19. 
178 Ibid., 25; 31. 
179 Ibid., 29; Self-examination is also a strongly emphasized feature of Calvin’s theology in The Institutes that is 
picked up in Perkins. See, Perkins, GC; Calvin, Institutes.  
180 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Until Justice and Peace Embrace: The Kuyper Lectures for 1981 Delivered at the 
Free University of Amsterdam (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1983), 147. 
181 Perkins, ATV, 107. 
182 Rogers, PC, 579. 
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Rogers is implying here, and goes on to say, that if one begins one’s day with godly duties, 
one’s work and callings will prosper. There is an order of priority. Prosperous work 
follows from daily devotions and meditation. He whose “mind may stil attend upon God 
by faith, goeth about it prosperously, & shal find his successes answerable.”183 Callings 
and work do not keep people from godliness.184 
Reynolds is concerned about individuals taking on too many activities in their 
lives and emphasizes the importance of fellowship and society in the Christian life. He 
writes that though contemplation is an excellent thing, we should not “divide ourselves 
into parts.” Everyone should execute their proper function: “so to attend upon mear 
mentall notions, as to neglect the practicall part of our Life, and withdrew our selves from 
the fellowship and regard of humane society, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in 
Nature monstrous to see a fire burne without light.”185 Performing our particular callings 
is a duty that is proof of grace on us, this grace being  “patience, righteousness, hope, 
faith, love,” which are helps to becoming “well ordered” to do other holy duties in life. It 
is because of our particular callings “that wee may shew foorth the vertues,” that God has 
given, which would remain hidden if not for particular callings.186 Those who desire to 
separate themselves from secular communities and from “earthly callings and dealings” 
for the sake of devotion have been deceived by the devil.187 Contempt for the world does 
not mean leaving earthly callings. Telling others of the happiness you have is part of the 
proof of conversion. 188 
 In summary, circling back to Baxter, our callings and our providentially appointed 
places within the polis are essential for a life dedicated to Christ. Baxter, while discussing 
the importance of prayer and meditation as callings that should be done, writes, “the 
labours of your calling must be painfully followed,” but servants and the poor who have a 
harder time providing for their families “may not lawfully take so much time for prayer, 
as some others may.” In addition, those who are in public service must not neglect their 
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political callings for the sake of devotion, meditation and prayer.189 We see here that the 
activities of the meditative life are of the utmost importance, but not to the expense of 
caring for oneself, others and the community. Baxter elsewhere encourages his readers to 
be laborious and diligent in their callings: “Both precepts and necessity call you unto this: 
And if you cheerfully serve him in the labour of your hands, with heavenly and obedient 
mind, it will be as acceptable to him, as if you had spent all that time in more spiritual 
exercises: For he would rather have obedience than sacrifice.”190 
 Lee Hardy comments that contemplation will always be a Christian vocation.191 
As we have seen from the first portion of this chapter, the Puritans would whole-heartedly 
agree with this statement. Reason, meditation and contemplation are essential aspects of 
the Christian experience as long as those politics and ecclesial responsibilities that are 
appointed by God on the individual, either ontologically or by one’s stations in life, are 
not neglected. Like Aquinas above, the Puritans order the love of God above the love of 
one’s neighbor, but the way that they conceive of this order taking place is by the love of 
the neighbor having equal value and effect in loving God as has meditation and earthly 
contemplation, rather than by either of these taking priority.  
In this section, we have first looked at Howard Curzer’s interpretation of the 
‘inclusive’ versus ‘dominant’ debate, in order to give some modern shape to the Puritans’ 
thought. Curzer emphasizes that the best life requires both forms of life. For the Puritan, 
the priority of these two forms of life rests with contemplation. This takes precedence, as 
it is more conducive to our created natures to be rational beings and to meditate on the 
things of God. However, this does not get Christians off the hook of having to be involved 
in the community through their particular callings. There is a sliding scale of the amount 
of responsibility one carries and time one is obligated to spend in regular meditation. 
Certain callings leave more time for meditation, while other callings consist almost 
entirely of contemplation. But in both cases, like Curzer has suggested, both are 
necessary, especially in those cases where a person thinks, meditates, prays and worships 
along with their vocations, continually contemplating the reasons why they act in the 
world. The best life is a life of action by a moral agent who continually practices theoria. 	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Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, we began to shape the Puritan notions of the perfection 
and happiness of humanity that is found in God himself. With slight disagreement as to 
the amount of happiness that is attainable in this life, the Puritans agreed with Aquinas 
that perfect happiness is found only in the knowledge of God in the next life.192 We also 
began to get glimpses into what this looks like in particular: the supernatural end as the 
vision of the divine essence.193 This chapter picked up where the previous left off on the 
discussion of supernatural ends and the form this takes for the Puritans, given their 
Aristotelian and Thomist leanings. It also began our investigation into the relationship 
between eudaemonism and theology of work. 
We have seen above in the Puritans that the tripartite soul was adopted from the 
earlier tradition, and this plays a significant role in how human identity was conceived, 
that is as rational animals. We will pick up this theme even further in the following 
chapter. We have also seen in the Puritans, however, that there were some disagreements 
about the particulars of meditation—some resembling Thomism more than others. They 
all placed high value on the use of the intellect both in this life, through the discursive 
reasoning of meditation and earthly contemplation of truth, and in the next life, in 
contemplation in the beatific vision. We also saw that the Puritans attempted to hold 
together these two forms of life: the life of theoria and the life of praxis. There was high 
value put on a political life of serving one’s neighbor through one’s callings. 
For Aquinas, the best life was the life of the bishop, who was able to engage in the 
contemplative life as well as in some amount of ministry.194 But there was still a 
distinction between the mixed life of the bishop and the life of the secular world. It was 
simply the case that laypersons were not expected to engage with discursive meditation or 
contemplation. For the Puritans, however, everybody was to meditate and to 
contemplate; it was part of what it meant to be a Christian. On a Sunday, Christians were 
to gather together in congregations and with family, to meditate and to contemplate 
divine truth. This was also to be done in daily prayers and devotions. It was not just the 
task of those who had elected these obligations for themselves. For the Puritans, when the 	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workday came, the farmer or the cobbler did not necessarily need to meditate on divine 
things in their labors, but they were expected to have a rich devotional life. The pastor or 
academic took on study as their vocation, but this vocation in and of itself was no higher 
than any other vocation in society. These aspects of the Puritan doctrine of calling, the 
relationship between meditation and daily labor, will be investigated at length in Chapter 
6. 
What is emphasized here is that for the Puritans we are rational animals and, in 
order to flourish in a way that is appropriate to our beings, we need to engage our reason. 
What we can draw from this chapter is that reason functions in two ways. The first is that 
there is an important place in the Christian life for the study of theology and that this can 
take place in a number of different ways, from intense academic engagement to the 
practice of short daily bible reading. It is part of our earthly flourishing to use our minds 
to engage with the world that God has created. Also, our being rational animals does not 
conflict with our daily work and activity. Here we have begun a discussion that will be 
taken up further in Chapter 5; there is a certain amount of earthly happiness that is 
obtained through our vocations, but these vocations do not conflict with the contentment 
that comes with meditating and contemplating God. Finally, since we are rational 
animals, the supernatural end that is achieved only in the next life is a kind of existence 
that engages our intellectual capacities through seeing and knowing. The ultimate end, 
supernatural happiness, is fundamentally related to reason in that to see God is to 
contemplate him. 
In the next chapter, we will extend the discussion of reason and natural and 
supernatural ends to consider the moral development of persons. This will begin our 
discussion of the habituation of virtue and how the virtues relate to the political life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 4 
A ‘Kind of Life’: Rationality, Virtue and Moral 
Development 
 
Pleasure to me is wonder—the unexplored, the unexpected, the thing that is hidden and the changeless thing that lurks behind 
superficial mutability. H.P. Lovecraft 
 
Be steady and well-ordered in your life so that you can be fierce and original in your work. Gustave Flaubert 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we began to shape the Puritan notion of the perfection and 
happiness of humanity that is found in God himself. We found that there is happiness that 
is attainable in this life, but that the Puritans, agreeing with their scholastic precursors, 
thought that perfect happiness was found only in the knowledge of God in the next life. In 
the previous chapter, we extended the discussion of supernatural happiness. Both the 
Puritans and earlier eudaemonists emphasized the importance of reason, not only in this 
life but also in the next. We are rational animals and in order to flourish in a way that is 
appropriate to our being we need to engage our reason. This chapter follows the previous 
chapters by giving more clarity on the relationship between moral development and the 
supernatural, and the place of reason. 
In this chapter, we will take the first steps to explore a Puritan doctrine of calling 
by looking at the doctrine generally. This will prepare us to delve deeper into the 
particulars of Puritan thought both here and in the chapters to come. The movement 
from the more general aspects of the doctrine of calling to the intricacies of this doctrine 
will be investigated through the three-part definition given by William Perkins, of which 
we will explore the first part here: calling as a ‘kind of life’ and character development.  
In current virtue ethics, there has been interest in whether the pagan cardinal 
virtues are incompatible with Christian virtues. We will see where the Puritans adopt or 
reject Aristotelian pagan virtues. In this chapter, I will first show how a life defined by a 
character must include the proper development of both the cardinal (pagan) and the 
theological virtues. Also, like their eudaemonist predecessors, the Puritans conceived of 
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the virtues in a two-fold manner, drawing a distinction between moral and intellectual 
virtues. As in previous chapters, we will see that the Puritans, in Thomist fashion, go 
beyond Aristotle to affirm that the ability for the development and habituation of virtue is 
tightly connected with the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. 
This occurs alongside the near complete adoption of a conception of the passions as a 
focal contributor to moral development, in that the sensual part of the soul relates to the 
reason part. 
What we will also see here is that, for the Puritans, divine commands do not 
necessarily need to be in conflict with ethical naturalism’s desire to speak to the 
development of character that is based on natural phenomena. We will look here at the 
first layer of the problem that must be addressed further in this thesis. This chapter’s focus 
is more universal in nature; that is, it is concerned with the command to all humankind to 
flourish by developing in character towards a telos that terminates in the vision of God. 
Calling: Particulars and Universals 
Here we are going to begin specifically to look at what is meant in this thesis by 
‘calling.’ We will do this by looking at the particular and universal aspects of calling 
within the Puritan literature. 
Calling and Particulars 
The Puritans investigated here generally take calling, minimally, to be the 
particularization of the virtues in a moral agent. Additionally, they take the character of 
calling to be relative to significant accidental intrinsic properties and significant relations 
to other people, places, and the times of each person in which it is instantiated. These 
terms, and their specific relation to the Puritans, will be explained in more detail below. 
 The fact that calling is a particularization of general dispositions, in conjunction 
with particular properties and relations, allows its character not to be the same in all 
cases. While the Puritans take calling to be a universal moral good, that is, a good that all 
people ought unconditionally to pursue, they also take the character of calling to be 
indexical, meaning that its intension (in particular instances) is contextually sensitive and 
is determined by the character of the person in whom it is instantiated in a particular 
context. Calling is a particularization of virtue, so its character is dictated by what it is to 
be a particular, properly functioning human, and that is not going to be the same across 
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the board. This will be addressed in much more detail in the following chapter, but 
before we can continue a discussion on the particularizing of calling, we need to draw our 
gaze back to the first of two aspects of universal calling. 1 
Calling and Universals 
Above, I noted that the means by which calling is instantiated will be different 
from person to person. This is because, whereas the character of the virtues in a person 
are grounded in that person being of a certain kind, i.e. what she is essentially, calling is 
grounded in the conjunction of those virtues with the accidental intrinsic properties and 
relations of a person, i.e. what she is accidentally. Here we move from a description of the 
particular calling of the individual to a description of one of the two aspects of universal 
calling: moral development. The virtues that will be addressed throughout this chapter 
are always the same in character, because their character is dictated by what it is to be a 
properly functioning human, something that is true generally, for all humans. 
 We see the above most explicitly in Williams Perkins’ definition of calling. He 
defines calling as, “a certain kinde of life, ordained and imposed on man by God for the 
common good.”2 For the rest of the thesis, this definition will function as the organizing 
principle and I will take each part of the definition in turn. Here, in this chapter, we will 
discuss what Perkins means by a ‘kind of life.’ What this chapter is specifically concerned 
with are the modes of being related to the moral development of persons towards the 
universal telos of humankind that was discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
With regard to the first phrase of the definition, “kind of life,” Perkins means an 
“order of leading our lives in this world,” like the monarch governing their country or a 
man governing his home.3 A ‘kind of life’ is a kind of character of life or being a certain 
kind of person. In this chapter, we will see that the development and habituation of 	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character is important for the Puritans. For this reason, being a Christian is important to 
doing work well. Robert Bolton states that sometimes “formall hypocriates” have good 
vocations, but that this is like a “stage-plaier; who sometimes putteth on roabes and 
maiestie of a prince, himself being a base and neglected state.”4 Perkins also writes that it 
is the heart of the person doing the work that makes that work good, just as when the 
publican and the Pharisee went to the temple to pray and the publican left justified while 
the Pharisee did not.5 We will see this principle (in order for one to do virtuous actions, 
one must be virtuous) in more detail later in this chapter. To put it in the Puritan 
vernacular, in order for one to be virtuous, one must first be made righteous through 
Christ. In the doctrine of calling, there is again an emphasis on this. 
 In order to look at the particulars of the Puritan conception of virtue, as it relates 
to contemporary thought in virtue ethics, we need to briefly widen our scope. In the next 
section, we will look at the differences between classical eudaemonism and contemporary 
virtue ethics. 
Virtue Ethics and Eudaemonism 
There has been a growing interest in virtue ethics because of the work of 
Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntrye.6 Virtue ethics has now received “full 
status” as a legitimate ethical theory along with emotivism, utilitarianism and 
deontology.7 The use of virtues can now be found outside of ethics in other areas of 
theology and philosophy, for example biblical studies, 8 virtue epistemology,9 and in social 
sciences,10 for example in psychology. Talbot Brewer, I think humorously, writes, “the 
history of ethics looks like a story of progress only if its main texts are read in reverse 
chronological order.”11 In one sense I agree with Brewer’s analysis, on the other hand, his 
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9 See, Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Oxford: OUP, 2007); 
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of 
Knowledge (New York: CUP, 1996). 
10 See, Kristján Kristjánsson, Aristotle, Emotions, and Education (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
11 Brewer, Retrieval, 1. 
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‘reverse chronology’ in not totally accurate as the Puritans can function as a resource for 
discussions of virtue. 
But here we reach an issue. Virtues, and virtue ethics, are not yet very descriptive. 
These terms could take on a number of different meanings. We are seeing that classical 
eudaemonism requires much more with regard to ontology and personhood whereas 
some virtue ethics can be grounded in constructivist historical and social conventions. 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue argues that metaphysics does not need to be an important aspect 
of virtue ethics. He has since changed his position on this, but many have not moved 
from his original position. The differences between virtue ethics generally and specifically 
classical eudaemonism is that the latter requires an in-depth discussion of ontology and 
personhood.12 For example, Michael Slote claims to have created a virtue ethic that is, as 
he maintains, not dependent upon Aristotle. Christine Swanson’s brand of virtue ethic 
looks far more like Nietzsche than the Ancients and Medievals. Then there is Jennifer 
Herdt’s attempt to leave behind a Thomist virtue ethics in favor of Erasmus.13 Within the 
designation of ‘Puritan’ itself, there are distinctions. Jean Porter reads American Puritan 
Jonathan Edwards as concerned with virtue, but with a strongly Humeian moral-sense 
approach, placing moral judgments in the realm of sentiment rather than of reason.14 
Late twentieth century virtue ethics and eudaemonism have several overlapping qualities 
that at times make them indistinguishable. But there are some slight differences that need 
to be addressed briefly here before moving on. 
Overlapping concerns of both virtue ethics and eudaemonism include character 
habituation and dispositions to act, feel and respond rightly in a variety of situations. The 
object is to be able to respond to a situation as a kind of second nature. However, virtue 
ethics does not necessarily mean that a person is being habituated towards any one 
particular end or good. It is about good character, not necessarily about teleology. A virtue 
ethicist can ignore metaphysical concerns and base their virtue and character on cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 163; 196. 
13 Jennifer A Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008). 
14 Jean Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” in Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Robin Gill, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 95–6; For another reading of Edward’s ethics that does not take Porter’s position 
see Clyde A. Holbrook, Ethics of Jonathan Edwards: Morality and Aesthetics, 1St Edition (The University of 
Michigan Press, 1973). 
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or historical concerns.15 The virtue ethicist’s grounding for character could be quite 
relative. 
Eudaemonism, on the other hand, as we have already observed, is metaphysically 
rich and is concerned with the right kind of happiness associated with the kind of thing in 
question. Virtue, for the eudaemonist, is for the sake of, and thus a constituent of, the 
happy life. The central question of the virtue ethicist is, “who should I be?” while the 
central moral question for a eudaemonist is, “what good can I bring into effect, express, 
attain or realize?” The happiness-based ethic argued for in this thesis places God as the 
good, the telos and the ultimate happiness. The virtue ethicist’s argument that the goal of 
their system is to make actions become ‘second nature’ is a bit of a misnomer, as the basis 
for their character and inclinations does not necessarily have anything to do with ‘nature’ 
at all. It is essential, at least according to Aquinas, that morality has considerations of 
human nature and that the virtues fit the appropriate nature of “creatures whose destiny 
was nothing less than to be friends with God.”16 Virtue perfects us so that we can follow 
our natural inclination in the right way.17 
How does this relate to the Puritans? The Puritan emphasis on happiness and 
virtues aligns with a tradition that emphasizes that the right kinds of virtues need to fit 
specific natures, that is, humankind expresses certain virtues in terms of a distinctively 
human form of goodness based on natural faculties as opposed to strictly cultural or 
traditional contexts. We will now look more specifically at the Puritans’ adoption of 
classical eudaemonism in more detail. 
Moral Virtue 
 We will here begin to look at how the Puritans conceived of moral development 
and virtue. We will first describe the finer points of virtue and eudaemonism by looking at 
Aristotle. We will then extend our horizon to look at Aquinas and the Puritans. We start 
here by looking at the moral virtue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Jorge L. A. Garcia, “Virtue Ethics,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 840–42. 
16 Stanley Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2001), 41; 266. 
17 Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Gerald Malsbary (South Bend: St. Augustines 
Press, 1952), 37; Aquinas, ST, II–II 108.2. 
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At the very basic level, for the Ancients generally, a virtue is a disposition to do the 
right thing and to have the right feelings and emotions in various areas of life.18 Aristotle 
separates virtue, and by extension excellence, into two kinds: intellectual and moral.19 
Intellectual excellence requires time, education and experience, while moral excellence 
requires habit (ἒξις), which is defined in the Metaphysics as “a kind of activity of the haver 
and the had—something like action or movement.” Having ἒξις is a “disposition 
according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, either in itself or 
with reference to something else.”20 Moral virtues are “dispositions of our emotions which 
help us respond correctly to practical situations.”21 
None of the moral excellences arise in us by nature “for nothing that exists by 
nature can form a habit contrary to its nature,” that is, if the nature of p is to do y kinds of 
things, p cannot be trained to behave like ¬y.22 We are adapted by nature to receive 
excellences, which we reflect by habit. Things that come to mankind by nature acquire 
potentiality and later exhibit actuality. “Men become builders by building and lyre-players 
by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing 
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.”23 
For Aquinas, moral virtue is not to deprive the function of the sensitive appetite, 
but rather to “make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper 
acts.”24 Virtue directs the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. Like 
Aristotle, Aquinas sees the animal “passions [as] a movement of the sensitive appetite 
when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational 
soul, when we think of good or evil.”25 Also, building on the previous chapter, there must 
be moral virtues in order for contemplation to take place. This was an emphasis of both 
Aquinas and the Puritans. The passions must be settled by the reason.26 We will discuss 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Annas, Morality, 108. 
19 Aristotle, EN, 1103a14. 
20 Aristotle, Meta, 1022b4–11; Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick (London: W. 
Heinemann; G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1933). ἒξις can also mean ‘habit’ or ‘state.’ 
21 Hutchinson, “Ethics,” 206. The moral virtues and the emotions will be addressed at length 
towards the end of this chapter.  
22 Aristotle, EN, 1103a20. 
23 Ibid., 1103a33–1103b2; W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), 104. 
24 Aquinas, ST, I–II 59.4. 
25 Ibid., q.22.a3. 
26 Ibid., II–II 180.2. 
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how the development of virtues relates to the passions in more detail later in this chapter. 
We now turn to the Puritans on moral virtues. 
Puritans and the Moral Virtues 
The Puritan conception of virtue is very close to the model given above in 
Aristotle and Aquinas. Perkins, in The True Manner of Knowing Christ Crucified, writes that 
Christ’s benefits to his followers are three-fold: (1) his merit, (2) his virtue and (3) his 
example.27 Christ’s virtue, according to Perkins, has a double benefit. The first benefit of 
Christ’s virtue is that through the “power of his death” God “creates new hearts in all 
them that beleeve in him, and make them new creations” and begins the process of 
mortifying and crucifying “the corruptions of our minds, wills, affections.”28 This first 
aspect of Perkins’ view of virtue, much like that of Aristotle and Aquinas, has a sense of 
purifying movement towards some good or end. The second aspect of Christ’s virtue, for 
Perkins, is the “vertue of Christs resurrection.”29 Perkins makes clear that this double 
virtue must be more than speculative; it must be experiential.30 It is by this experiential 
sense of Christ’s resurrection that Christians “labour” to kill and mortify sins and “put 
spiritual life into us.”31 We must have “spiritual resurrection.” As Christ rose from the 
grave so are we to do the work of coming out of our graves. “This worke cannot be done 
at once but by degrees, as God shall give grace.”32 If resurrection is perfection for Perkins, 
this statement seems to imply that he sees a progression towards a supernatural end.33 
It is also interesting that Perkins says that Christ’s example is one of his benefits, as 
having good examples and moral exemplars are the key ways in which eudaemonists 
claim moral education occurs. “Emulation” for Aristotle is the “pain” of 
 
[S]eeing the presence, in persons whose nature is like our own, of good things that are highly 
valued and are possible for ourselves to acquire; but because we have not for them ourselves.34 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Perkins, CC, 11. There are many moral implications to the merit that Christians receive from 
Christ with regard to political peace and property, to name a few. However, these benefits are outside of the 
scope of this thesis. 
28 Ibid., 23 Emphasis Mine; Campbell, Religion of the Heart, 48. 
29 Perkins, CC, 23. 
30 Ibid., 24. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 29. 
33 Also see R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinsim to 1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 72; Hall, MV, 164. 
34 Aristotle, Rhet, 1388a29–32. 
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The definition might lead one to believe that emulation is a negative thing, resembling 
something like envy, especially as emulation has an aspect of pain involved with it. 
Emulation, however, is “a good feeling felt by good people,” while envy is “a bad feeling 
felt by bad people.”35 Emulation gives us the desire to secure good things, while envy 
gives us the desire to stop our neighbor from possessing good things. The person who 
wants to emulate someone is motivated to improve “so that they may in the end deserve 
the goods they desire.”36 The good student of ethics, for Aristotle, is not one who learns 
only by moral rules or precepts but one who learns “the that” and “the because” of moral 
action and lives well by observing the prudent and wise person and emulating them.37 
The person of practical wisdom (φρόνιμος) is the rule by which to measure what is fine 
and pleasant. For Aristotle, practical wisdom, or prudence, is the intellectual virtue that 
serves the moral virtues by helping the moral virtues to find right and suitable means to 
their ends. 
Aristotle’s ideas about moral education are that “prudence is concerned with 
particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a 
young person lacks experience.”38 That is, someone who reasons excellently on moral 
matters and is in possession of “the that” and “the because,” both the particular and the 
universal moral principles, is the picture of virtue at its finest in both the intellect and 
affect. This person has acquired a disposition to do and to love good by habituating good 
actions. By engaging her intellect in exploring the reasons behind what makes good 
actions good, she has further cemented her disposition to do the good by gaining the 
wisdom to discern the right thing, “for the right end, in the right way, at the right time” in 
any situation.39 
 Perkins’ use of Christ as a moral exemplar functions in much the same way as 
Aristotle’s prudent person. Mark McIntosh, in Divine Teaching, gives an example of how 
the activity of reasoning, studying and observing God begins to actually create habits 
within the observer. In order for a person to truly study and observe their subject, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid., 1388a34. 
36 Kristjánsson, Emotions, and Education, 105. 
37 Ibid., 99–113; Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics. 
38 Aristotle, EN, 1142a13–16. 
39 Ibid., 1115b17–18. 
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would have to begin to take on the characteristics of the object of study.40 In the same 
way as McIntosh describes, Christ, for Perkins, is not just a redeemer; upon our reflection 
on him, he is to show us the “paterne of all good duties, to which wee ought to conforme 
ourselves.”41 Citing 2 Corinthians 11:1, Perkins writes, “Christ must be followed in the 
practise of every good duty that may concerne us without exception simply and 
absolutely”42 
The emphasis on moral exemplars is also found in Baxter. “Reason” he writes, 
“concludes that for the Best, which is so in the judgment of the best and wisest men.” 
Baxter believed that God “hides not from his people the end they should aim at and 
attain” and that one learns to be good by the examples of good and wise people.43 God 
has provided through scripture wise persons, such as Abraham, Moses, the prophets and 
Christ himself, for us to look. Baxter writes, “If the holiest men are the best and wisest, 
then their Lives tell you their judgements; and their unwearied labour and sufferings for 
this Rest, shews you they take it for the perfection of their happiness.” We should not look 
to “dying men” who are not yet in “their right minds.” Christians appeal to the unerring 
judgment of Wisdom it self.”44 
In Perkins and Baxter, we have seen a description of how one becomes virtuous 
and develops one’s character. These thinkers have emphasized Christ as an exemplar, 
and in this way, they resemble Aquinas more than they resemble Aristotle. But, as we will 
see in Chapter 7, in the section on friendship, they also emphasize the importance of 
community. We will now turn to other characteristics of the moral virtues in Puritan 
thought. 
Continuing our discussion of moral virtues more generally, Robert Bolton writes, 
“an absolute integritie of all concurrents is required to make a good worke acceptable to 
God.” He goes on to say that the end intended must be good and for the glory of God. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mark McIntosh, Divine Teaching: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 
2008), 4–6. 
41 Perkins, CC, 25. 
42 Ibid., 26. Christ as an example is also seen in Perkins, GLE, 6; Hall also writes, “I will honour 
good examples, but I will live by good precepts.” Hall, MV, 185; For More on Christ as example in Baxter 
see, Baxter, CD, 91. 
43 Baxter, SER, 60. 
44 Ibid., 60–1. It may seem in this passage that Baxter does not recommend the use of philosophy 
for wisdom. However, he notes later that he is happy using philosophers to do his theology as long as one 
does not view “Cicero and Aristotle above Christ.” 518. 
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“The action itself in its own nature must be just and warrantable; the circumstances 
honest and seasonable; the meanes direct and lawfull; the fountain, the heart, sincere and 
sanctified.”45 “The moralists,” Bolton writes, “through nature saw a true proportion able 
to this, even in the actions of virtue. For them it was not just the outward action, but the 
inward and free and independent uprightness of the mind.”46 For the ‘moralists,’ an 
action is truly virtuous if it requires a resolved knowledge, freedom of spirit, habit of the 
mind and an entire love to the fairness of virtue. Therefore, accidental moral good actions 
do not have the full weight of a good moral action.47 Bolton’s concerns here sound very 
close to Aristotle’s necessary conditions for good actions. Aristotle shows that an agent 
must be in a certain condition when he does actions. He must have knowledge; he must 
choose the acts, and choose them for their own sake; and these actions need to come from 
a firm character. These are the conditions of fully virtuous actions. 
Bolton continues, stating that God cares about the heart not just the action and 
that Pharisees may have deceived themselves into thinking that they were in a state of 
true happiness.48 Actions without sincerity of heart are nothing, because they do not come 
from the inward affection of the worker.49 Moral virtues and outward performances of 
religion are good. Bolton does not deny that moral virtuousness is good, and is excellent 
in itself: “the outward performance of religious duties, and the excersise of the meanes of 
our conuersion, are necessarie.”50 But these outward “performances” should not be used 
in order to get applause:  
 
If morall vertousnesse were able to put on the greatest magnificence, and applause, that ever it 
anciently enioyed amougnst the precisest Romans; whereby it might worthly draw into admiration 
and iust challenge euen these times of Christianty: yet in respect of acceptance with God, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Bolton, DSTH, 64. 
46 Ibid. For Augustine, faith in the incarnation requires that believers reject the concept of an 
autonomous moral reason in the soul. The source of virtue is Christ, and to accept perfect human virtue 
can be found only in Christ. Robert Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 72; “For what kind of mistress over the body and the vices can a mind 
be that is ignorant of the true God and is not subjected to his rule, but instead is prostituted to the 
corrupting influence of vicious demons?” The virtues must be in relation to God. Augustine, City of God, ed. 
John O’ Meara, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), XIX.25. 
47 Bolton, DSTH, 64. 
48 Ibid., 65. 
49 Ibid., 60. 
50 Ibid., 14. 
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conformitie to his will; and being not guilded, and sanctified by supernatural grace, it is but at the 
best, the very filthinesse of a monstrous clout.51 
 
However, man is sinful. The best man should not be deceived into thinking that with the 
“choisest and profoundest learning” or the expression “in action and ciuill honestie,” the 
“absolute portraiture of Aristotles moral virtues,” he can profess true happiness without 
“supernaturall illumination, and the divine graces, of faith, love, zeale sinceritie spiritual 
wisdome, a sanctified contention of spirit.”52 
I believe that Aristotle would take issue with Bolton’s accusation. For Aristotle, 
virtue alone does not make one happy; this is, however, the case for the Stoics. In 
Aristotelian eudaemonism, for true eudaemonia, more than just virtue is required, like 
external goods of fortune.53 That happiness requires some wealth is something that the 
Puritans would generally deny, but then again, so would Aquinas. Drawing upon 
Aristotle’s distinction between natural and artificial wealth, and disagreeing with his 
conclusion about wealth, Aquinas shows that external goods are not sufficient for 
happiness.54 The Puritans are closer to Aquinas with regard to external wealth and 
attaining happiness. It still stands that Bolton’s criticism of the person with “Aristotles 
moral virtues” is not necessarily fair.55 
For Church of England clergyman John Preston (1587–1628), prayer, which is 
usually associated with the building of virtue and character, must be done regardless of 
the way the prayer feels about the authenticity of the prayer itself. Preston argues that “a 
man by setting himselfe upon the worke,” of actively praying “shall gather a fitnesse, 
though he were unfit at the first.” The very practice and use of the heart “makes it fit for 
the duty.”56 Reynolds, in similarity to Preston, thinks of virtue like external goods of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid.; Joseph Hall similarly notes that “a mans best monument is his vertuous actions.” Hall, 
MV, 82. 
52 Bolton, DSTH, 20. 
53 Aristotle, EN, 1095b32–1096a2. 
54 Aquinas, ST, I–II 2.1. 
 55 Hall makes an interesting comment about wealth and virtue. He states that he “will account 
vertue the best riches, knowledge the next, riches the worst; and there fore will labour to bee vertuous and 
learned without condition; as for riches, if they fall in my way, I refuse them not; but if not I desire them 
not.” Hall, MV, 165. 
56 John Preston, The Saints Daily Exercise A Treatise Vnfolding the Whole Dutie of Prayer. Delivered in Fiue 
Sermons Vpon I Thess. 5. 17. By the Late Faithfull and Worthy Minister of Iesus Christ, Iohn Preston, Dr. in Divinity, 
Chaplaine in Ordinary to His Maiesty, Master of Emmanuel Colledge in Cambridge, and Sometimes Preacher of Lincolnes 
Inne., ed. John Davenport, Early English Books, 1475-1640 / 1555:01 (London: Printed by W[illiam] 
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body. “As we see in external riches of the body, none desire them more egerly then those 
that possesse them; and the more vertuous the Soule of man is, the more is the heart 
enlarged in the apperition of a greater measure.”57 
Focusing on the relationship of the passions to the virtues, Reynolds cites Tully, 
who is in turn quoting the Peripatetics, that the passions are the “sharpeners and…the 
Whetstones of Virtue, which make it more operative and fruitful: for the Passions stirring 
up the saints, and quickening the Fancie, hath thereby a direct influence upon habits and 
manners of the Minde.”58 
Thomas Goodwin writes in The Returne of Prayers that prayer is said to help to keep 
duties. Prayer keeps man upon the path, keeps him diligent in his duty.59 If ordnance is 
just a duty, then just doing the action itself is good enough, but we should be continually 
looking for the outcomes of these duties.60 The law of God consists of commands and 
duties, not to be followed in themselves, but a means to blessing and flourishing.61 These 
statements by Goodwin seem to address the issue raised by modern ethicist William 
Schaller’s ‘standard view,’ which states that the end of virtue is to obey moral rules. This 
will be discussed in more detail later, in Chapter 7. We have seen above that the Puritans 
adopted the previous eudaemonist tradition of moral virtues. We will now look at how 
they discussed the intellectual virtues. 
Intellectual Virtues 
In this section, we will begin by explicating Aristotle’s own thought on intellectual 
virtues. We will continue by looking at Robert Bolton’s almost wholehearted endorsement 
of Aristotle on this topic. Though we only focus on Bolton here, other Puritans’ 
embracing of the intellectual virtues will be discussed at greater length throughout the rest 
of this chapter. The intellectual virtues are important for the Puritans because of the close 
relationship that exists between the intellect, or understanding, and the will. Especially, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I[ones] for Nicholas Bourne, and are to be solde at the south entrance of the Royall Exchange, 1629., 
1629), 74–5. 
57 Reynolds, TPFS, 167; Reynolds cites here, Aristotle, “Pol.,” Bk 1.6. 
58 Reynolds, TPFS, 57–8. 
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how the intellect and the will relate to the use of passions in doing right actions.62  We 
shall investigate this in more detail later in this chapter. 
Right action, for Aristotle, is an important balance between the passions, with 
which moral virtues are concerned, and with reason, which is related to the intellectual 
virtues. Moral excellence is concerned with choice that is “deliberate desire, therefore 
true reasoning” and true and right desire. The intellectual virtues are important for 
Aristotle because, as we have seen, humans are rational animals, and humans are at their 
best when they are doing things that are good for humans to do; namely reasoning. It is 
good for humans to know the truth about things, and the intellectual virtues help us in the 
process of learning truth. The only overlapping virtue between the moral and the 
intellectual virtues is prudence, “whose function is to enable us to know the correct way to 
behave.”63 The intellectual virtues give us the reason necessary in order to achieve a 
mean state,64 which I address in further detail below.  
 The rational soul has two aspects: (1) scientific, when it contemplates things that 
cannot be otherwise; and (2) calculative, when it thinks of things that can be otherwise.65 
Aristotle is interested in finding the function of the scientific and the calculative parts of 
the reason. Scientific knowledge (ἐπιστἠμη), as defined in the Prior Analytics and Posterior 
Analytics. is concerned with deductions concerning nature.66 The second intellectual virtue 
that helps with scientific knowledge is comprehension or understanding (νοῦς), which we 
have addressed in the previous chapter. Philosophical wisdom (σοφἰα) is a combination of 
the two intellectual virtues above and is the “most finished of the form of knowledge.”67 
Contemplation is the combination of these three virtues.  
 Aristotle makes a distinction between philosophical wisdom and prudence. 
Prudence is the ability to “deliberate well about what is good and expedient for 
himself.”68 A person who exemplifies prudence knows what is good for her and for people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For discussion of the relationship between intellect, will, passions and moral and theological 
virtues see Baxter, SER, 437–443. 
63 Hutchinson, “Ethics,” 206. 
64 Aristotle, EN, 1138b18–25. 
65 Ibid., 1139a5–17. 
66 See ibid., Bk VI.3; Aristotle, “Posterior Analytics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised 
Oxford Translation, ed. and trans. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), I.1; 
I.3. 
67 Aristotle, EN, 1141a17; 1141b1–3. 
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in general. Prudence, then, is “concerned with things human and things about which it is 
possible to deliberate” and things that are “brought about by action.” Aristotle describes 
the prudent man as one who:  
 
[I]s without qualification good at deliberating [and] is capable of aiming in accordance with 
calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action.69  
 
Prudence is not concerned with universals only, but must also consider particulars 
because particulars are concerned with practice. Just as medicine does not control health, 
so practical wisdom does not control theoretical reason.70 Thus prudence is of the utmost 
importance because it is concerned with both universals and particulars, whereas wisdom 
is only concerned with universals. The fifth intellectual virtue is art or technical skill 
(τἐχνη). This is concerned with bringing something into being, which can be equated with 
the craft of the shoemaker or medical doctor (who brings health into being). The first 
three virtues mentioned above (knowledge, understanding, wisdom) are scientific and are 
about facts in the universe that cannot be altered. The last two virtues (prudence, art) are 
calculative and are virtues of the mind that can bring about change. Now that a very 
basic understanding of Aristotle has been given, we can move on to the Puritans to see 
their particular agreements and disagreements. 
Puritans and the Intellectual Virtues 
 In Discourse of True Happinesse, Bolton is interested in probing the distinctions 
between the “formall hypocrite,” who is without saving grace, and the person in the 
“state of grace.” He is particularly interested to see if the “kinds of perfection, and degrees 
of goodnesse; whereof a man as yet unregenerate is capable, and may bee partaker.” He 
ultimately finds a few differences, one being that “the word and faith in the formall 
hypocrite have no root,” that is, they are not “rooted and planted in his understanding, 
conscience, thoughts, affections, and actions.”71 The formall hypocrite does not have the 
habits which St. Paul calls “σοφια and συνἑσει πνευματικη,”72 “heavenly knowledge, or 
speculative wisdome in the mysteries of salvation: And spiritual prudence, or a sanctified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid., 1141b8–14. 
70 C. D. C Reeve, Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (Cambridge: HUP, 2012), 
250. 
71 Bolton, DSTH, 88. Emphasis mine. 
 72 Bolton is citing Colossians 1:9. In Bolton’s original version the Greek does not have breathing 
marks. 
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understanding in the practical affairs of the soul.” Bolton understands these two virtues as 
proportional to Aristotle’s two intellectual habits of sapientia (wisdom) and prudentia 
(prudence), as cited from book six of EN.73 
 Bolton continues with his Aristotelian distinction to clarify that sapientia is in the 
schools and that it is a habit compounded of the intelligencia (understanding). “Intelligencia is 
a naturall light and ability of apprehending and acknowledging speculative principles, the 
foundations and fountains of all humane knowledge.”74 
 Scientia (knowledge) is the habitual and exact understanding of all necessary 
“conclusions and deductions by force of reason.” Just as we have seen above, scientific 
knowledge, for Aristotle, is knowledge that is teachable and can be learned. It is taught 
through induction and deduction. Scientific knowledge is “known by its necessity,” is 
“eternal” and is “ungenerated and imperishable.”75 Both Aristotle and Bolton see scientia 
as the habit and proper use of reason, though Bolton does not explicitly mention the use 
of induction in the Discourse, while Aristotle sees both as necessary. 
 Bolton writes of prudentia that it is rooted in the understanding but is also used 
practically “in respect of the Object and the end and is the sovereign and guide of all 
other vertues.” This definition is nearly identical with that of Aristotle, as both ground 
prudence in “human concerns.” Prudence concerns “things open to deliberation.” The 
prudent person is one who deliberates well.76 The good deliberator is one “whose aim 
accords with rational calculation in pursuit of the best good for a human being that is 
achievable in action.”77 Aristotle also sees prudence as the chief virtue. In both cases, 
Aristotle and Bolton, Prudentia is about practical action; it is also the most important of all 
the virtues. 
 Of the five virtues that Aristotle discusses in book six of EN, Bolton does not 
mention the virtue of art or craft. However, Bolton does go on in the same section to talk 
about calling and vocation, which is how Aquinas talks about the intellectual virtue of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Bolton, DSTH, 88; For Augustine, ratio sapientiae consists in the faith, hope, and love through 
which the mind reflects on God and on those eternal things (res aeternae) that pertain to God, such as true 
virtue and happiness, as well as eternal rest. Augustine calls ratio sapientiae “contemplation” Dodaro, Just 
Society, 165.  
74 Bolton, DSTH, 89. 
75 Aristotle, “EN,” 1139b15–35. 
76 Ibid., 1140a25–30, 1141b10–14. 
77 Ibid., 1141b10–14. 
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art.78 Art as a virtue is present in Bolton, but perhaps in a more Thomist sense. With that 
said, Bolton, with almost no variation, derives his thought on intellectual virtues from 
Aristotelian thought.79 Now that a brief overview of the virtues has been laid out, we must 
look at how it is that these virtues develop our character. 
Habituation and the Theological Virtues 
Aristotle’s moral education strongly emphasizes habituation. The activities of 
virtue must be practiced and habituated so that one can acquire a right state of character 
(ἒξις).80 Actions should accord with right reason, but both rational and non-rational 
desires must be trained. Each person in every case must consider the right actions so that 
these actions become second nature.81 Actions that come from a state of character are 
“effortless but careful and attentive.”82 An agent must “be in a certain condition” when 
they act, that is, they must first “have knowledge”; second, must “choose [the acts] for 
their own sake”; and third, as we have seen, “actions must precede form a firm 
unchanging character.”83 
This presents a potential ‘problem’ for Aristotle, who says that we acquire virtue 
by being virtuous, but also that we must be virtuous in order to do virtuous actions. 
Unfortunately, Aristotle’s solution to this potential problem leaves him with other 
dilemmas.84 Aquinas’ discussion of infused and acquired virtues adds an interesting 
component to Aristotle. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle’s account of the virtues but adds a 
direct divine element. He writes, “some habits are infused by God into man,” that is, God 
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is the “efficient cause of infused virtues” which he works in us, but not without our 
consent. Thus “infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part,” but 
not without our consent.85 This is a departure from classical virtues, as Aristotle, as we 
have seen, thought that a habit (disposition) “informs a reason-governed power in such a 
way as to perfect the activity of that power.”86 However, Aquinas takes a much more 
Augustinian position, noting that virtue is living righteously and is something which “God 
works in us without us.”87 How this plays out will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter and in the next, in a discussion on concurrence. All virtues, with the exception of 
the theological virtues, are both infused and acquired. However, the theological virtues of 
faith, hope and charity are only infused and not acquired, “first, because their object is 
God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us 
by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine 
revelation, contained in Holy Writ.”88 We should hear echoes of the discussion of sacra 
doctrina from the previous chapter concerning the importance of God and revelation in 
breaking through philosophy’s reason cap. 
Acquired virtues, for Aquinas, are the traditional, cardinal virtues: temperance, 
fortitude, justice and prudence.89 These four cardinal, or acquired, virtues are infused 
along with the theological virtue of charity.90 Jean Porter helpfully writes, “the 
transforming effects of grace go all the way down, so to speak, transforming each of the 
operative capacities and power of the human person through infused analogues of the 
acquired cardinal virtues.”91 The infused virtues direct us to something that is higher than 
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our own natures, in a way a “higher nature.”92 Those who have the infused virtues also 
have the beginnings of acquired virtues. Aquinas even goes so far as to say that “grace 
perfects nature.”93 
Aquinas gives two reasons why God infuses habits. The first reason is “because 
there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion 
of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man.”94 Aquinas 
continues, “habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, 
therefore it is necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion 
of human nature.” The sorts of habits that Aquinas is discussing here “can never be in 
man except by divine infusion.”95 Aquinas’ second reason for why habits are infused is 
because God “can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes.” 
What Aquinas means by this is that God, on occasions, can show His power. “He [God] 
causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at 
times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which 
can be caused by a natural power.”96 This brings us back to the discussion addressed in 
Chapter 2 concerning natural and supernatural ends. It is through the acquired virtues 
that one can attain a connatural form of natural happiness. The theological virtues, which 
are infused by grace, allow mankind to move towards supernatural ends.  
For Aquinas, moral principles can be known without divine assistance. By reason, 
someone without the indwelling Holy Spirit can know good and true ends because sin has 
not touched the reason. Only by grace and the theological virtues can one achieve 
beatitude. In addition, Eleonore Stump notes that it is at this point that Thomist virtues 
cease to be Aristotelian virtues, in that, with the infusion of love, the acquired virtues 
become the gifts of the Holy Spirit. For example, “temperance becomes the fear of the 
Lord and justice becomes pietas.”97 There is still a place for the reason without the spirit in 
the ethical life, but God infuses ‘true’ virtues. Classical courage is a virtue, but it is not in 
its full form without the Holy Spirit. Therefore, we can see that Aquinas adopts the 	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93 Ibid., I 60.5. 
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95 Ibid., I–II 51.4. 
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Aristotelian moral virtues but reshapes them, showing an immediate divine aspect of 
them that not only helps with the cyclical dilemma in Aristotle’s conception of virtue but 
also makes his own ethics distinctly Christian. 
We can now turn our attention to the Puritans on the habituation of virtue and 
the role of God in this development. What we will see below in the Puritan discussion of 
virtue is a very close connection between the habituation of virtue and the infusion of 
theological virtues as described above in Aquinas; like Aquinas, the Puritans go beyond 
Aristotle. 
The idea of habits and dispositions being essential parts of the development of 
virtue is common amongst the Puritans.98 In respect to the habituation of rational virtues, 
Bolton believes that one cannot cultivate these without the Spirit. This is one of the most 
significant differences between the ‘formal hypocrite’ and ‘saving grace’ found in 
scripture. Imagine that one man has many perfections of virtues, “and yet it remaine 
starke blind in the mysteries of salvation.” Without grace and faith, all these virtues are 
like “rich attire upon a leprous bodie.” The person without grace and faith may express 
the Greek virtues, but without the divine grace that brings a person to God “in all kinds 
of duties” and puts them “into possession of happinesse.” This person cannot “perceive 
the things of the spirit of God.”99 What Bolton is communicating here is that the formal 
hypocrite can be prudent and can be excellent at his work, but the regenerated person 
can be excellent and something more.100 
 We can see that Aquinas and Bolton would agree in this regard. When discussing 
sacra doctrina in the first part of the Summa, Aquinas argues that wisdom is an infused 
virtue. In the order of human life, the prudent man is called wise, in as much as he directs 
his acts to a fitting end.” The one who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole 
universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Sapientia is said to be the knowledge of 	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divine things. Thus higher habits can only come through the gifts of the Spirit and 
through knowledge of scripture. It is by scripture, not through philosophy alone, that we 
are able to know our end.101 Wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and “denotes a certain 
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law.”102 We can also see continuity 
between Aquinas and Bolton in that there is some wisdom that someone without divine 
grace can have, but there is a higher wisdom that is from the Spirit. Aquinas notes,  
 
the wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired 
intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is ‘descending from 
above’ (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in 
itself, whereas it belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the 
gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because ‘a man judges well what he knows’ (Ethic. i, 3).103  
 
For Aquinas “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to 
sins.”104 And this wisdom presupposes charity, which is “incompatible with mortal sin.”105 
 Further, Bolton continues, these virtues spring out of the mystery of regeneration 
and the ‘formal hypocrite’ is ignorant of Satan's schemes. Satan tricks the hypocrite to 
think that they are flourishing and tries to mix work in with our salvation.106 We saw in 
Chapter 2 that Bolton thinks that there is some semblance of happiness in this life, but he 
also admits that one weapon of Satan is earthly happiness and honor.107 
Bolton was not the only Puritan who envisioned virtues in this way. “Saving 
Grace,” for Richard Baxter, is the “special effects of this Work of the Spirit on the Soul, 
commonly called Habitual Grace, or the Spirit in us,” our “seed of God abiding,” “real 
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holiness” and “new natures.”108 It is from saving grace that all other graces proceed. 
Baxter makes the distinction that ‘common grace’ allows for good dispositions, but only 
special grace contains habituation within it. He goes on to note that habituation and 
dispositions come in degrees. The “carnal man by the help of common grace” may be 
able to have a “weak inclination” to the superior good and a strong inclination to the 
“fleshly, Earthly, Inferior good.”109 
‘Habitual Grace’ and the habituation of virtue seem to be very close conceptually. 
In the same passage looked at above, Baxter goes on to note that good acts are an 
important signifier of habituation. He cites sixteenth century jurist and moral theologian 
Francisco Suarez to articulate “habits are not to be felt in themselves, but only by their 
acts.” Baxter explains that acts discern the habit. “We cannot know that we are disposed 
to Love God, but by feeling the stirrings of Love to him. So that it is the Act that we must 
directly look for, and thence discern the Habit.”110  Baxter describes good actions as 
being a mean state between two extremes, an ethical concept that will be discussed at 
length below. Citing Aquinas, Baxter shows that discovering “marks” of true belief, 
“there is a threefold truth to be enquired after in examination: 1. The truth of the Act or 
Habit. 2. The Moral truth of it as a Grace or Duty. 3. The Moral truth of it as a Saving 
or Justifying Grace or Duty.”111 We can see that Bolton and Baxter are very much like 
Aquinas in that the ‘formal hypocrite’ and unregenerate person has the capability to 
habituate virtue to a certain extent. 
Baxter also places significant weight on God as the first mover pertaining to 
habituation and good actions. If God does not move us, we do not move. This seems to 
resemble the idea of concurrence that is found in scholastic philosophers and theologians 
including Aquinas and Suarez, in which God is the first mover of every action of every 
creature. This will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter. For Baxter, this 
is the necessary part of Christian wisdom, to keep our subordination to God and 
dependence on him. When “you once begin to trust to your own habitual Grace, and to 	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depend on your own understanding or resolution, for duty and holy walking, You are 
then in a dangerous declining state. In every duty remember Christ's words, ‘without me 
ye can do nothing.’”112 
Church of Ireland bishop George Webbe, in Practice of Quietnes, writes that 
quietness is a habitual disposition of the whole man (external and internal).113 What is also 
fascinating is Webbe’s description of the “quiet man.” Webbe begins his treatise by giving 
physical and characteristic descriptions of the man who possesses the “character of a quiet 
man.” This list includes descriptions as varied as “made of milde nature, and true 
Christian temper,” “not overladen with cares,” having large shoulders, having fortitude 
and not being a coward, and moderating himself. The quiet man also “has a charitable 
eye” and a peaceable hand.114 Interestingly, Aristotle has a similar description of the 
magnanimous man, or the man that has greatness of soul. There are certainly 
discrepancies between the description of the “quiet man” and the “magnanimous man,” 
but it is not their dissimilarities, but their equivalences, that are fascinating. Aristotle’s 
magnanimous man shares many of the same attributes mentioned above in the quiet 
man. He is moderate, charitable (liberal), slow to speak, possesses virtue and is brave.115 
The strongest points of disparity are that the magnanimous man is concerned with great 
honors, and is boastful and full of pride (as in, an excellent man deserves excellent honors, 
not in the traditional Christian understanding which would attribute this mentality as 
sinful), whereas Webbe wants to emphasize meekness and humility.  
Hursthouse helpfully shows that there is flexibility in the interpretation of Aristotle 
and his account of the virtues and other relevant issues. For example, the elitism that is 
found in Aristotle is not something that must be essentially held in order to be an 
Aristotelian. Elitism, like sexism, is present in Aristotle, but we do not need to think it is 
built into the very structure of his thought.116 Given Hursthouse’s comments here, it is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Baxter, SER, 11–12; Baxter’s comments here also strongly resemble Aristotle’s statement at the 
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981b29–30. 
113 Webbe, PQ, 7. 
114 Ibid., 9–11. The virtue of fortitude belonged to men. War was a way of showing masculinity. 
Thomas, Ends of Life, 44–5. 
115 Aristotle, EN, Bk IV. 
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(London: Penguin Books, 2010). 
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inconceivable that Webbe could replace the magnanimous man with the quiet man and 
still be thoroughly within the eudaemonistic tradition. Webbe holds on to the most 
essential and fundamental attributes of the virtuous person of character. 
Habits are an important aspect of justice for Edward Reynolds. It is by the habits 
of the soul that “we bear the image and signature of God.”117 Concerning the continual, 
cyclical movement of the development of a state of virtue Reynolds writes, “[a]s we see in 
external riches of the body, none desire them more egerly then those that possesse them; 
and the more vertuous the Soule of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the 
apperition of a greater measure.”118 Interestingly, Reynolds holds that the “Soul is Rasa 
Tabla, without any acauired or introduced habits.”119 
“Of the things that come with Grace,” John Owen thinks, “the first is the removal 
of our defilement.” This is “the habitual cleansing of our nature.” We are naturally 
unclean and also have a habituation to pollution. The grace of Christ removes our 
defilement.120  
Christ himself, according to Owen, thought that the sending of the Holy Spirit, 
“gives us habitual Grace: a principle of Grace opposed to the principle of Lust that is in 
us by nature.”121 Owen reads Joseph’s resisting temptation in Genesis as evidence that he 
had “a strong and habitual bent, against that sin” and where he was not fortified by 
“habitual grace,” Christ gave suitable help.122 But even Christ himself was in need of 
infused habitual grace in order to accomplish his task and calling on earth. The 
conformity of the "Soul of Christ, to the Will, Mind or Law of god, or his perfect 
habitually inherent Righteousness" necessarily came from being in “union” with grace. 
Owen also thinks that Christ in the incarnation was “furnished with habitual grace” and 
“could never have actually fulfilled the righteousness which was required at his hands.”123 	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119 Ibid., 5. For further discussion of Habits in Reynolds, see 4; 456. 
120 Owen, Comm., 232. For a more in-depth look at Owen and Thomist infused virtues, see 
Christopher Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). 
121 Owen, Comm, 234. 
122 Ibid., 190. 
123 Ibid., 212–15. Another important aspect of Aristotle’s idea of actions is that in order for them to 
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   121 
We have established above some of the major features of Aristotelian virtues and 
states of character, but there are other essential characteristics that the Puritans pick up 
on and use to their advantage. We also saw, in our discussion of the theological virtues, 
that there are significant Thomist similarities in the Puritans investigated here. The 
Puritans see a close connection between the development of virtue and the role of God in 
the development of certain virtues. We must once again investigate the nature of virtue 
and excellence. Of the three conditions in the soul—passions, faculties (capacities) and 
states—states best fit the criterion for excellence.124 The “excellence of man… will be the 
state which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.”125 
Moral Development and the Passions 
Above we have begun to describe what the virtues are from the perspective of the 
Puritans in order to become clear as to what is being required of humankind in God’s 
command to a ‘certain kind of life.’ We have looked at the difference between the moral 
and intellectual virtues and seen that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is a 
near complete adoption of Aristotle. We have also seen, above, a Thomist move in the 
Puritans to go beyond Aristotle, putting the emphasis of moral development in the realm 
of the supernatural, through the theological virtues. Through possession of the infused 
virtues of faith, hope and charity, the other cardinal virtues can be developed. 
In this upcoming section, we will first look at aspects of the passions and actions 
that the ancient and medieval eudaemonists and the Puritan thinkers have in common. 
Alec Ryrie notes, “most of the emotional territory… had already been well-trodden by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Choice, for Aristotle, is voluntary and deliberate, is not in irrational creatures and has to do with things that 
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entertaining temptation. Experiencing temptation is involuntary, as an external force is acting upon the 
moral agent, or the agent has a sinful thought go through their mind. Entertaining temptation, which is 
voluntary, is taking the idea and consciously thinking it through. For further discussion of this, see Alec 
Ryrie, “Sleeping, Waking, and Dreaming in Protestant Piety,” in Private and Domestic Devotion in Early Modern 
Britian, ed. Alec Ryrie and Jessica Martin (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012). 
124 Aristotle, EN, 1105b19–1106a13. The possession of passions and faculties, in themselves, is not 
worthy of being praised. This is why they are not the best things in the soul that relate to excellence. 
125 Ibid., 1106a21–23. 
	   122 
pious Catholic Christians for centuries.”126 Reformers had a lot of material to use for their 
own thought on the topic of moral development and the passions. 
For both the early eudaemonists and the Puritans, the passions need to be ordered 
by the reason. The Puritans disciplined their emotions because they knew how important 
they were. Of any other group of this time, these thinkers were the least suspicious of the 
use of passions, believing that they should be nurtured and directed, not suppressed. Our 
natural affections are not sinful.127 Ancient and medieval eudaemonists, as well as these 
later theologians, saw the importance that emotions played in the spiritual life. The 
affections give mankind insight into true happiness.128 
We will look at the relationship between passions and reason from two 
perspectives. The first is that of the relationship between the above two parts of the soul 
and what happens when there is discord, namely, the differences between virtue, 
continence and incontinence. Here we will mostly be looking at Edward Reynolds. The 
second perspective that we will look at is the relationship between reason and the passions 
in the doctrine of the mean. 
Virtue, Continence and Incontinence 
Here we will begin to discuss the right relationship between the passions and 
reason by describing what Aristotle writes on the issue. As we saw in Chapter 3, Aristotle 
thinks that the soul is made up of three parts: nutritive, sensitive and rational. Aristotle, 
based on this view of the soul and its place within the “rational animal,” emphasizes 
reason taking precedence over the passions. This is most clearly found in the four-fold 
distinction between virtuous, continent, incontinent and vicious persons. With the 
virtuous person, there is no discrepancy between the passions and the reason as to the 
right and good action. With the continent person, the rational part of the soul, which is 
pursuing right and good ends, and the non-rational part of the soul, which desires wrong 
ends, disagree with each other as to the right action. In the case of the continent person, 
the rational part of the soul overcomes the non-rational part. Functionally speaking, there 	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is no visible difference between the virtuous person and the continent person. The 
incontinent person judges accurately the best thing to do, but fails to control her desire to 
do otherwise and, as a result, acts on her desire and not her reason or better judgment.129 
Thus her non-rational soul overcomes the rational part. The incontinent person has the 
ability to reason well and knows the right action, but acts on appetite.130 A “good state is 
truth in agreement with right desire.”131 
The idea of continence and habit was adopted early in western Christian ethics, as 
seen in Augustine’s Confessions. “Lady Continence” plays a significant role in Augustine’s 
conversion experience. As the voices of “habit” are weakening, Lady Continence 
encourages Augustine to come to her and encourages him by “good examples” for him to 
follow.132 Reynolds adopts this aspect of the tradition. In man, there is a natural struggle 
between appetite and reason, which comes from the fall but not from nature itself.133 “For 
from the Law of creation, there was not formall Opposition, but a Subordination between 
Spirit and Sence; Man having it in his own power, to excite, continue, remit, lay down his 
Passions, as Reason should dictate unto him.”134 Placing a person’s inability to properly 
submit the passions to reason within a post-fall reality is an addendum that Reynolds adds 
to Aristotle, but the belief that it is natural for a rational animal to control the irrational 
passions by use of the rational is an Aristotelian idea.135 
Reynolds uses Aristotle in his description of the incontinent person first in his 
definition of incontinence as “the weakness and disabilitie of Reason, to keepe close to her 
own Principles and Resolutions.”136 He continues by stating that, “this is the case of 
reluctancie betweene the Knowledge and Desires of Incontinent Men, and others of the 
like Nature: For, as Aristotle observes of them, they are but…, half evil, as not sinning 	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with that full and plenary Consent of will, but Praeter Electionem.”137 Rather, they have a 
kind of “half-knowledge,” much like the sleep-talker who is neither fully awake nor 
asleep.138 These ideas are nearly direct quotes from EN. The “half-wicked” man, for 
Aristotle, is one who is “like the man who is asleep or drunk,” who acts voluntarily “in a 
sense with knowledge both of what he does and of that for the sake of which he does it,” 
but is not fully wicked.139 
The sin of imposture, according to Reynolds, is when a person allows their lower 
parts to reign, “and being impatient altogether of resistance or controul, laboureth and to 
muffle reason.” This is where understanding is overrun by passions. It is the judging of 
things, “not according to their naked and naturall truth, but according as it finds them 
beare in the Fancie those impressions of Pleasure, which are most agreeable to corrupted 
Nature.”140 
Another manner of corruption, for Reynolds, is the withdrawing of the reason 
from the examination of pleasures, a voluntary ignorance. “Since as Aristotle hath 
observed, directly agreeable to the phrase of St. Peter, there is…an elected or Voluntaire 
Ignorance, which for their securities sake, men nourish themselves in.”141 He takes Romans 
1, 2 Peter 3.5 and EN Book 3 Chapter 1 to be saying the same things concerning 
voluntary ignorance, or the voluntary suppressing of knowledge for a perceived good. 
However, what Aristotle is talking about in the section cited and what the Biblical authors 
are discussing do not seem to be the same. Aristotle is discussing the difference between 
voluntary, involuntary and nonvoluntary actions, but Aristotle never mentions that these 
forms of involuntary and nonvoluntary actions are related to people who are suppressing 
knowledge with malicious intent. The only mention of the passions in this chapter is to 
make the point that the irrational passions are no less a part of human nature than the 
reason is.142 In both the Biblical passages, there seems to be a voluntary ignorance of 
something natural, in the case of Romans 1, or something revealed, in the case of 2 Peter. 
St. Peter strongly emphasizes the conscious effort of ignorance when he writes, “for they 	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deliberately overlook this fact…” (2 Peter 3.5). However, the point that Reynolds is trying 
to make, perhaps inaccurately, is that there is a place within the biblical narrative for a 
doctrine of continence and incontinence.143 
Doctrine of the Mean 
The next aspect of the reason and the passions that we will be looking at in terms 
of habituating virtue is the well-known, but controversial, doctrine of the mean. This 
‘doctrine’ is controversial because of its many misuses in history. Ethan Shagan has 
shown that the idea of moderation was certainly pervasive in Reformation England; 
however, it was at times misapplied from the sense that Aristotle used the concept.144 
Shagan opens his study of the doctrine of the mean by telling a story of Henry VIII’s 
“simultaneous execution of three Catholics and three Protestants” as a statement of 
moderation.145 This, however, is not an acceptable Aristotelian employment of the 
concept of moderation. Here we will see that the Puritans do, in fact, think and apply a 
doctrine of the mean that is acceptable within eudaemonistic ethics.  
Aristotle writes, “every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate between two 
other states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency.”146 Courage, for instance, is 
the mean between rashness and cowardice. This state has become known as the doctrine 
of the mean. The virtuousness of an emotion or action is dependent on there being 
neither excess nor a deficiency. He writes that actions and passions, 
 
may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right 
times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim [motive], 
and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence 
[virtue].147  	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Virtue exists between two vices that are on either of the opposite extremes. An individual 
person’s natural tendencies lean towards one vice or the other.148 If someone were 
naturally disposed to find him or herself on the side of cowardice, then they would need 
to move more towards rashness in order to achieve a good balance. Aristotle does not 
claim that negative passions and actions need to be eliminated and suppressed; he is in 
fact saying quite the opposite. It is not the case then that there can be negative passions 
and actions that one needs to be rid of. Rather, ‘negative’ passions and actions are used to 
counter natural dispositions towards one vice or another.149 However, not every action 
and passion has a mean; some are just wrong. This will be discussed in further detail in 
the following chapter and in Chapter 7. 150 
 
 The Puritans believe that the passions and actions need to be directed and 
ordered while balance is sought.151 Bolton notes that one of the true marks distinguishing 
the Christian from the “formall hypocrite” is that the “power of saving grace doth subdue 
and sanctifie our affections with a conscionable and holy moderation.”152 William 
Perkins’ definition of meekness is “a gift of the Gods spirit, whereby a man doth moderate 	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his affection of anger, and bridle in himself impatience, hatred, and desire of revenge.” 
Meekness is the "vertue" of moderating passions with two outcomes: (1) it gives man a 
“quiet and patient heart, to beare Gods iudgements” and (2) the meek person bears 
injuries that are done to him by others, to “forgive and forget.” In order to be happy, the 
virtue of meekness needs to be in our hearts.153 Joseph Hall wrote, “as hypocrisie is a 
common counterset of all vertues, so there is no speciall vertue, which is not to the very 
life of it seemingly resembled by some speciall vice.” Devotion is antithetical to 
superstition, good thrift to “niggardlinesse,” and “charity with vaine-glorious pride.”154 
Webbe writes that “all immoderations are enemies unto the quietness of the Minde” and 
that moderation is an antidote to a disquieted mind.155 Baxter writes that the use of 
reason and the rule of law decide the mean, and he also notes that anger needs to be 
moderated.156 We currently have contrary desires, but we are able to cultivate our desires 
and “raise them up.” This is the life of satisfaction and enjoyment.157 
Edward Reynolds also uses the Aristotelian model of moderation in regard to the 
passions.158 Like a ship sailing between storm and calm, the passions must also be 
between two extremes for virtue.159 Just as in Aristotle, passions are specific “to such and 
such a person,”160 and “is done either by opposing contrary passions to contrary, which is 
Aristotles rule, who adviseth, in the bringing of passions from an extream to a 
mediocritie” and to “incline and bend them towards the other extreme” by the power of 
reason.161 In the mind, “passions, as they mutually generate, so they mutually weaken 
each other.”162 Anticipating an objection in the case of Jesus casting out the 
moneychangers in anger, Reynolds acknowledges that Jesus had intense emotions, but he 
successfully moderated and directed them according to the rule of judgement. “In which 
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respect, the Passions of Christ are by Divines called Propassions” or the beginnings of 
passions, but not passions themselves.163 
Thomas Wright, when discussing the passions in his book The Passions of the Minde, 
agrees with the above model for moderation. He writes the “men commonly by nature 
are more enclined” towards one sinful extreme or another and need to practice 
moderation in their spiritual development.164 One passion is the cure for another, and 
fear of being punished by a superior often tempers the passions of anger or lust or any 
other disorder of the commonwealth.165 He writes, “every moderat passion bordureth 
betwixt two extremes, as liberalitie betwixt avarice; fortitude betwixt desperate boldnesse 
and superfluous feare, called timiditie.”166 
Once a person has figured out to which vice they lean, then they should 
investigate how heavily they lean that way.167 The first remedy to “mortifie passions” is 
moderation. Among many other tools that Wright gives, the Aristotelian idea of 
habituation as one of the most important ways to appropriately control the desires. He 
writes, 
 
This meane, to mortifie passions, I take to be one of the most forcible and important remedies that 
men can use, especially for two causes: the first, for that by these contraries acts are bred in the 
soules, certaine habites, helpes, stayes, or inclinations most opposite unto our passions; and 
therefore the passions being strong, they cannot be overcommed, by the might of excellent 
vertue.168 
 
The deeper the roots of a tree, the more force is needed to pull it up. The deeper the vice, 
the more habituating of virtue a person needs to moderate it.169 
Church of England clergyman and writer William Fenner is interesting for our 
purposes here because of the components of the doctrine of the mean that he wants to 
adopt and those that he wishes to disregard. In his Treatise of the Affections, Fenner makes 
frequent use of Aristotle to discuss the moderating of the emotions. He, like Aristotle, 
believes that the affections need to be ordered. When discussing taking control of the 	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emotions, Fenner writes that in the “Greek tongue the spirit of God cals it 
σωφροσυνη,”170 which has a semantic range of reasonableness, self-control and 
temperance.171 Σωφροσύνη is used a number of times by St. Paul and St. Peter in 
discussing temperance as well as in the EN as Aristotle’s preferred word for the virtue of 
temperance.172 
 According to Fenner, one cannot raise up one’s affections, or order them, unless 
one is risen with Christ.173 Fenner cites Aristotle’s questioning of whether Brutus was a 
block or brute for having no affections for his own children, who were murdered in front 
of him. He further cites “The Philosopher” stating that 
 
[T]he affections are like wheeles, and like chariots unto reason. If a mans reason be never so good, 
he knowes hee is bound to repent, and be godly, and obey; yet if he have no affections thereto, he 
goes like a chariot without wheeles; he goes without force, he cannot go at all; but if he have 
affections thereto, the affections are like wheeles; and like horses to carry him amaine.174 
 
The emotions were an “elemental spiritual force, as irresistible as hunger or gravity. As 
such, it was folly to ignore them and prudence to harness them. ‘When a childe of God 
prayes with affection, he prayeth with force.’”175 This is a eudaemonist and the Puritan 
polemic against the Stoic view of the passions. 
 Fenner also uses Aristotle to talk about sickness in the soul, stating that “Aristotle 
cals the affections Ægritudines animi…if the soul be affected indeed, she is sicke if she speed 
not.”176 What Fenner is using Aristotle to express here is that if the affections are sick, 
then the whole person is affected. They are also what make a man mutable. Without the 
passions, a person cannot be persuaded.177 Fenner cites Aristotle in saying that “virtues 
are nothing more than the right ruling of the affections.” He says that “with little 
alteration” to Aristotle, the “ruling of the affections is the main worke of grace.” Grace 
does not take away affections but rules over them. If a man were angry before conversion, 	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grace would not take the anger away.178 We can see above that Fenner is in fairly strong 
agreement with how Aristotle conceives of the soul and the emotions.  
This seems to be the case generally; however, Fenner has interesting differences 
with Aquinas himself. We have seen above that the Puritans generally agree with 
Aristotle, and thus with Aquinas. Fenner, however, has some doubts about adopting the 
above description of the passions wholeheartedly. He asks, if the affections are only in the 
sensitive and material part of the soul, then what about the angels? But Aquinas has a 
response to this in ST. When God and angels have joy and love, “they specify simple acts 
of the will having like effects, but without passion.”179 Shagan’s account of Puritan 
moderation describes it as a universal aspect of a disciplined life across the board; 
however, as we can see with Fenner, this is not quite the case.180  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have had our first glimpse into the moral ramifications of the 
Puritan doctrine of calling. For the Puritans, to develop a ‘kind of life,’ or a life that is 
defined by a character that exhibits the cardinal and theological virtues, is central to a 
conception of ethics that is based on divine calling. Like their eudaemonist predecessors, 
the Puritans conceive of the virtues in a two-fold manner, making a distinction between 
moral and intellectual virtues. This is alongside the near complete adoption of a 
conception of the passions as focal contributors to moral development, as the sensual part 
of the soul relates to the rational part. We have also seen that the Puritans, in a very 
Thomist fashion, go beyond Aristotle to affirm that the ability for the development and 
habituation of virtue is tightly connected with the infusion of the theological virtues of 
faith, hope and charity. 
 What we have also seen here is that for the Puritans, divine commands do not 
necessarily need to be in conflict with ethical naturalism’s desire to speak to the 
development of character that is based on natural phenomena. However, this is just the 
first layer of the problem that must be addressed further in this thesis. This chapter’s focus 	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has been more universal in nature; that is, it has been concerned with the command to all 
humankind to flourish in a way across the board. In the following chapter, we will look 
further at the universal call for everyone to be in right relationship with God through 
Christ and to develop into perfected and happy human beings. We will also look at what 
it means to have particular callings ‘imposed’ on the individual amidst the universal 
calling to develop virtues, which end in the happiness addressed above. 
 
 Chapter 5 
‘Imposed on Man:’ Personhood, Command and Calling 
 
Abe said where do you want this killing done, God said highway 61. Bob Dylan 
 
Play is more proper to man than work, and it is only when work is play that it is really good and right. Eric Gill 
 
Introduction 
In prior chapters, we looked at the moral ramifications of the Puritan doctrine of 
calling as it relates to metaphysics and rationality in a flourishing life, as well as the 
importance of developing a ‘kind of life,’ or a life defined by virtue. Rowan Williams 
emphasizes this aspect of calling, noting that the call is the process of living life well and 
vocation is the moment of “crisis within the unbroken process.” Crisis is the moment of 
recognizing that creature comforts distract us from “answering the call to be.”1 What 
Williams is addressing here is the calling that we have been discussing in previous 
chapters. Here we must go a step further. In this chapter, we move from a conception of 
the divine command to universal humankind in moral development to the more 
particular commands in the doctrine of calling. Calling is ontologically grounded and thus 
related to flourishing generally as well as particularly. By ontologically grounded I mean 
that callings are to some degree possessed at the level of being as well as circumstantial 
based on one’s surrounding situation and context. This will be explained and examined in 
more detail within this chapter in a discussion of what I am calling a ‘deep’ calling 
alongside a discussion of calling being related to one’s ‘station’ in life. 
The second part of Perkins’ definition is of interest to ethics, as this ‘kind of life’ 
(development of character) is imposed on, or commanded for, the human agent. The 
Puritans, because of their emphasis on a metaphysically rich ethic, are able to navigate in 
an interesting way the problem of divine commands. We can take call and command to 
be nearly synonymous, as both can be construed as moral impositions given by a superior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rowan Williams, A Ray of Darkness: Sermons and Reflections (Cambridge: Cowley Publications, 
1995), 150. 
	   133 
agent to an inferior agent to act in one way rather than another. Weber notes that calling 
is the will of God and has the “same worth in the sight of God.” Calling is a command to 
fulfill duties, which the divine will imposes.2 John Hare makes a helpful distinction 
between the strict senses of a command and a calling. He notes that the word command 
stresses the “power relation” between God and humanity, whereas call emphasizes a 
“love relation which governs not just the destination but the selection of the route” 
towards particular ends.3 In this chapter, we will further investigate the command as a 
calling and how it relates to the eudaemonism that has been constructed in previous 
chapters. 
A Brief Reformation History of Calling 
As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, the Reformation way of 
addressing the doctrine of calling was a complete reversal of thought from previous 
generations. With this in mind, many of the reformers thought of calling in their own 
distinctive ways, giving the doctrine a feeling of development over the two centuries that 
we are looking at here. This section will look at two different Reformation doctrines of 
calling as expounded by Martin Luther and John Calvin. By doing this, we set the 
historical context for the Puritans and allow the distinctiveness of their thought to appear. 
We begin with Luther. 
According to Luther, every person has a double vocation, spiritual (vocatio 
spiritualis) and external (vocatio externa). The ‘spiritual vocation’ emphasizes that everybody 
has a calling into the kingdom of God, that is, everyone is called to be in right relationship 
with God through Christ. On the other hand, the ‘external vocation’ is to serve other 
people in the community. Because justification is by faith alone, God does not need our 
works: our neighbor does. Justification by faith—fulfilling the spiritual vocation—frees 
humans to live out their external vocation. 
External vocations are for the good of the community and are also related to one’s 
‘station’ in life, a station being an external vocation that is by nature helpful, as it is 
related to one’s role in a surrounding context and place. In this way, people can have 
multiple vocations. A person can have the external vocation of three separate estates: the 	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priestly office, the family and the civil government. A particular person can be 
simultaneously a store clerk and have the vocations of a son, a father and a husband. The 
external vocation has a horizontal application in how God providentially relates to those 
who share in community life. Through earthly and spiritual government, God drives 
people to good works and to faith. Thus a paradox: “[a] Christian is a perfectly free lord 
of all, and subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.”4 
The earthly life drives one to love one’s neighbor.5 For Luther, there is nothing more 
delightful and lovable on earth than helping one’s neighbor. “Love does not think about 
doing good works, it finds joy in people; and when something good is done for others, 
that does not appear to love as works but simply as gifts which flow naturally from love.”6 
When one loves one’s neighbor through one’s vocation, love for God is active. “It is the 
neighbor that stands at the center of Luther’s ethics, not God’s Kingdom or God’s law or 
‘character.’ Vocation and law benefit the neighbor, as does love born of faith.”7 This is 
how our external vocation relates to God; it shows how our works fit within the scheme of 
salvation. God provides his people with ‘daily bread’ through the vocations of those 
around them in different vocations. The economic system of a working community 
contributes to meeting the needs of others within the community. This is how God 
provides for his people. Luther thus emphasizes that, for example, God is milking the 
cows through the vocation of the milkmaid. Vocation is the “mask of God,” because he is 
hidden in everyday work. This is how God works through his creation. 
Calvin takes a quite different perspective on calling, relating calling to his doctrine 
of predestination. Where Luther would say that the ‘general calling’ is the internal call of 
God to draw all humanity towards himself in the preaching of the word, Calvin agrees 
but amends Luther, making the ‘special calling’ an illumination of the general ‘universal 
calling,’ through the Holy Spirit.  
Within the context of expositing Matthew 22:14, “many are called, but few are 
chosen,” Calvin writes that the universal calling is the word preached to all, while special 	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calling is that worked out in the heart of the elect.8 These “two species of calling” are both 
attributed to salvation. On occasion, special callings can be “justly forsaken,” meaning 
that God blinds a person because of their ungratefulness.9 Callings, for Calvin, are a kind 
of protection that God gives mankind against being rash and transgressing limits. 
“Therefore each individual has his own kind of living assigned to him by the Lord as a 
sort of sentry post so that he may not heedlessly wander about throughout life.” These are 
different “modes of life” to which God has given the name calling are assigned duties so 
that  “all things may not be thrown into confusion by our folly and rashness.”10 Calling is 
at the foundation of well-doing. Holding to the straight path and doing one’s duties 
require that we direct ourselves to our callings. So in a sense, calling, for Calvin, becomes 
a form of law, whereas for Luther, (external) vocation is the form of life one lives after 
being freed from the law through justification.11 
 We will see below that the Puritan approach to a Reformation doctrine of calling 
is an unabashed appropriation of Aristotelian metaphysics. This places them in stark 
contrast to Luther, who famously spurns Aristotelian philosophy in theological discourse. 
As we have also seen, Luther’s doctrine of external vocation is based on one’s standing, or 
station in life and not concerned with ontology. For Luther, one has a calling because 
there is a certain need in the community, or because one is a father. Also, as we will see in 
more detail later, for Luther there is no social mobility within a calling. If a person is a 
cobbler, they must stay a cobbler with little expectations of leaving that role in society. 
The Puritans are much happier to say that people can leave one calling for another, as 
long as there is a good motive for the change.  
The Puritans differ from Calvin in much the same way as they differ from Luther. 
As seen above, Calvin places the contemplative life below the active life. By contrast, the 
Puritans hold, or at least attempt to hold, a balance between the active and the 	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contemplative life. Another difference between Calvin and the Puritans, which we will see 
in more detail later in this chapter, is that Calvin attributes special callings only to those 
who possess the Holy Spirit, making it strictly soteriological, while the Puritans, like 
Luther, think that all people inside and outside the church contribute to society through 
their callings. 
We can see that the Protestant expression of vocation and calling was new and 
central to the Reformation. Thus, this novel and nuanced concept of calling brings about 
something that is unique to the Reformation not found in the medieval times, though 
there are a plethora of continuities. Max Weber notes that for Protestants, “the only way 
of living acceptable to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, 
but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his 
position in the world.”12 The Puritans are a rich resource because their thought on calling 
was highly systematized and influential.  Their thought on divine calling represents some 
of the most helpful and clear thinking on this doctrine in Christendom.  In treating 
Protestant asceticism as a single whole, Weber notes that the Puritans give the most 
consistent religious foundation for the idea of the calling,13 but I would add, while holding 
on to a medieval tradition. They are aware of Scotus and voluntarism as well as 
Aristotelian-Thomist naturalism, but they do not simply draw upon these categories. 
They are continually shaping and molding their beliefs while engaging with the 
tradition.14 For this reason the Puritans are an exceptional conversation partner with 
ethical naturalism, specifically eudaemonism, because of their metaphysical 
considerations, as well as their emphasis on obedience to the will of God in the ‘call’ of 
God. This aspect of my thesis is to show that the Puritans were eudaemonistic in their 
view of calling. 
 Now that a brief Reformation context on calling has been given, we will look 
further at the relationship between ethical naturalism in the Puritans and calling as 
command of God.  	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Calling as Command of God 
In this section, we will begin to further unfold an aspect of divine commands in 
the Puritans in light of the previous chapter’s argument that they fit exceptionally well 
within a long ethical naturalist tradition that goes back to Aristotle. Before we get to the 
specifics of how the Puritans conceive of divine commands and the ways in which they 
relate to naturalism, we will need to look broadly at some of the distinctions and where 
the Puritans fit in Christian history. We will do this by looking at other naturalists and 
divine command theorists in and around their time. 
Naturalism and Divine Commands  
We will hear look at the relationship between eudaemonism in the Puritans and 
divine commands, specifically the idea of calling. Below are three forms of divine 
commands: 
 
A. All precepts that make up morality have their origin in God’s unconditioned will. As God’s will is 
unconditioned no moral reason can be assigned as to why these precepts are as they are.  God 
could have willed otherwise. Thus, x is wrong because God wills it so. 
 
B. God is above all moral norms. Natural reasons may be given as to why these moral precepts are 
binding to mankind. However, God on particular occasions can suspend these precepts and 
command actions that are in no way conditioned by natural moral norms, but are simply the 
expression of His supreme power.  
 
C. God’s will is conditioned by reasons including moral reasons that are inscrutable to humans from 
the point of view of mankind. God’s will may appear to be arbitrary and even unjust; but this is 
only an appearance due to the feebleness of human understanding.15 
 
Puritans generally follow B and C and deny A. Not all of God’s moral precepts are based 
on his unconditioned will. A is opposed to, and incompatible with, the Puritan naturalism 
described in previous chapters. I take that the Puritans, however, are committed to those 
kinds of commands represented in B and C. God’s suspended commands are sometimes 
positive in calling one to go above and beyond the moral norm. But the way that the 
Puritans argue for these aspects of commands of God have distinctive features, in that 
there is a denial that God’s commands are the expression of his supreme power. God is 
not simply showing off his authority. His reasons for commanding are not contrary to the 
natural order and are always related to his goodness and wisdom. Point C differs from A 
and B as it is a quite weak account of the commandments of God and mostly concerned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 These definitions are adapted from, John Colman, John Locke’s Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1983). 
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with epistemology.  The fact that some moral reasons are hidden is not in every case 
because of some lack in humanity or as a result of sin. There may be cases where God 
does not reveal the purpose of his commands to those whom he is commanding. 
One of the potential problems with naturalism that the Puritans do not run into is 
that the created order demonstrates right and wrong distinct from divine will. Fourteenth 
century philosopher Gregory of Rimini (1300-1358) argues “that even if God did not 
exist…those dictates would still have the same legal character which they actually posses 
because they would constitute a law pointing out that evil exists intrinsically in the 
object.”16 In this view, natural law is separate from God and the divine law, because the 
law resides in human natures or in the structure of things. This is to say that, for this 
brand of naturalism, if God did not exist, the law would be the same because of human 
nature. What this sort of naturalism allows is the implication that God does not essentially 
command the natural law17 and that some principles or goods are independent of, and 
co-eternal with, God. 
The above form of naturalism is problematic for the ethicist who wants to keep 
God central to morality and is unhappy with the naturalist account. Natural rightness and 
wrongness apart from God’s will restrict God’s freedom, a freedom that the Puritans are 
interesting in keeping, at least to some extent. Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) argues 
that the naturalist is theologically unsound. According to Pufendorf, God created 
mankind by the exercise of his free will, and he was free to do otherwise than to create us 
with this exact nature. “The independence of natural law from God, as explained by 
objective naturalism, has the unwelcome result that natural law is not divine law and is 
not from God.”18 
 The Puritans also are dedicated to keeping God central to morality and political 
societies. One of the major benefits of divine command theories is that God has no moral 
restrictions and is free to will what is good rather than to will it because it is good. For the 
theist, allowing God to will the good is a very tempting and plausible option, because it 
emphasizes his sovereignty and allows the good to be below or subservient to God rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 J. B Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 
1998), 60. 
17 This is the objection of Francisco Suarez to this form of naturalism; see Terence Irwin, The 
Development of Ethics. From Suarez to Rousseau, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34. 
18 Ibid. 
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than being something to which God must submit. If God wills the good because it is 
good, then God seems to be subordinate to the good. Strict divine command theories 
seemingly allow God to be above the good and to command his creation to be involved in 
it by obeying what he wills. We will see below that this way of construing divine 
commands is not something that the Puritans are dedicated to entirely; however, they are 
dedicated to the benefit of having God at the center of ethics. We will see below that the 
way they conceive of divine commands restricts God’s freedom in some respects. The way 
that divine commands work for the Puritans looked at in this thesis is naturalistically 
grounded, as God’s created order plays a significant role in God’s willing the good.  
It is not possible, for the Puritans, for one to simply deny the existence of God 
and, in the words of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, “make all things permissible.” This is where 
Puritans’ naturalism has strength. Simply denying the existence of God, and hence 
throwing out his precepts, does not get one off the moral hook. Oliver O’Donovan’s 
objects that “in this modern ‘faith-ethic’ Christian moral obligation becomes a function of 
the believer’s decision, something that he has opted into. It is esoteric, meaningful only to 
those who, by a process in which moral awareness has apparently played no part… have 
placed themselves within a closed circle.” Moral duties are relegated to “ecclesiastical 
house-rules” and have no authority for those outside the church community.19 
O’Donovan argues that both theists and atheists, for the most part, use and agree on the 
meanings of words such as right, wrong, ought and duty. Two people with very different 
worldviews can talk about ‘wrong’ without knowing each other’s full definition. When 
either party utters the sentence, “x is wrong and it should not be done,” there is typically 
agreement on the types of things that are wrong. Let us say we take x to be, “one should 
not torture babies for entertainment.” Both parties would agree that the emotional and 
volitional attitude toward the word ‘wrong’ here is the same. ‘Wrong’ is a word of 
opposition. When we say something is wrong, we are saying we are against it.  
Why is it the case that theists and atheists have so many similarities in their 
conceptions of these words? Why is it that we can use the same language, without 
knowing each other’s worldview, and have roughly the same definition? Naturalists, and 
thus the Puritans, could argue that human nature tells us something about what it is to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and the Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids: 
Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), 16. 
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a good or bad human. They could say that there is something that grounds the universal 
definition of a human being: our natures. Why do we come to the same conclusions when 
one of us is grounded in God’s commands and another of us is grounded in something 
else? 
Also, because of their metaphysically aware naturalist ethic, the Puritans do not 
fall victim to some of the problems that come with strict divine command theories, such 
as a particular construal of the general universalizable thesis. The problem of the general 
universalizable thesis is the idea that 
 
(a) if x is right at t1, then x must be right for every person at t2 or t3. 
 
There seem to be occasions where a person (p1) believes that it is obligatory for one to do 
x at t1 and that the same action, x, is not obligatory for p2 at t2 or t3. This ‘generalizing’ 
universalizable thesis is problematic and, as we will see, the Puritans do not fall victim to 
this problem. 
A reflexive universalizable thesis could also be phrased as: 
 
(b) if x is right at t1 because a, b, and c, wherever a, b, and c, x is right. At t2 we have a and b, 
but q (not c).  
 
So x could be wrong without violating universalizability. This way of working the 
universalizability thesis resembles more closely how Luther would see calling (vocation), as it 
depends more on the circumstances or ‘station’ of c being different from that of q. The 
Puritan emphasis is on a distinctive person’s internal dispositions towards actions at t1 or 
t2 and not so much on external circumstances. Both a and b, in a sense, have put the cart 
before the horse, because the command is particularized from person to person in 
creation itself. The Puritans evade these problems by advocating a double imposition, or 
command, that takes place in their doctrine of calling, calling being ‘imposed’ in creation. 
The Puritans can say that right relationship with God, in Christ and through the Holy 
Spirit, contributes to the flourishing of all mankind because this is the telos of humanity, by 
virtue of being human, and is universalizable, while also asserting that the universalizability 
thesis does not apply to the particular individuals who have particular telè in themselves.20  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Hardy, Fabric, 81–2. Elsewhere, Hardy writes that Calvinist thought on vocation does not 
impose a certain kind of life upon one from the outside. Based on Perkins’ clear Calvinist sympathies in his 
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The implications of this are that the eudaemonistic doctrine of calling found in the 
Puritans allows for a kind of situationism in ethics. This is not a situationism based on 
minor situational differences and moral psychology,21 but rather situationism that has the 
explanatory power to explain moral norms alongside individual supererogatory acts. 
There have been other attempts in Christian ethics to develop a situationist ethic, one 
example being Joseph Fletcher. Fletcher, however, does not have the important 
metaphysical concerns that we can see in the Puritans.22 His theory is concerned with the 
loving of persons and moves away from principles, the Puritans looked at in this thesis 
would agree, but Fletcher swings the pendulum too far in the other direction. He thus 
makes his construal a Christian brand of utilitarianism.23 The situationism that is an 
consequence of eudaemonsim in the Puritans is grounded not in love, though we have 
seen love (charity) is important, rather the vision of situationism here is grounded on 
cross, community and new creation, as Richard Hays suggests is the perspective of the 
New Testament authors.24 The particulars of this brand of situationism will be spelled out 
in further detail throughout this thesis. We will now begin to start analyzing some of these 
concepts within the Puritans. 
What this section has aimed to accomplish is to give a clearer picture of the 
relationship between naturalism, calling and divine commands as it relates to Puritan 
thought. Secondly, the section has given a very brief context to some of the moral debates 
taking place between naturalists and divine command theorists surrounding the Puritans 
in and around their time. We will now begin to look not only at how the Puritans 
navigate these concerns in ethics but also at how they relate to politics through general 
and particular commands.  
General Calling 
We will now begin to look at the specifics of the two kinds of callings promulgated 
in reformation theology. We will first build upon our discussion of moral development in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
other works and the above emphasis on imposition language, it is clear that Hardy has not taken these 
English Puritan Calvinists into account when making this statement; see Hardy, Fabric, 67. 
21 See, John M Doris, Lack of Character : Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge: CUP, 2002). 
22 Joseph Fletcher, “What’s a Rule?: A Situationist’s View,” in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, 
ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Scribner, 1968), 328; 333. 
23 Ibid., 332. 
24 Hays, The Moral Vision. 
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the previous chapter and discuss the universal call to, or imposition on, all mankind to 
have a right relationship with God through faith in the death and resurrection of Christ.25 
We will then move on to discuss the second aspect of calling, which is related to particular 
individuals. 
As mentioned above, the first call is ‘general’ and is thus universal, as it is related to 
the essence of what it is to be a human agent and thus to experience the flourishing and 
happiness that is specific to humans. This is also related to the ‘kind of life’ discussed in 
the previous chapter, because the moral development that comes with habituating the 
virtues, cardinal and theological, relates to the good of all humanity and directs humanity 
to eudaemonia in the vision of God in the next life. 
Salvation and Virtue 
In True Manner of knowing Christ Crucified, Perkins shows the distinction between 
general and particular callings. 
 
For as Christ in the garden, & upon the crosse, by prayer made with strong cries and teares, 
presented and resigned himselfe to be a sacrifice of propitiation to the iustice of his Father for 
mans sinne: so must we also in prayer present & resigne ourselves, our soules, our bodies, our 
understanding, will, memorie, affections, and al we have to the service of God, in the generall 
calling of a Christian, and in the particular callings in which hee hath placed us.26 
 
Here, like Luther and above, we see Perkins’ distinction between two kinds of callings, the 
first of which is related to the giving of our ‘ourselves’ to the service of God in our 
‘generall’ callings, while our particular calling is related to his placement of a person in a 
particular place. “The General calling is the calling of Christianitie, which is common to 
all that love in the Church of God.” It is a calling “out of the world” and into the 
“kingdome of heaven.”27 The practices of the general calling are prayer, thanksgiving, 
meditation on Jesus and the furthering of the good estate of the Church.28 Like Luther, all 
Christians are called to play the roles of popes, bishops, priests and monks through our 
earthly vocations by loving our neighbors.29 It is the duty of the general calling that 
“every man ... become a servant of his brother in all the duties of love.” It is important 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25See Guinness, The Call, 29–31. 
26 Perkins, CC, 27. 
27 Perkins, ATV, 13; Rogers, PC, 39; 50; 201. 
28 Perkins, ATV, 14–5. 
29 Martin Luther, “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,” in Luther’s Works, ed. James 
Atkinson, trans. Charles W. Jacobs, vol. 44 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 127–131. 
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that Christians learn this duty because the “practice of it is the special ornament of 
Christs holy Gospel.” The last general duty is to “walk worthy that calling whereto God 
hath called you.” This calling of Christianity “is the most excellent calling in the world.” 
It is to keep a good conscience before God and be blameless among men. This duty is 
commanded “to the meditation and practice of all men.” 
In Baxter’s Treatise on Conversion, he takes conversion, repentance, regeneration, 
sanctification and vocation to be the same work upon the soul, with very distinctive minor 
differences. The vocation that Baxter is discussing here is the more general vocation of 
becoming a Christian. We can see this in that he makes very little distinction between 
sanctification and vocation, though the latter is involved in the former.30 As it relates to 
salvation, vocation is “God’s act of calling,” which is called “uneffectual” when it is not 
answered and “our calling” when it is successful.31 We see here that Baxter makes a 
distinction between callings that are obeyed and callings that are “unanswered.” As we 
will see in more detail further in this chapter and in the next, our calling in the general 
and salvific sense, when successful, is when we are “brought but to outward profession 
and common gifts.” The second sense, which Baxter calls “special,” is when people are 
“savingly converted to Christ.”32 The successful universal calling of mankind to God 
Baxter calls “special effectual calling,” which is the same as conversion and repentance.33 
The successful vocational calling he calls “common effectual calling,” which is “outward 
profession and common gifts.”34 Both of these are related to salvation and are part of the 
sanctification process.35 In Saints Everlasting Rest, Baxter writes that all effectual callings 
must be external callings “because the Scriptures hath yet shewed us no other way to the 
Internal Call, but by the External.”36 Based on our discussion of general calling, here in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Baxter, ATC, 9. 
31 Ibid., 6. 
32 Ibid., 7. 
33 Baxter, SER, 119. Though vocation and repentance are the same thing for Baxter, there is a 
slight difference in that repentance is terminus pro quo, while vocation is only the state to which one is called. 
Also see ATC, 7. 
34 Baxter, ATC, 7. Special effectual calling is the same as conversion and repentance. It is for this 
reason that vocation is different from sanctification. Vocation is the “spirits causing the first act of faith in 
the Soul, and by that Act a habit is effected, and wherewith the seed of all Graces, which they call the work 
of Sanctification.” Vocation is a “special respect” of the Gospel’s call to the “act of believing in Christ.” 
35 Perkins also uses the term ‘effectual’ to talk about the general calling and acceptance into God’s 
family; see Perkins, GC, 265. 
36 Baxter, SER, 117. 
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this section and in previous chapters, we are now in a position to look at the relationship 
between the general and the particular calling. 
Particular Calling 
We have established in earlier chapters and above that there is a universal 
flourishing of humans by nature of being human. We will here begin to investigate the 
specifics of flourishing that are situational, depending on the individual person through 
their calling. This section will continue with the Puritans’ discussion of calling from the 
more general salvific calling to the particular calling that is imposed or commanded upon 
the individual. This is where the Puritans become distinctive in their position.  
The particular calling, “is that special calling which belongs to some particular 
men: as the calling of a magistrate, the calling of a Minister, the calling of a master, of a 
father, of a child, of a servant, of a subject, or any other calling that is common to all.”37 
Perkins writes, “every man must judge that particular calling, in which God hath placed 
him, to be best of all calling for him: I say not simply best, but best for him.”38 
In the context of living this life well, we can see that, for Rogers, particular callings 
are “commanded to abide.”39 
 
[I]f the scriptures commend unto as a certaine course to walke in with God, and a particular 
directing of our lives (of what calling or estate soever wee be, according to his word) and further 
requireth the same to be daily kept and followed of us (as hath been shewed) then Christians must 
bee guided by some daily direction in the leading of their lives.40 
 
We can see from the above that there is a moral weight and obligation that comes along 
with a particular station and place in life. This is a requirement of our daily lives and 
activities. Calling is the service of God “in the observation of his commandments.”41 
Rogers also writes, 
 
[W]hat ordinary actions in any lawfull calling are to be done of a Christian through the day, but 
God hath in his word guided him how to doe them, such wise, as hee by the helpe thereof, may 
with peace and comfort being it to an end...he the knoweth his will therein, and walketh not after 
the same, shall neither finde peace in his life, nor happines after.42 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Perkins, ATV, 13. 
38 Perkins, ATV, 29. Emphasis mine. 
39 Rogers, PC, 61; Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 301. 
40 Rogers, PC, 302–3. Emphasis mine. 
41 Perkins, GC, 30. 
42 Rogers, PC, 303; 318. 
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Here, in Rogers, calling, as the will of God, brings about our end, that end being 
happiness. 
The St. Matthew account of the Sermon of the Mount, according to Perkins, is 
concerned with calling and the will of God. What Jesus is teaching here is the will of the 
father. The beatitudes, though speaking of blessedness and happiness, are also speaking of 
the will of the father.43 Perkins, in his exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, writes that 
it is a sermon to his disciples so that they would know his will and the “particularity in 
their office and calling.”44 
 We can also see an account of the virtues as they relate to calling. “The vertues 
which the word of God requireth of us in the practice of our callings are many, but two 
especially: Faith, & Love.”45 The faith being referred to here is not a saving faith, but a 
faith arising from the knowledge that doing our particular calling is pleasing to God. 
“Without this particular faith, no man can please God in any calling.”46 Thus when 
people live by faith and regard God’s commandments, “it causeth them to do their 
actions in obedience.”47 Further equating calling with command, Perkins defines 
commandment as “that word of God, whereby the actions of every mans calling, are 
either expressly commanded, or at least approoved.”48 For example, God must authorize 
a magistrate to use the sword.49 
 The other virtue related to work is love. Perkins writes, “we must referre all the 
works of our calling, to the honour, praise, and glory of God: and here is the principle 
thing wherein love consisteth.” Love in our work and callings is first and formost, “for the 
honour and praise of [Christ’s] name.” The second sense and work of love, as with 
Luther, is “to apply the works, and duties, and labour of our callings, to the good of the 
Church, and common-wealth, and the place whereof we are members.” This is how love 
is put into practice.50 But unlike Luther, Perkins takes calling further than one’s station in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Perkins, GLE, 3. 
44 Ibid., 2. 
45 Perkins, ATV, 102. 
46 Ibid., 102–3. This statement may be an attempt to understand St. Paul’s statement in Romans 
14:22-23 that anything not done in faith is sin. 
47 Ibid., 104. 
48 Ibid., 5; 103. 
49 Ibid., 103. 
50 Ibid., 105–6. 
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life. Perkins writes, “God ordaineth a calling when he prescribeth and commandeth the same 
in and by his word and those calling and state of life which have no warrant from Gods 
word are unlawfull.”51 Robert Adams shines some light on another aspect of the love of 
serving others. Having a calling is like having a personal project (which includes 
everything from parenting to hobbies or work) in which one nurtures and loves or cares 
for “something in particular, as one does in loving, and not just as a way of doing the 
most good.”52 We love the things that are put before us or “put in front of us to love” and, 
in this way, these things become more than just projects.53 The happiest people find these 
sorts of projects important. To combine the second Puritan sense of love with what 
Adams is stating above is to say that to love and nurture the community is a project of 
love. Serving the commonwealth, church and family is love in practice. 
 It is here that we shall make a further distinction within the category of particular 
calling. What we will call ‘deep’ callings are a priori broad character traits or innate 
dispositions that relate to one’s natural abilities, and they are metaphysically grounded. 
Some of examples of what I call deep callings are predispositions towards detail-oriented 
activities or towards being a natural conversationalist. Deep callings can also be 
inclinations towards arts over maths, or towards athletics over intentional discursive 
reasoning. Lawrence Blum articulates this aspect of calling (vocation), noting that callings 
are nonimpersonal goods in which the “moral pull. . . is experienced as implicated in the 
individual’s own sense of personal values,” as opposed to universal demands that weigh 
equally on all moral agents regardless of their character or desires.54 Vocation, is ‘about’ 
the individual agent, whose character is determined by certain intrinsic features, and its 
demands are meant to maximize flourishing and effectiveness in doing good. Vocation is 
also nonpersonal in that it is not solely about, or concerned with, one’s own good, but 
should generally be about service as much as it is about personal fulfillment. Deep callings 
are in relation to other a posteriori particular callings that are related more to time and 
space, such as living in this or that place or being the wife or husband of such and such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid., 4. Emphasis mine. Some things are not callings, e.g. gambling. 
52 Adams, Infinite Goods, 298. 
53 Ibid., 302. 
54 Lawrence Blum, “Vocation, Friendship, and Community,” in Identity, Character, and Morality, ed. 
Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 179–80. 
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person. These distinctions will be drawn out in more detail later in this chapter and in the 
next. 
To conclude this section, we look to Rogers, who shows that the Christian’s 
growth must be seen in their duties to men and to “particular callings.”55 Before moving 
on to further investigate the distinctive features of Puritan particular callings, we need to 
connect the above description with a view of providence. We will here show the 
relationship between Aristotelian metaphysics and medieval elucidations of concurrence, 
and the correlation between divine freedom and the particular call. 
Providence 
Drawing upon Aristotle’s metaphysics, Perkins, in his doctrine of calling draws 
upon two causes of Aristotle’s four causes: the first and final. We will discuss the first 
cause here, as it relates to providence, and the final cause in more detail later in Chapter 
6, on calling in the political sphere. Perkins writes that the first cause is God, “the author” 
of every calling. “Every man is to live as he is called of God.”56 Aristotle, in the 
Metaphysics, writes that a first cause has four senses. The first is concerned with “essences” 
or “substance,”57 which we have seen above and will see in more detail later in this 
chapter. God is, for the Puritans through substances and essences, the first cause, like a 
military general who appoints every person to their particular calling. God being the first 
cause in the above sense is his “special providence” over mankind. God watches over this 
great world, “allotting to every man his motion and calling, and in that calling his 
particular office and function.” This is how God is the author and beginner of our 
calling.58 
 From these statements, we are able to see a concept of concurrence in Perkins’ 
conceptions of God as the first cause of our callings. This is that divine action is  
“‘concurring’ with human action in a single cause.”59 The concept of concurrence was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Rogers, PC, 206. 
56 Perkins, ATV, 3. 
57 Aristotle, Meta, 983a24–983b5. The other three aspects of the first cause for Aristotle could also 
be easily related with calling in the way that Perkins has conceived it. The second sense is a matter of 
“substratum,” the third is the “source of change” and the fourth is the cause “opposed to” the first cause. 
58 Perkins, ATV, 3–4. 
59 Christopher J Insole, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 24. The concept of concurrence can still be found in eighteenth century Catholic 
moral thought: see Alphonsus de Liguori, Uniformity with God’s Will, trans. Thomas W. Tobin (Lamp Post 
Onc., 2008), 13. Concurrence can also be found in the works of Luther; see Martin Luther, “Exposition of 
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prominent in the theology of Aquinas as well as in that of other Catholic thinkers like 
Francisco Suarez. Concurrence is seen as an aspect of God’s providence in which created 
moral agents and God cooperate in every action, directing their distinctive properties to 
act. Brian Brock notes that for the reformers, “the glory of human work is not that 
humans become co-creators, but that God involves himself with it in order to use it for his 
purposes.”60 This is an asset that a concept of concurrence has for a theology of work, 
which we will see in the Puritans.  
Divine action as the first cause becomes a way in which the Puritans can associate 
callings and vocations with a telos (or final cause, the second cause that Perkins associates 
with a kind of life) as well as with providence. In the previous chapter, I noted that both 
Bolton and Baxter use the language of concurrence in discussing the development and 
habituation of Aristotelian virtues that direct us towards ultimate ends.61 This is lucid in 
the discussion of infused virtues. Concurrence is a necessary part of Christian wisdom in 
order to keep our subordination to God and our dependence on him. Baxter further 
associates calling with ends and with providence when he writes, “make an advantage of 
every Object thou seest, and of every passage of Divine Providence, and of every thing 
that befals in thy Labour and Calling, to mind thy soul of its approaching Rest. As all 
Providences and Creatures are means to our Rest, so do they point us to that as their 
end.”62  
Perkins, Bolton and Baxter agree that specific callings have ends and endeavors.63 
Ben Witherington III highlights this from a New Testament perspective. “Certainly one 
of the most miserable things a human can experience is the feeling of not knowing what 
she ought to be doing with her life.” This is why it is important to have a telos. We must 
grasp that our lives have God-given purpose and a goal that is not just a “terminus.” This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Psalm 127, for Christians at Riga in Livonia,” in Luther’s Works Vol. 45, ed. Walther Brandt (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1962), 311–37. 
60 Brian Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (William B Eerdmans Publishing, 2010), 297. 
Brock continues on to note that that God’s working in our action is not about “achieving a goal.” This may 
seem contradictory in a section discussing the use of final causation. However, Brock is emphasizing the 
completion of a certain task or, in Aristotelian-Thomist terms, the end for which one acts. However, the 
Puritan discussion above, which will be addressed in the next chapter, is not about the completion of tasks, 
but final in the achieving of the “common good.” 
61 Bolton, DSTH, 64; Baxter, SER, 11–2. 
62 Baxter, SER, 465. Also see Bolton, DSTH, 57. 
63 Baxter, SER, 510; Perkins, HL, 43; Adams, Infinite Goods, 304. 
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“most certainly involves us working, indeed working hard, for the kingdom.” Work must 
be “both eschatological and ethical, both theological and teleological.”64 As mentioned 
above, this discussion of providence and ends will be again addressed in the following 
chapters on the political sphere as the end of particular callings and providence. Here we 
have seen providential efficient and final causation in particular callings, whereas in the 
next chapters we will see these concepts extended to God’s sustaining of the political 
order. 
This, however, raises a potential problem with regard to providence and the 
relation of particular to general callings and obligation. O’Donovan notes that divine 
providence is ‘arbitrary’ in that God is not bound to act a certain way when there is no 
reason for him to do one thing rather than another. This divine freedom is related to the 
giving, or commanding, of callings.65 O’Donovan brings to the surface a problem with 
the relationship between general and particular callings. Does calling come into conflict 
with the ethical, as Kierkegaard argues in Fear and Trembling?66 Does there, in some 
particular instances, need to be a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ where our 
particular calling conflicts with general moral principles?67 The protection of divine 
freedom is one of the benefits of holding a DCT, as mentioned above. O’Donovan argues 
that we should not confuse vocation with moral duty, meaning “the vocational demand, 
which is not generic, is sanctioned by the generic principle that one should heed one’s 
vocation.”68 There is the general moral principle that everyone should obey his or her 
calling, but the individual circumstances of this are left to the particular person to work 
out and obey. The Puritans would disagree with O’Donovan’s claim that “it would be 
wrong to say of any action which I might find myself ‘called’ to do that such an action 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Witherington III, Work, 9; 14. Witherington also notes that our work is distinguished from God’s 
but, because we have koinonia with him, we are able to participate with his actions. This seems to resemble 
concurrence language with a New Testament grounding; see pages 28-9. 
65 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 42. 
66 I do not take the moral views espoused in Fear and Trembling to be the actual views of 
Kierkegaard himself; I rather take them to be those of the pseudonymous author Johannes De Silencio. 
Even so, the moral discussion found in Fear and Trembling has a long history of representing the problem that 
O’Donovan is concerned with here. 
67 Moltmann too sees this problem in the Lutheran conception of vocation; see Jürgen Moltmann, 
On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 47. Also see Weber, 
Protestant Ethic, 109. 
68 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 44. 
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was ‘morally obligatory.’”69 As we will see, Puritan authors’ general ethic of ‘love thy 
neighbor’ is as morally obligatory as, to use O’Donovan’s example, the command to obey 
the call to live in Toronto. The call to live in a certain place and to do a certain work in a 
certain family and community is a duty. As we will see in more detail in the following 
chapters, one’s calling includes one’s particular station in life. The Puritans often use the 
term ‘duty’ as a way of describing the motivation for obeying a particular calling to do a 
certain action or work in a certain place and at a certain time. However, I imagine that they 
would also be uncomfortable agreeing with the author of Fear and Trembling that individual 
callings can contradict natural and general moral principles. More will be said on this in 
chapter 7, in the discussion on law. With this addressed, we now move on to discuss the 
Puritan doctrine of particular calling in further detail. This discussion will mostly focus on 
William Perkins, but will broaden to other Puritan authors as it continues. 
In summary, what we have seen above are the beginnings of a discussion on how 
particular callings fit within a broader understanding of universal ethics. This, however, 
brings out certain problems that need to be addressed. I will attempt to answer two of 
these concerns in the remaining sections of this chapter. The first concern is with 
metaphysics: is there a discrepancy between persons and moral development, between 
universal personhood and particular persons, and does this lead to a conflicting dual 
flourishing? The second concern is addressed below and is epistemic. How can we know 
what our callings actually are? 
Dual Flourishing 
Here we must address the problem of dual commands or flourishing. What we see 
in the Puritan doctrine of calling is a sense that a ‘deep’ calling of broad character traits is 
individually substantiated at an ontological level within each person. How is it that there 
can be commands that all must obey, but at the same time commands that only some are 
obligated to obey? Further, how is it that individual commands could contribute to 
individual happiness and flourishing, given the Puritans’ strong metaphysical 
assumptions? 
The tension lies in that the kind of situationism I am arguing for in this thesis 
makes a distinction between universal and individual happiness that may make it seem as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid., 43. 
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if there is a conflict between universals and particulars. To be more specific, there is a 
universal happiness that is objective and fitting for every person by virtue of their being 
human, but there are multitudes of particular ‘happinesses’ that are not the same ends. 
The question that needs to be addressed here is this: how can a multitude of seemingly 
conflicting parts contribute to a unified whole? As we have seen earlier, it is right for one 
person to do one set of actions, while it is wrong for another person to do that same set of 
actions. How does this diversity represent any cohesive conception of universal human 
flourishing and not fall into flagrant relativism? 
In this section we will briefly see that there is a shared universal, which is human 
nature and which needs, for example, faith in Christ. This universal is expressed in 
unique and particular ways, and calling relates both to the universal and to the particular. 
The Puritans seem to be silent on how the relationship between universal personhood 
and flourishing relate to particular persons metaphysically, though, as shown in previous 
chapters, ontology is important to their ethics. It is not clear if they even see this as a 
problem. 
The tension set out above relates to our current discussion of calling in that a 
person, by virtue of being a member of the species ‘human’ experiences human-specific 
flourishing as described in Chapter 2. One does this by being in right relationship with 
God through Christ. For all humanity, faith in the atoning work of Christ on the cross is 
fundamental to experiencing flourishing in the next life. Development towards this end is 
through the development and habituation of virtues as described in Chapter 4. But there 
is also a flourishing that comes along with being a particular human. For example, p1, as a 
numerical particular of a broader universal of being human, expresses the property of 
flourishing through activity a1 and not a2, where p2, while being a human being also 
expresses the property of flourishing by doing a2 and not a1. So within the broader and 
general flourishing, there are instances of particular flourishing. The above description of 
particular callings and particular flourishing is an a priori metaphysically rich account that 
gets to the level of our natural gifting and talents and includes the ‘deep’ calling described 
above. But there is another aspect of individual calling as well. Drawing upon the 
Lutheran emphasis in a doctrine of vocation, there are a posteriori conditions such as 
families, upbringings and other relationships within the community that contribute to the 
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particular calling. This aspect of particular calling is related to our being-in-the-world and 
who we are, subject to space and time. 
Twentieth-century philosopher Edith Stein helpfully notes that with regard to 
individuation (the manner in which particular things are identified as distinct from other 
things) and natural talent, it is in these talents that we find ourselves. And the danger is 
that if we do not find ourselves as individuals, we “do not find God either and do not 
attain eternal life.”70 However, she also emphasizes that individuation is not simply 
reducible to talents. What matters is that “each of these persons feels himself in his 
innermost essence as an ‘authentic individual’ and is so regarded by those who have truly 
‘grasped’ or ‘apprehended’ the nature of his personality.”71 Furthermore, as was saw in 
the previous chapter with the primacy of charity in the virtues, this is also the case for 
individual callings. O'Donovan is again helpful when he states, drawing upon 1 
Corinthians 13, that individual callings are ‘clanging cymbals’ without love. Love 
intermixed with our callings becomes the fulfillment of the moral law. Callings are  
 
[T]rue interpretations, each within a unique vocational matrix, of the one moral life, the life which  
is given to all men to live. Just as love is the one demand which is differentiated generically in the  
varieties of commands in the moral law, so it is the one life-task which is differentiated particularly 
in the uniqueness of individual vocations.72 
 
It is the virtue of charity that takes the mundane, everyday gifts of the secular person, 
done without this pivotal virtue and thus considered in Paul’s words as a ‘sounding gong’ 
or ‘clanging cymbal,’ and turns them into the cohesive fulfillment of the moral law. “We 
respond to the objectivity of that gift [calling] and live the life that God has summoned us 
to live in all its distinctiveness.”73 Circling this same theme, but with regard to freedom, 
O’Donovan notes that part of freedom is “the individual’s discovery and pursuit of his or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being, trans. Kurt F. 
Reinhard (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2002), 509. My reading of Edith Stein significantly 
influences my account of uniqueness given here, though with some slight differences; see Stein, FEB; 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue (London: Continuum, 2007); Sarah Borden Sharkey, 
Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later Writings (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2010); James B. Reichmann, “Edith Stein, Thomas Aquinas, and the Principle of Individuation,” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 1 (2013): 55–86. 
71 Stein, FEB, 502. 
72 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 223; 222. 
73 Ibid., 220. 
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her vocation from God.”74 Talents are signifiers of a metaphysical reality, but are not the 
extent of this reality. We will explore this further later in this chapter. A strength of 
addressing the problem of universal and particular calling in the above manner is that it 
allows for a strong sense of divine interaction and dependence between individual and 
universal personhood. 
We have discussed above that human flourishing and happiness are the end and 
result of obedience to commands given either explicitly or at the level of our natures. The 
problem of dual commands, or dual flourishing, can be addressed in the above discussion 
of particulars by identifying the universal happiness that comes with the end, or telos, of 
being human, and also the telos of right use of the gifts and talents that are our natural 
abilities. The most happy person, for the Puritans, is the one who pursues both universal 
and particular ‘happinesses.’ Peter Sedgwick notes,  
 
The importance of a theology of vocation is that it finds a purpose in the valuing of work, as an 
offering by the created order to their Creator in love and adoration, with the sacrifice of self to 
serve others (altruism in happiness and social capital literatures). This goes beyond, although it 
includes, the idea of work as self-actualization.75 
 
This resembles the Puritan position on calling, work and happiness. We will now look at 
the specifics of the above discussion of universals and particulars in Puritan texts. 
Puritans, Calling and the Individual 
We can see this concept of individuation subtly in comments like Baxter’s 
statement that meditation is not a duty for certain people, depending on their natural 
disposition,76 or his statement that “any weak person [should not] stretch their braines 
beyond their ability.”77 Reynolds shows attention to a distinction between general and 
particular calling, while also emphasizing the demands upon private persons. He states, 
 
But must here withal, take notice of the generall care of the Creator; whereby he hath fastened on 
all creatures, not only this private desire to satisfie the demands of their own nature, but hath also 
stamp’t upon them generally charitie and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the 
Universe or common body. Wherein cannot possible be admitted (by reason of that necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgment: The Bampton Lectures, 2003 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2005), 72. Also see Amartya Sen, Inequality Examined (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 39–40; 49. 
75 Sedgwick, “Happiness, Work and Christian Theology,” 70. 
76 Baxter, DHM, 5–6. He has in mind here people who have a natural disposition towards 
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77 Ibid., 6–7. 
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mutuall connexion betweene the parts thereof) any confusion or divulsion, without immediate 
danger to all the members.”78 
 
Here, we can get the sense in Reynolds’ thought that individual demands (or particulars) 
make up the parts of the universal common body. If a particular person is in confusion 
about the demand, there is an immediate danger of breaking a necessary, mutual 
connection. Rogers writes that a calling grows and develops with the Christian towards 
an end of comfort and enjoyment. “When yet, they having once received it of the Lord at 
their first effectuall calling and conversion, it ought to grow up with them and 
accompanie them throughout their life, and make every part of it more sweet and 
comfortable.”79 Owen emphasizes that Christ, as our exemplar and as perfected 
humanity, has a particular call and command from the father: “that he should lay down 
his life, and take it again.” The law of mediation, which is a law for the work of a single 
individual, Christ, was for no one else. Christ, Owen thinks, had a unique calling.80  
In this section we have seen that, according to the account of calling, how talents 
and by extension one’s daily work, can contribute to earthly flourishing. However, this 
can only be understood in light of universal human flourishing that resembles the 
traditional Aristotelian-Thomist concept of happiness. We will now focus our attention on 
the particularly spiritual aspect of Puritan calling and personal uniqueness and how it 
shapes the way that they conceive of prayer and calling. 
Calling and Prayer 
 In the Puritans, addressed above, we see a particularization of calling to the 
individual. There is another way to see this played out in Puritan theology that will be 
looked at here. What we will briefly look at here is the fact that different people in 
different callings will have their own kinds of temptations and concerns. 
 Thomas Becon (1512/13–1567) in Flour of Godly Praiers writes prayers for different 
callings. We can begin to see some of the varieties of concerns that come with being in a 
certain calling. For example, a magistrate has the responsibility to promote virtue and 
godliness in their people through the upholding of true religion. Becon writes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Reynolds, TPFS, 76. Emphasis mine. 
79 Rogers, PC, 432. Rogers seems to resemble Calvin himself, as he thinks that only Christians 
have callings. If we recall, for Calvin the general calling is to all in the form of proclamation, but the special 
calling is only for those who have the Spirit. 
80 Owen, Comm, 215–6. 
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We besech the, unot all civile Magistrates, head rulers and common officers thy holy spirit, which 
may so rule them in al their doings, that every one of them according to their vocation: may trulye 
and faythfullye do that whyche appertayneth unto their office.81  
 
The king’s councilors, similarly, are to remember that they should care about the good of 
the people and direct them towards virtue and away from vice.82 
 In the realms of the court, Judges need prayers that they will judge matters 
according to “equity and justice, deliver the oppressed from the power of the violent.”83 
Becon’s discussion continues on to sound like passages from Isaiah about caring for the 
fatherless and the widow. The lawyer, through the law, restores virtue and punishes vice. 
The prayer for lawyers is for “wisdome, prudence, and knowledge, so to rule thorow the 
goveraunce of thy holy spirit the harts of al lawyers.”84 The lawyer needs prayer that he 
will walk uprightly. 
Bishops and Ministers should pray for hospitality, to lead a godly life, and to bring 
up the youth virtuously. They should also be aware of, and pray against, the inclination to 
be men pleasers which “by their fair speche and flatterynge wordes, decayue the hertes of 
the simple.”85 
Schoolmaster John Clarke (d. 1658) in Holy Incense has a special prayer for the 
scholar. The scholar needs help in reading and meditating on things taught as well as the 
bestowal of understanding and wisdom.86 Clarke’s prayers for the scholar resemble the 
discussion of theoria in Chapter 3. In a very Aristotelian and Thomist fashion, scholars are 
to search out wisdom and the “reason of things,” or first principles.87 They should learn 
not only “heathen, and prophane Authors, but that wisdome also which is from above, 	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and heavenly, which may give me an inheritance among all them that are sanctified.”88 
There is also a place in Clarke’s treatise to pray to possess the intellectual virtues.89 
Thomas Becon has prayers for the merchant not to commit “fraud, gile or 
deceit,” as well as prayers for safe travel.90 Clarke also has a specific prayer for merchants 
and tradesman. They need prayer against the desire to lie and use false weights and 
“deceitfull balances, or unjust measures,” as well as prayer not to take advantage of the 
poor.91 There are also prayers for laborers not to be idle, but to labor in the callings God 
has given. This theme of idleness is also found in the vocational prayers of Church of 
England clergyman Thomas Tuke (1580/81–1657).92 
Alongside prayers for callings, Becon writes prayers for people in specific stations 
in life, like the ‘richman,’ the ‘poor,’ and the ‘commons.’93 Clarke has a specific prayer to 
“blesse my estate, that my riches doe encrease,” but to not let the workers “heart be set 
upon them.”94 
What we have seen in this section is the recognition in Puritan thought that 
different callings have different kinds of temptations and roles within a society and thus 
need certain kinds of prayers that address them. The temptations of the bishop are not 
the same as those of judge, and the temptations of the magistrate are not the same as 
those of a merchant. We have also seen that these prayers are not just related to the jobs  
themselves but to stations in life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Ibid., 194. This resembles the relationship described between philosophy and theology in 
Chapter 3. To do theology well is to be able to engage with secular thought. These two disciplines 
complement each other. 
89 Ibid., 196–7. 
90 Becon, Godly Praiers, xxx. 
91 Clarke, Holy Incense, 198. 
92 Thomas Tuke, The Practise of the Faithfull Containing Many Godly Praiers Both of Morning and Euening 
and Other Necessarie Occasions. Whereunto Are Added Diuers Profitable and Comfortable Meditations Necessarie to Be 
Remembered and Practised of Euery Christian., Early English Books, 1475-1640 / 1086:12 (London: Printed by 
Io. Beale for Samuel Man and are to be sold in Pauls Church yard at the signe of the Ball, 1613., 1613), 
153; 158. 
93 Becon, Godly Praiers, xxxiii–xxxv. Tuke also comments on the responsibilities of those who are 
progressing in their wealth; see Tuke, Practise, 157. And there is a recognition that it is God in his 
providence who puts people in stations of wealth, ibid,. 154. 
94 Clarke, Holy Incense, 203; For more prayers on vocation more generally see Abraham Fleming, 
The Diamond of Deuotion Cut and Squared into Sixe Seuerall Points: Namelie, 1 The Footpath to Felicitie. 1 2 A Guide to 
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being the assigne of William Seres, 1581., 1581), 118–9. 
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With all the above in mind, John Hare helpfully emphasizes that the particular 
adds perfection beyond that of the universal. “Since our happiness is being co-lovers, 
particular happiness should be a way of being a co-lover that is unique to each of us.”95 
Because there are individual essences and common natures that can be “perfection,” the 
difference in our treatment of different neighbors has to respect the common nature 
(humanity) that they all share.”96  
 There is little to no room in the Puritans’ thinking on calling for the problem 
addressed by the author of Fear and Trembling via O’Donovan, that is, our callings morally 
conflict with the generic good. Special callings coexist with and enliven general callings; 
they should not fight against each other.97 What we see implicitly in these Puritan writers, 
in the relationship between the good of the individual and the community, seems to be 
discussed explicitly by eighteenth century English bishop and philosopher Joseph Butler. 
Butler makes a distinction between the self-love (in the sense described in Chapter 2) that 
is related to the individual and benevolence that pertains to the universal or social.98 He 
writes that these ends, individual and communal, “do indeed perfectly coincide; and to 
aim at public and private good are so far from being inconsistent, that they mutually 
promote each other,” but remain distinct.99 The beginning of benevolence, which begins 
with self-love, contributes to happiness, both individual and communal.100 Against what 
would become the perspective of the author of Fear and Trembling, social goods and 
individual goods do not come into conflict. 
What we have seen above in our discussion is that the problem of dual flourishing 
does not need to be a problem. The command to flourish as humanity, described in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, need not be in conflict with the particular calling of the individual. 
In fact, they mutually inform each other. What we have also seen in the Puritan doctrine 
of calling is a sense that a call is individually substantiated at an ontological level, within 	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humanity generally and in each person specifically, while also maintaining an emphasis 
on one’s ‘station’ in the world. I need to reiterate at this point that, in light of the above 
discussion on earthly ‘happinesses’ and Chapter 2 on the supernatural end, there is still 
technically only one ultimate end for humanity, and that is in the next life in the vision of 
God. We will now look at how a theology of work relates to creation or nature, and some 
of the problems that arise if these are separated. We will focus of the work of Miroslav 
Volf. 
Volf, Calling and Work 
For the Puritans, it is most certainly the case that personal callings are based in 
creation and ontology; they are a part of us. Miroslav Volf, in Work in the Spirit, disagrees 
with the Puritans brand of ontologically based, or at least creation based, view of calling 
and work. Looking at Volf here helps to bring out something distinct in the Puritans. 
Volf’s pneumatological view of work is similar to that of the Puritans, as it is 
teleological. All human work is moving towards the eschaton, and even though most 
human work will not be in the new creation, work makes the building blocks of the 
community that allow it to move towards the end. “Human work is ultimately significant 
not only because it contributes to the future environment of human beings, but also 
because it leaves an indelible imprint on their personalities.”101 Volf recognizes ends in 
much the same way as the Puritan eudaemonists do, in that the goal of human history is 
to have shalom with God, such that our end affects our means to our end.102 A Christian 
definition of work must account for where history is moving in the hands of God. “A 
theological interpretation of work is only valid if it facilitates transformation of work 
towards ever-greater correspondence with the coming new creation.”103 
We also see that, like the Puritans, Volf’s emphasis is on man’s cooperation with 
God in creation through the Spirit.104 In some ways, the Puritans and Volf have a similar 
concern, that is, how creation and work relates to ends. For both parties, there is an 
integral connection between the “first creation” of the world and the new creation, but 
for the reformers, as seen above, God involves himself with human work in order to use it 	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104 Ibid., 98; 114. 
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for his purposes. Creation is set, and God providentially places us in the world in a certain 
place and time, whereas for Volf, humans are co-creators. Volf thus deemphasizes the 
‘first creation’ aspect and focuses on the role of the spirit in a process towards the eschaton. 
Accordingly, for Volf, Christianity should not emphasize work based entirely on a 
doctrine of creation; in fact, doing so is “impossible.”105 
The potential problem that one could run into if one takes creation out of a 
theology of work, while still emphasizing an eschatological teleology, is a separation 
between the ‘first creation’ and the ‘new creation,’ to put it in Volf’s terms. This could 
lead to an unhelpful distinction between the natural and the supernatural, as we have 
seen in Chapter 2. Effectively, the theologian that has this tendency would be making a 
distinction between creation, taken as the natural end, and new creation, taken as the 
supernatural end, and claiming that they are no longer related. Making work a strictly 
pneumatological concept effectively elevates it to the supernatural, so much so that that it 
leaves creation behind. The potential problem with this is that work becomes unnatural, 
as it is only related to the new creation and is above the current creation. 
Volf himself seems to flirt with this tendency without explicitly falling into it. 
Aspects of work become ends in themselves, such as leisure106 or nature itself.107 This 
comes dangerously close to implying that there are multiple ends that are not directly 
related to, or inclusive of, the new creation. Volf ultimately does not fall into this trap 
because he wants to emphasize that this world is transformed and not annihilated. The 
tendency towards annihilationism is not uncommon in Christian theology.108 Though 
Volf does not fall into this particular problem, he does seem to esteem work as having 
equal importance with worship in bringing in the new creation, giving the sense of the 
divide that concerned us above. 
There is also the possibility with a theology of work divorced from creation that 
there is not a lot of ground for human nature as it relates to work. By affirming that the 
Spirit is a key aspect of human identity and that non-Christian work contributes to the 
bringing in of the new kingdom, we have a potential contradiction. Either non-Christians 	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who lack the Holy Spirit also lack an essential and necessary attribute of humanness or all 
humans are somehow in the Spirit in the same way. Based on a later statement 
concerning the Spirit’s relationship to the natural order, it would seem that Volf agrees 
with the latter. The Spirit relates to creation the same way in the non-Christian’s work as 
it relates in that of the regenerated person. 
The Puritan doctrine of calling does not fall into these potential pitfalls for two 
reasons. First of all, the dichotomy and distinction between creation and the telos does not 
exist. The creation that we are currently working in has its telos in the new creation. Thus 
the work that we do here is integrally related to the bringing about of the new creation or, 
as we put it in Chapter 2, its perfection, not because we are co-creators with God, but 
because we are involved in God’s continual sustaining of the socio-political order. The 
eschatological transformation of the world is not its annihilation, but rather its fulfillment. 
Creation is not in the process of being completed or ‘open,’ but is to a vast extent set 
awaiting its perfection.109 There is not a distinction between pure and supernatural nature 
as it relates to the created order. Second, the Puritans do not have the potential problem 
of having the Spirit overly present in the world. In relating work to creation and the 
Spirit, rather than just to the Spirit, the Puritans are able to navigate these potential 
issues. The next question that will need to be addressed is an epistemic problem. How is it 
that we come to know what our callings and positions in society should be? 
Self-Examination, Community and Mistaken Callings 
Here we begin to look into a potential problem with regard to epistemology and 
discerning what our callings actually are. Finding a calling is, in a sense, discovering one’s 
God-given talents (what one can do) and one’s God-given personality (what fits the 
person), for the building up of community.110 At face value, this is easy enough. The 
problem is that we can only see the effects of our essential being, but never the essence 
itself. Because of this, it is possible for us to be deceived as to what truly makes us the 
individual that we are.111 Since the ability to recognize our particular essences are an 
important part of human flourishing, we need to address here if any certainty can be had 	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in discerning our callings. Because the call of God encompasses every part of life, from 
eternal salvation to the places in which we live, there is a lot at stake, namely flourishing 
or frustration, in misinterpreting or not understanding one’s call. Here we will address 
this issue. 
Perkins writes that every calling must be fitting to the person. The way people 
know their calling is by examining themselves and deciding to which calling they are most 
fitted and to what things they are not. One does this by examining one’s affections and 
examining one’s gifts. “For his gifts, he must examine, for and to what calling they are 
fittest. Having thus tried both his affections and gifts, finding also the calling to which they 
tend with one consent, he may say, that is his calling, because he liketh it best, and is 
every way the fittest for it.”112 This appeal to reflection on the inner self and experience 
was distinctively Puritan. Though they believed they were in the wake of Calvin himself, 
this move from an emphasis on looking to Christ, in Calvin, towards looking inwardly, as 
in the case of the Puritans, is notably more individualistic.113 
The Puritans give a number of ways that one can know one’s calling. For 
example, one should ask oneself if the sense of vocation strengthens or weakens with 
prayer. Or does it survive tribulation? Sometimes callings are difficult; at other times, they 
come with ease. Actual results are a test in some contexts, but not in all.114 Baxter 
acknowledges that callings can be dangerous.115 For children, it is the parent’s choice to 
‘fit’ the calling for them until they can judge for themselves.116 Parents looking for callings 
in their children should look for gifts of the body so that they can practice the mechanical 
arts or gifts of the mind.117 If a parent makes a mistake and puts their children in wrong 
vocations, then they ruin society by disturbing the web of interlocking economic 
structures.118 We can see that it is important for the flourishing of the individual and the 
community that people know their callings and are able to achieve them. The problem 
here is an epistemic problem of how people can have confidence that what they are doing 	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is actually their calling. We have seen plenty of talent television programs in which people 
genuinely think that they are gifted at singing, cooking or some other activity, but they 
are clearly deceiving themselves. 
There are a few directions in which one can be deceived of one’s calling, but I will 
argue that one can be minimally justified in believing that something is one’s calling and 
avoid falling into error, by self-reflection that is necessarily grounded in a community. We 
will draw upon the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor to help navigate this 
issue. 
 In order to know that one has a certain gifting or calling, one must be justified in 
believing that one’s belief in possessing a calling is formed in a manner that is at least 
minimally reliable, that it has at least a minimally reliable source. We saw above that the 
Puritans’ “minimally reliable source” for knowing one’s calling is based on self-reflection. 
This could be the reflection on the joy one receives from the activity, and on the progress 
of ‘getting better’ over time. By self-reflection, as well as by the increasing growth of joy 
and progress in doing a calling, people are at least minimally justified in believing that 
they are gifted in a certain activity. Surely, if someone were engaged in self-reflection, 
then they would recognize that they are naturally gifted at some activities and not at 
others. There is also the possibility that a person genuinely believes that their calling is a 
particular activity but chooses not to recognize, either voluntarily or involuntarily, that 
they are not gifted in this way. 
We have seen throughout this thesis that character development and uniquely 
human rational capacities like reflection are an essential and emphasized aspect of 
Puritan thought. Charles Taylor shows the relationship between a person’s character and 
their ability for self-interpretation. For Taylor, our self-interpretations are based on, or 
are ‘constitutive’ of, our previous experience. Taylor puts it this way:  
 
…because our insights into our own motivations and into what is important and of value are often 
limited by the shape of our experience, failure to understand a certain insight, or see the point of 
the moral advice proffered, is often taken as a judgment on the character of the person 
concerned.119 
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Our own insights into our motivations and into what we believe to be important are 
limited to our previous experiences. If someone fails to understand their experiences, it is 
taken as a ‘judgment’ upon their character. As we have seen several times throughout this 
research, the Puritans emphasize the character development of the moral agent and, as 
we saw in Chapters 3 and 4 and will see again in Chapter 7, the ability of rational animals 
to be self-reflecting and to meditate on truths about self and God. Thus, rational and self-
interpreting humans must continually reconsider their most basic evaluations and rethink 
what is essential to their identities. This, for Taylor as well as the Puritans, is at the very 
foundation of personhood and moral deliberation. If someone is obviously not 
reevaluating their own identity enough to realize what they are truly called to, it says 
something about their character. 
 It seems, however, that these queries can also be addressed by putting the self-
reflective person in the context of the broader community. MacIntyre notes that the 
virtues that are indispensably required for acquiring degrees of self-knowledge and 
preventing self-deception are “honesty, primary truthfulness about ourselves, both to 
ourselves and to others.” These virtues are exercised not only in self-examination but also 
in accountability to those with whom we participate in community, “those who have 
reason to look to us to help in meeting needs, by acknowledging to them our inadequacies 
and failures, wherever it is relevant to do so.” In order to be independent practical 
reasoners, we must concede to those who are expert co-workers and moral exemplars. As 
we will see more clearly in the next chapter, we have to rely on such people, from our 
close communities, friends and family members, for these necessary corrections.120 As 
dependent rational animals, we are dependent on the voluntary and involuntary 
communities in which we find ourselves. 
What we have looked at above is the potential epistemic problem of how we can 
know what our callings are, and whether we can be deceived. Simply put, the answer is 
yes; there is the possibility of being deceived. By looking at MacIntyre and Taylor, 
however, we were able to see that the method that the Puritans give for learning one’s 
callings is at least minimally reliable. God created us with the capabilities to discern his 
call, and to discern the appropriate and specific means of achieving eudaemon. God created 	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us in such a way that we can, upon reflection sense the call of God.121 Further, the 
Aristotelian practical reasoning that is being argued for in this thesis is, by its very nature, 
communal and takes place in social relationships within families, schools, apprenticeships 
and the church.122 Rational reflection is an important aspect of the doctrine of calling. 
Now we turn our attention to a historical epistemic problem in the Puritans that has 
relevance for constructive argument. 
Certainty, Prosperity and Hardship 
There is a further epistemological issue that comes along with the doctrine of 
calling: the relationship between certainty and prosperity. The above description of the 
Puritans doctrine of calling could sound to contemporary ears like a prosperity gospel. 
The problem that this section will briefly try to address is how we can know that we are 
called to something while struggling to do it. Or, to put it another way, do we know that 
we have found our calling simply because we are prospering and are successful? We will 
look at two different strands of reformation epistemologies to help us think through this 
problem: a theology of glory and a theology of the cross. 
How do people know God in the world? A theology of glory would answer this by 
appealing to reason and personal perceptions. Through these one can increase one’s 
knowledge about God and the world. If an action appears to be good, then it must be 
good. There certainly seems to be a strand of this within the Puritan thought investigated 
thus far. However, Reformation England also saw strands of a ‘theology of the Cross,’ 
which would answer the above queries by Christ on the cross. The self-revelation of God 
through Christ is the only means by which one can learn about God and one’s relation to 
him; all good actions pale in comparison with this. Because Christ suffered on the cross, 
and he is the only way that we can know good, we know our good, or know if we are 
following the will of God, by our suffering. Thus “the paradoxical insistence that the 
route to Christian glory is through suffering, and that persecution and worldly misfortune 
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are signs of God’s favor.”123 When you are suffering, then you know that you are doing to 
will of God. 
Robert Bolton argues that prosperity can actually be a sign of the “cunning and 
work” of Satan. The wicked experience prosperity because of their “large and unlimited 
consciences,”124 and because they are “men of this world,” placing their full “felicity in 
this world.”125 The Christian, however, must suffer in this life. He writes, 
 
Let every godly man then with comfort and benefit undergoe those crosses which the Lord layeth 
upon him: for they are unto him as looking glasses, wherein God sees his faith and dependance 
upon his providence … So that by them God is pleased and glorified, the others edified and 
instructed himselfe humbled, recovered by repentance, and more sanctified.126 
 
The hypocrite’s prosperity even makes them more inexcusable.127 
On the other hand, we see in Ezekial Culverwell the exact opposite inclination. In 
his bestselling work from 1623, the Treatise of Faith, Culverwell writes, “what need there is 
to live by faith for these earthly blessings, which if we did, we should not onely be free 
from many fore vexations, which torment many ungodly in their distresses.”128 He 
continues, stating, “this if it were considered, would move many to labour more for this 
precious gift of faith, which will so abundantly supply all our earthly wants, whereof wee 
bee so sensible, and thereby so distracted.”129 Again, Culverwell writes, “there remain 
sundry other earthly blessings, which as they be much desired, so are they abundantly 
provided, promised, and bestowed as need requires upon the faithful.”130 What 
Culverwell is expressing in this passage is that those who live by faith will be free of 
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distress, while the ‘ungodly’ will experience ‘vexation.’ There is health and prosperity for 
those who “perform [their] “places and callings.”131 
There are two possible ways of working out these discrepancies for our purposes 
here. The first, from a historical perspective, is that the Puritans can come to an issue 
from a number of different perspectives, emphasize different aspects and ultimately come 
out with very different conclusions. We have seen this throughout this research. This 
aspect of the Puritan doctrine of calling is generally wildly inconsistent, as different 
persons at different times want to emphasize one aspect over another. 
The second way of working out these discrepancies, in a more constructive 
context is for a brand of moral situationism described above. With this in mind, we could 
respond to the above problem by asserting that each event and situation has its own 
particulars and its own surrounding context. Each of these particulars needs to be taken 
into account, and it takes the independent practical and reflective reasoning that comes 
along with the development of virtue grounded in a community to discern if prosperity or 
hardship is symptomatic of obedience to God.132 
Conclusion 
We have seen in previous chapters that the Puritans eudaemonistic doctrine of 
calling set forth in this thesis has a universal component. We have seen that by virtue of 
being human, there are certain virtues that should be habituated, even by regenerate and 
unregenerate persons, in order for them to experience earthly happiness. This also 
involves the use of natural rational faculties in the workplace and in discursive and 
contemplative reasoning. 
In this chapter, we have moved from a conception of the divine command to 
universal humankind in moral development and then to more particular commands in 
the doctrine of calling. A Puritan eudaemonistic doctrine of calling is ontologically 
grounded and thus related to flourishing generally as well as particularly. The 	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particularization comes because the means of achieving earthly happiness vary from 
person to person. The means to the general calling or telos—the infusion of virtues 
through faith and charity in Christ—are universal in that every person has access to 
them. Specific callings, or earthly telè, are the same, but the means are particular. 
In this chapter, through the Puritan eudaemonistic doctrine of calling, we have 
seen that universals and particulars in flourishing can be simultaneously held together. 
We have also shown some potential problems that arise if creation and nature are taken 
out of a doctrine of calling and a theology of work, and that the Puritans do not fall victim 
to these issues. Finally, we have focused on the Puritan emphasis on self-reflection as a 
means of knowing one’s calling, showing the importance of the community in 
determining one’s calling. 
From here, we will look at the final portion of Perkins’ definition of calling and 
move our gaze from the individual to the political. We will show that the community is 
exceptionally important for ethics as well as for a robust doctrine of calling.
 Chapter 6 
‘Common Good:’ Community and the Political 
 
There is no duty we so much underrate as the duty of being happy. By being happy we sow anonymous benefits upon the world. 
Robert Louis Stevenson 
Introduction 
Christopher Hill argues that the Puritan emphasis on private readings of scripture 
derives from Luther’s stress on the priesthood of all believers and the personal conversion 
of the individual’s heart. He claims that they create an ‘individualist’s anarchy.’1 We will 
see in this chapter that this narrative is misleading. In the previous chapter, we saw that 
the call of God is a loving, divine command that carries with it strong naturalist leanings. 
Along with the universal call to humankind to the happiness described in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4, there are also particular ‘happinesses’ that are tied to individuals, not only in their 
historical and geographical position, but also at the level of ontology. 
This chapter begins where the previous one ends, by looking at the social and 
political aspects of the Puritan definition of calling and at how the divinely ordained social 
position of individuals contributes to the whole of a flourishing society. This will be done 
by looking at some of the nuanced specifics of their doctrine of calling, regarding how 
both Christians and non-Christians use their callings to benefit society. 
We will then direct our gaze away from a discussion of the particular happiness of 
the individual back to the universal development of virtue and the community’s role in 
this development. We will do this by looking at two aspects of social life. The first is the 
importance of friendship; the second is a discussion of the state’s role in moral 
development.  
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For the Good of the Political Community 
Here we reach the third portion of Perkins᾽ definition of calling. Perkins writes 
that the “good estate of the common wealth is when every person keepes himselfe to his 
owne calling. And this wil undoubtedly come to passe, if we consider what bee our 
callings & that we are placed in them of god, and therefore judge them to be the best 
callings of all for us.”2 Rogers writes that all Christians “must live in some lawfull 
vocation” in addition to practicing other godly duties while they “faithfully and diligently 
walke in the same.” Those who do this are the children of God, and “passe the day well 
and christianly.”3 
Here I will show how God in his providence directs certain persons to certain 
callings for the good of the whole society. Each person doing his or her calling creates a 
complex economic web, building upon others and depending on others, to make society 
function. 
Callings do not reside exclusively in the realm of ethics, but widen to encompass 
the good of the whole society and thus become a topic of political theology. It is here in 
Perkins’ statement, “for the common good,” that the definition moves from aspects of the 
individual person to the good of the community. Calling is to be “for the benefit and good 
estate of mankinde.”4 Personal callings must have a community aspect to them. “There 
can be no working out of a personal destiny that is in abstraction from the community.”5 
In this section, we will begin to widen the scope of the Puritan doctrine of calling 
to see how it relates to the political realm, while continuing the discussion begun in the 
previous chapter on the relationship between calling and God’s providence. We will then 
look at the three primary communities to which callings relate, those being the 
commonwealth, the church and the family. After we look at the relationship of callings 
and work to these societies, it will then be important to address how one uses one’s calling 
well, having entered into a particular calling, and finally whether it is ever appropriate to 
leave one calling for another. 
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Aristotle, Providence and the Political 
Like Aristotle, Perkins notes that we are socio-political animals, and, like Luther, 
Perkins subdivides three natural sorts of communities: commonwealth, church and 
family.6 “God in his worde hath ordained the societie of man with man, partly in the 
common-wealth, partly in the Church, and partly in the familie: and it is not the will of 
God that man should live and converse alone by himself.” Even though mankind is a 
socio-political animal, “there should stil remaine a distinction betweene man and man, 
not only in regard of person, but also in other respects.”7 Our callings are necessarily 
related to another. The practice of an individual’s virtue and calling was seen as 
something that not only benefitted the individual but the community and the flourishing 
of the whole. However, the individualist mindset that is typically identified with the 
enlightenment was certainly becoming predominant in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century.8 Perkins feels it necessary to attack a common saying, “everyman for himselfe 
and God for us all.” Perkins writes that this individualism is “wicked, and is directed 
against the end of every calling or honest kind of life.”9 Veith comments that the 
“doctrine of vocation undermines conformity, recognizes the unique value of every 
person, and celebrates human differences; but it sets these individuals into a community 
with other individuals, avoiding the privatizing self-centered narcissism of secular 
individualism.”10 The Puritan doctrine of calling resembles something of what MacIntyre 
is looking to recover in contemporary ethics, and the mindset that he is attributing to the 
enlightenment seems to have been prevalent in England in this time. The Puritans’ denial 
of this view of God’s relationship to society and the individual may spring from their close 
readings and use of Aristotle.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Perkins draws upon Aristotle’s first and final 
causations. The first cause is related to God’s continual work in sustaining providence; the 
final cause is the political aspect of calling. The final cause is the “proper end” and is “for 
the benefit and good estate of mankinde.”11 Within the Puritans, we have seen the final 	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9 Perkins, ATV, 7. 
10 Veith, God at Work, 24. 
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cause being used in a double manner. As we saw in Chapter 2, the final cause is related to 
eudaemonia as the end of the individual, culminating in the vision of God. In the present 
chapter, we see it as it relates to the end of a calling to the body politic. According to the 
Puritans, God designs us with callings that will accompany our flourishing and the 
flourishing of society. “The common good of men standes in this, not onely that they live, 
but that they live well in righteousness and holines, & consequently in true happiness. 
And for the attainment hereunto God hath ordained and disposed all callings and in his 
providence designed the persons to beare them.”12 Baxter writes, “[e]very one that is 
able, must be statedly, and ordinarily imployed in such work, as is serviceable to God, 
and the common Good,” even if one is wealthy. Every person that is part of the 
commonwealth or church must employ their parts to the utmost for the good of the 
people. “Publick service is God’s greatest service.” For Baxter, a life of prayer and 
meditation is to refuse the “greatest work, and tie yourself to some lesser or easie part.” 
“God hath commanded you some way or other to labour for your daily bread and not to 
live as drones on the sweat of others only.”13 
Callings and Their Political Place 
We will now look in more detail at how callings relate to the political life. It is the 
very nature of callings to be social. Callings not only affect the individual but also benefit 
those within a community. Perkins and Rogers note that relationships help with our 
work.14 Calling, however, is wider than just work, though it includes it. A calling also 
involves service to others, “whereas meaningful work need not involve this element of 
service.”15 Within the three-fold subdivision given above—commonwealth, church and 
family—the Puritans generally give three ways of appropriately dealing with callings. The 
first we will look at is the right use of callings, how people should conduct themselves 
within their callings. Second, we will look at how the Puritans think that one should enter 	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into a calling. In this section, we will be looking at callings that are within the family 
structure. We will look at this firstly because their thought on family vocations resembles 
Luther’s thought, in that one enters family callings through one’s station in life, and 
secondly because it is through the family that children begin their callings through 
education and parental discernment. Finally, having established how one is to enter a 
calling, we will see how one stays in that calling, and when it is appropriate, if ever, to 
change from one calling to another. 
Perkins makes a further distinction between the priorities and types of personal 
callings. The first type of calling is one that is at the essence of a society. As we have seen 
above, this includes callings within the family, the church and the magistrate. The second 
sort of personal calling is “such as serve onely for the good happie, and quiet estate of 
societie.” This kind represents workers like the husbandman and merchant, the physician, 
the lawyer and the soldier.16 It is important to note, however, that there is a distinction 
between essential social callings and those of the ‘quiet estate;’ “the goodness of the 
calling does not abase the goodness of the work, for god looketh not at the excellencie of 
the worke, but at the heart of the worker.”17 
I. The Right use of Callings 
In addressing the right use of callings, it is important, as far as it is possible, that 
one makes good choices in choosing a calling. Callings must be “honest and lawful 
callings” that “uphold the state, family and church.”18 The first ‘rule’ of calling is, “what 
so ever any man enterpriseth or doth either in word or deed, he must doe it by virtue of 
his calling, and he must keepe himselfe within the compasse, limites, or precinctes 
thereof.”19 God must assure him of his calling. The second rule is that “everyman must 
doe the duties of his calling with diligence: & therefore Salomon saith, whatsoever is in 
thy hand to doe, doe with all thy power.”20 In other words, people should execute their 
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callings to the best of their ability and with diligence. Webbe encourages his readers to 
preserve a quiet conscience and work hard in their callings.21 
By working hard in one’s calling, one fulfills to some degree the second table of 
the Decalogue: love thy neighbor. In our callings, we are able to love our enemies more 
than we love ourselves. “The like love ought wee to shew, by doing service to all men in 
the compasse of our callings, & by being al things to al men (as Paul was) that we might 
doe them all the good we can, both for body and soule.”22 Just as St. Paul is cited here as 
an example of loving our neighbors and enemies through our callings, Christ is also put 
forward as an example of this. In the context of Christ being our moral example, Baxter 
argues that Jesus “condescended to labour at a Trade and mean imployment in the 
world” in order to first teach that both body and mind express obedience and to teach 
men “to labour and live in a calling; and to comfort poor labourers with assurance that 
God accepteth them in the meanest work, and that Christ himself lived so before them, 
and chose their kind of life.”23 Therefore, like Christ, we need to be “lights and good 
examples in all good works,”24 particular callings “[w]herein every man, according to the 
gift which God hath given him, must bestowe himselfe honestly, to his owne, and 
neighbors good.”25 
The right use of calling is not for wealth and comfort. One’s calling should be 
“serviceable to God,” in that one should not choose a vocation that will bring the most 
money or honor, “but that in which you may do most good, and best escape sinning.”26 If 
a calling is “not to be sanctified by serving God in it, and regulating it by his Law, it is 
then neither honourable nor desirable.”27 Reynolds writes that there are “no more 
pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the publike Good, than those who are best qualified 
for service and imployment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the 
common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon 
“publique Ruines.”28 Rogers also writes in his diary that he could have gone into some 	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other calling or line of work and “increased [his] commodities not a little,” but saw that 
his time and mind were better put to use by being a pastor and meditating.29 
We see in Rogers, Perkins and Baxter another means by which calling relates to 
Christian ethics. Doing our callings is not just obeying the command of God to perform 
our God-given callings at the individual level, but also performing these callings fulfills the 
greater command to love our neighbors and those within our communities. Money and 
survival are secondary motivations for someone to work hard in their vocations. We will 
be discussing money as it relates to work in more detail later in this chapter. 
II. Good entrance into the calling 
 We will here further address the question of how one enters into a particular 
calling. We have seen above and in the previous chapter that every person, regardless of 
education, comes to know his or her callings, according to the Puritans, by self-reflection, 
which gives insight into the work that every person should pursue. 
In the relationship between general and particular callings, it is always the case 
that the general calling takes precedence over the particular. A Magistrate must be a 
“Christian Magistrate in executing the office of a Magistrate.” This is the same for the 
father, mother, schoolmaster and any other special calling. But the general calling 
without the particular calling is “but a forme of godlinesse without power thereof.” Both 
callings must work in tandem like the “bodie and soule.”30 
 Amongst the Puritans, there is general agreement with Luther; sometimes people 
may have more than one ‘particular’ calling.31 We will now explore how this can be the 
case by explaining the three cases for there being dual callings. Here we will look at 
multiple callings as they pertain to work; we will later look at them as they relate to work 
and family. One can have two callings if God combines them, is not against scripture, and 
in their joining they do not hinder each other or the common good.32 Baxter notes that a 
person cannot have multiple trades if the motivation is to become rich and put their 
neighbor with the same calling out of business, thus negating this cut-throat and self-	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serving aspect of modern capitalism. Also, in order to have two callings, one must be able 
to manage both well without one being sinfully neglected.33 “Thus god manifests his 
fatherly care over us by the imploiment of men in his service according to their several 
vocations for our good.”34 
We saw in the previous chapter that some callings have specific temptations. 
Baxter anticipates the following question: what if the highest calling brings about the most 
temptation? Baxter replies in various ways to the idea that certain callings have certain 
kinds of temptations and that a person of good character will be able to overcome these. 
If the temptation is particular, meaning that it is great on a certain occasion that is not 
usually the norm, one must “still obey God whatever the difficulties and temptations are.” 
When God calls someone to a vocation, he will preserve them, “for no temptation can 
necessitate you to sin.”35 Baxter later admonishes his readers to know the temptations of a 
calling and to be “suspicious of yourself.”36 
There are instances of what the Puritans call ‘extraordinary callings,’ where the 
spirit gives strength to someone for a time to accomplish the restoring of the Gospel. 
These cases are very rare; Luther’s reforming the church is held up as an example.37  
Family 
As we have seen, there are many differences between Luther’s doctrine of 
vocation and the Puritan’s doctrine of calling. The Puritan doctrine of calling is more 
concerned with a person’s ontology. There is, however, some overlap on the place of the 
family as a calling or ‘station.’ This Lutheran emphasis, as seen in the previous chapter, 
still carries weight for the Puritans and is still to this day an important aspect of Christian 
moral and political theology.38 To have a certain station in a family is not ontological but 
contextual, meaning that the calling to be a father is not inherent in a person, but it 
comes about when one bears children. 
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Webbe draws upon Aristotle to discuss roles in the family,39 showing how fathers 
should relate to servants, children, and their wives. Reynolds writes that the special 
calling of a minister is difficult in inward and outward duties, finding the same trouble in 
disciplining themselves to be in the word. In fact, they have a double duty—the spiritual 
lives of themselves and their people—but the spiritual calling of a minister is not any 
easier than the layperson’s.40 Baxter agrees, noting that being a minister is a high work, 
but being a father is higher.41 The good husband is aware of the workings of his labor as 
well as that of those he supervises. He must know the “particular tempers, and faults, and 
virtues of those whom he is to govern.”42 He must have “prudence” in the way he 
conducts himself, and “justice” in the way that he conducts his workers. 
Part of the calling of parents is to wisely discern the calling of their children. It is 
the parent’s responsibility not only to cultivate moral sensibilities in their children but also 
to discern the crafts at which the child should develop. The parents become the first and 
primary educators of the child.43 Children at young ages are motivated to certain callings 
not by self-reflection but by the prompting of their parents or other authorities. A 
poignant sign of bad parenting is forcing children into wrongful callings, or preventing 
them from entering into their rightful calling.44 When discussing the duties of 
schoolmasters in the education of children’s souls, Baxter argues that one must first 
determine the end of labor and then continually keep “in your eye” the end and the 
means by which to accomplish and attain it. “If the end be chiefly your own commodity 
or reputation, the means will be distorted accordingly, and your labours perverted, and 
your calling corrupted, and embased (to your selves,) by your perverse intentions.”45 
Parents must “choose such a calling and course of life for your children, as tendeth most 
to the saving of their souls, and to their publick usefulness for Church or State.”46  
Parents need to pick callings for their children that will allow them the leisure time 
to develop spiritually, make a decent amount of money and have “fit opportunities to get 	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43 MacIntyre, Dependent, 89–90.  
44 Ibid., 104–5. MacIntyre gives the example of Aquinas, whose mother locked him up in order to 
keep him from the Dominican order. 
45 Baxter, CP, 44. 
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good, and to do good.”47 Parents need to bring up their children in their calling as a 
means to quietness.48 We have seen from previous chapters that Webbe’s quietness 
resembles closely the concept of eudaemonia. From another perspective, children need to 
seek the approval of their parents to pursue their chosen callings.49 
With regard to the relationship between the calling of one’s employment and the 
calling of a place in the family, sometimes a person with a work calling will need to be 
away from their family calling for months. Baxter thinks that this is fine as long as no 
significant hurt is to follow.50 There are times when it is necessary to prioritize a “lesser 
work” when the greater may be delayed. “The duties of the first table [love God] are to 
be preferred before those of the second [love neighbor], yet the greater duties of the 
second table must be preferred before the lesser duties of the first.”51 This means that 
there could be times when one should favor the needs of the family over other aspects of 
morality, for example, the command to rest on the Sabbath. 
Men and children are not the only people within the household that have 
particular vocations and callings; women are also important parts of the family and 
community. Every person has a personal calling, regardless of class, sex, state or degree.52 
Women, Baxter thinks, need to be taught callings at a young age, so that they will have 
some skill when they get older and will not become beggars if their husband dies,53 
though there are certainly jobs that are only for men.54 In the same way that the wider 
political community had certain people doing certain jobs in order to fulfill the needs of 
the entire community, this was the same for the family. The mutual duties of marriage 
partners were given equal stress both in the case of the female and of the male.55 But even 
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with this emphasis, it was of mutual importance for wives and husbands to keep up with 
their roles within the home, women’s vocations are often gruesome work.56 
Women’s vocations were also not always restricted to the household, one example 
being brewing. There are vocations in which women may partake, but there were great 
discrepancies between the wages of women and men. Nevertheless, even with this wage 
discrepancy, women, depending on their trade, were paid quite well for their work.57 We 
can see here that women’s vocations were not restricted simply to the home; at times, 
they included running businesses or writing books, and some upper-class women 
managed their husbands’ estates and political roles.58 There was a recognition that their 
callings may be, to an extent, outside the home. In sum, women of this time were essential 
parts of this sixteenth and seventeenth century economy and not simply relegated to 
domestic labors. 
There is certainly a cultural favoritism for males over females in this period. As 
was mentioned in Chapter 4 with regards to Aristotle, virtue ethics and putting aside the 
non-essential and dated aspects of his thought (elitism, sexism, racism), we can put aside 
the aspects of Puritan thought that are not built into the very structure of their ethics.59 
The overarching principles of the Puritan doctrine of calling with respect to male and 
female also does need to be adopted. There is still plenty of room in this argument to say 
that women can be entitled to equal pay and high-ranking social positions.  
III. The Good Continuance in a Calling  
An important aspect of nearly all the Reformation doctrines of calling is that the 
work that people are called to is the work in which they need to stay. ‘Continuance,’ 
which is the “constant practice of the duties and workes of the same calling,”60 is certainly 
seen as an important point of the doctrine. Continuance in calling requires that people do 
the proper works of their callings and “must do them in a good and godly manner.” Two 
things are “principally required for a calling,” writes Perkins, “Holiness, and 
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Constancie.”61 Moving away from one’s calling leads to frustration, because flourishing is 
found in performing our callings.62 
As we have seen above, the primary purpose of work for the Puritans is not to 
accumulate wealth or to move up in social class. Money is not a proper motivation for 
performing a calling; rather, the primary motivation should be to serve God and 
neighbor. It is not a duty, Baxter argues, to labor for the sake of riches and wealth; it is, 
however, good to work for the “honest increase and provision, which is the end of our 
labour.”63 With this in mind, there is nothing wrong with working hard in order to 
receive a pay increase. Thus it is acceptable “to choose a gainful calling rather than 
another,” so that “we may be able to do good, and relieve the poor.” For Baxter, the 
accumulation of money is fine as long as that money ends up in the hands of those who 
are in need. Christians should “forbear all needless expenses; but those also that are 
needful but to such conveniences and accommodations as may be spared without a 
greater hurt.”64 In summary, the accumulation of wealth is not necessarily an evil as long 
as those who are in need are not left in want. A successful worker should make caring for 
those in need a priority rather than prioritizing lush unnecessary comforts. 
Leaving a Calling 
If the Puritans claim that calling is related to the flourishing of an individual at an 
ontological level, then is there the potential objection that one can never leave one’s 
calling or vocation? The worry is that some people will be stuck in a less than ideal work 
environment for their entire lives. Luther’s doctrine of vocation emphasizes that all 
people should restrict themselves to one calling, thus not allowing there to be any sense of 
social mobility.65 One should not pass from one social class to another. God put people in 
a certain class and to leave that class would ruin the social order.66 The Puritan doctrine 
of calling, however, allows for people to change callings as long as it is for the right 
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reason. The Puritans give much thought to this, asking, under what circumstances are 
people able to leave their calling, and when do they need to stay where they have been 
put? 
Generally, Puritans think that one should not change one’s calling out of envy, 
ambition (in the negative sense), or impatience. Rather, one should strive to be content in 
one’s calling.67 Rogers notes that after performing our callings for some amount of time, 
they will become pleasurable. One should not leave a calling because it is difficult.  
 
It may appear, that it is no wearisome thing to be setled in such a course (wherein we may please 
God) as frailty will permit: but the sound and chiefest pleasure rather, yea and besides, it is that 
onely, which so seasoneth our earthly and temporall liberties, that so they become lawfull and 
pleasant to us also; and the duties and works of our callings, that they be not (as to others) 
burthensome and tedious68 
 
For Perkins, a change can only be made on two occasions. First, if it is of private 
necessity, which is when a person “cannot maintain themselves and theirs, but the calling 
in which they are.” For example, St. Paul upon “private necessitie, returned to the calling 
of a Tent maker: yet so as he performed his ministerie, when occasion was offered.” 
Secondly, we can change our callings for the “common good.” But in this second case, 
people can only change their callings if their station in life is improved and it is thus better 
for the community.69 
Perkins makes another distinction under the umbrella of callings: changeable and 
perpetual. Changeable callings are callings done for a season, while perpetual callings can 
only be left for a disability of mind or body or lawfully disposed of for a crime committed, 
death or the last day of judgment. These are the only occasions when people may resign 
from perpetual callings.70 Using the ‘army and general’ metaphor used earlier, Perkins 
shows that people are able to leave a calling for another: God assigns “a particular office, 
in performance whereof he is to live and die. And as in campe no souldier can depart his 
standing without the leave of the general.”71 
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Baxter writes, “keep in the way of your Place and calling, and take not other mens 
works upon you, without a call, under any pretense of doing good.”72 Baxter is saying, 
just because you can do something better than the person who is called to it, this does not 
mean that you should hijack the other and do their job for them. This specifically applies 
if the work that one wants to do is higher than one’s particular calling. God will honor 
lower callings, though men do not honor them.73 The reason that Baxter gives for not 
doing the work of another person’s ‘higher’ calling is that God knows best what is 
pleasing to him and it is better that one is obedient than sacrificial. Baxter also argues that 
pastors cannot leave their callings simply because there is resistance from politicians and 
congregants.74 If someone is not succeeding or finding blessing in their labors, this does 
not mean that they should stop.75 
With the Puritans, however, there is the possibility of the “lawful going from one 
calling to another.” It is not the “[a]postles meaning to barre men to divert from this or 
that calling, but he gives them an item to keepe them from changing upon every light 
conceit, and ever suddaine occasion. And that changes may lawfully be made, it appearth 
thus.” Many people in scripture changed their callings, including Christ (from carpenter 
to minister and mediator). Baxter also points out that the changing of callings is 
something that we see in the example of the Apostles in scripture and of pastors of the 
church in the history of the church. “God no where forbids men to change their 
employment for better, upon a sufficient cause or call.”76 But this does not mean that one 
can simply leave the callings of the family. “No man must take up or change any calling 
without sufficient cause to call him to it: But when he hath such cause, he sinneth if he 
change it not.”77  
At this point, I must address a potential problem. In the previous chapter, I noted 
that callings trickle down into the very specifics of our lives and that these even include 
such things as the places we live. If this is the case, how is it that one can change one’s 
calling? In the previous chapter, we looked at the concept of a ‘deep’ calling. I described 	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deep callings as a distinctive combination of broad character traits, for example, being 
detail-oriented or highly curious and contemplative. The deep calling does not necessarily 
need to be to any one specific job. Earthly flourishing can be possessed by a person in a 
number of jobs that correlate to their broad character traits. If a car mechanic, who 
enjoys the visceral experience of working with her hands and is not particularly detail-
oriented, is offered an office job to do the paperwork for the garage she works for, this 
would not necessarily be a good promotion, even if the pay is more. The promotion 
comes with responsibilities that do not comport with the natural ‘deep’ calling. Just 
because one is able to leave a calling, this does not mean that one should.  
With regard to job mobility, Volf’s theology of work is, in part, to protect a 
diachronic plurality of employment in modern society. He claims that his pneumatological 
understanding of work does not necessitate a “single event.” This allows a person the 
opportunity to change vocations multiple times in their lives.78 This, however, is to 
baptize modern ideologies of mobility. Brock rightfully criticizes the view of work apart 
from creation by noting that this view is “relentlessly and voluntaristically optimistic” and 
is “deaf to the limitations that materiality and finitude place on social change.”79 In 
juxtaposition, what we can draw from a Puritan theology of work for our constructive 
purposes is that career changes and work advancements are good and should be taken if 
it will benefit the community. It is fine if there are financial benefits, but this is secondary. 
We can also draw from the Puritans that there are some jobs that are simply not 
conducive to the natural dispositions of certain persons. Volf’s diachronic plurality does not 
account for the fact that certain jobs are naturally not conducive to certain persons for 
whom doing them would lead to frustration rather than flourishing. Ultimately, any 
opportunity for movement, as mentioned in the previous chapter, requires a person to 
seek God and heed the advice of those in their communities. These important decisions 
should be made through practical reasoning and the advice and counsel of friends. 
The consideration of leaving a particular calling should not lead us to think that we 
should leave our general calling. There is no vacation or change from the general calling as 
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there can be with our particular callings.80 With this in mind, we must now look at the 
occasions when people can leave callings. As we have seen above, there are acceptable 
times for people to leave one calling for another calling. What we will need to look at in 
the context of what we have looked at in light of our discussion of Aristotle and Aquinas 
in Chapter 3 is whether there are any occasions on which one can leave a calling in order 
not to work. This also leads us, again, to think about the relationships between work, 
meditation and rest and leisure. 
Sabbath, Recreation and Disability 
A major emphasis on work could be seen as an apologetic for a whole community 
to become workaholics. Bremer notes that this is the impetus to Max Weber’s claim that 
Puritanism is the foundation of Capitalism. However, writes Bremer, Weber does not 
account for the fact that the Puritans view rest with the same moral seriousness as work.81 	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community: family, church and magistrate; see Perkins, ATV, 37-8. However, upon the command of a 
prince, there are occasions on which people can become soldiers to do an “urgent work of publick 
consequence” and forbear regular aspects of their lives, such as weekly worship; see Baxter, CD, 871. The 
command of a magistrate to leave a calling to become a soldier should not be taken lightly and requires 
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It is also worth asking, with regard to the changing of callings and the family, whether getting 
married is a change of calling—a change from the call to be single to the call to be a spouse. This is an issue 
that cannot be addressed here at length, as it does not significantly alter the broader constructive argument 
of this thesis. 
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At this point in our study of the Puritan concept of calling, work and contemplation, we 
need to connect a few strands. We have also discussed in this chapter the relationship 
between leisure and work. This section will attempt to bring these two stands together 
and address issues related to rest, play and disability. This is important to our discussion 
because it rounds out and gives some clarity to the Puritan thought on rest and work in 
very practical ways. This section broadens to discuss not only the leisure that comes with 
contemplation but also that which comes with recreation and rest.82 
This section will continue to use William Perkins’ thought as a model to build a 
more comprehensive Puritan view. Perkins’ discussion of constancy in a calling looks at 
the concept of vacation.83 Perkins seems to use the terms ‘vacation’ and ‘sabbath’ 
synonymously. Vacation is the “surcease from doing duties of a particular calling from 
some time or space.”84 It is a command of God and is allowed in three ways. The first is to 
keep the Sabbath day holy, second recreation, and third is disability. We will look at each of 
these in turn below. 
The first is by the command of God in the Decalogue to keep the Sabbath day 
holy, “[h]ere every man is bound in conscience before God, to surcease from the duties of 
his calling.”85 Knowledge of the kingdom of heaven cannot be attained unless people take 
a break from their labors and hear and study the word of God. “Therefore it is for the 
good of the families, townes, countries, and kingdoms, that the Lords day be kept, and 
consequently it stands us in hand to take the benefit of this vacation, and to use it for the 
increase of faith, repentance and obedience, if we desire the salvation of our owne 
soules.”86 Christians must depend on God’s providence for the success of their labors. 
This is how Perkins suggests that one strike a moderate position between hard work and 
rest: by having faith that “God best knows our wants, and he will give unto us all things 
which hee in his wisedom knows to be necessary.”87 
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The Sabbath is the day that is dedicated for all people to meditate and rest. As 
seen earlier, knowledge of God and eternal salvation comes from people taking a Sabbath 
to study the word of God together. This is how the contemplative life and the active life 
come together. As we have seen earlier in Chapter 3, both are fervently argued for. Rest, 
and particularly the Sabbath rest, is how lay people can participate in both activities. 
Sabbath rest and the command for the layperson to temporarily cease labor and meditate 
is also a social endeavor. The Sabbath is also a time of coming together through church 
services and family gatherings. The communal and ecclesial structure of meditation is 
highlighted in a warning given by Bishop Joseph Hall, “that when left unbridled, 
meditations could easily wander from the Word and become superstitious.”88 In definitive 
opposition to privatized understandings of meditation, Hall’s warning insists that 
meditation be an expression of the life of the community of faith in seeking God. This is 
not unlike the pedagogical character of Aquinas’s vision of sacra doctrina and the truly 
ecclesial and communal understanding of meditation that was discussed in Chapter 3 like 
the necessary relation between a teacher and a student.89 
The second of Perkins’ “vacations” is recreation. There is general recognition that 
work is hard and that, since Adam, callings have strife mixed with them. However, we 
can take heart because God is well pleased with us and all our efforts will be for the good 
in the end.90 In addition, even with the recognition that work is hard, there is still an 
encouragement to make labor a pleasure and a recreation.91 It is helpful, as seen above, 
that most of our callings, at least the ones that are ontologically associated with our 
persons, are tied to our happiness. Outside of finding pleasure in our work, recreation “is 
a necessarie meanes to refresh either bodie or minde, that we may the[n] better doe the 
duties which pertaine unto us.”92 Rest is not optional; it is compulsory, and indeed 
compulsory each and every day of our lives.93 We again see a theme of moderation, as 
recreation is not to cut into our work. 
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If we can recall the discussion of the two virtuous people given in Chapter 3 by 
Howard Curzer—p1 is only concerned with practical knowledge and spends all their free 
time in recreation, while p2 is concerned with practical knowledge as well as theoretical 
knowledge and spends some free time in contemplation—we can see that the Puritans 
encourage the lifestyle of p2. The Puritans reserve a high place for practical and moral 
knowledge in their work places as well as within their communities. However, the 
Puritans go to great pains to emphasize that in work we should not just be concerned with 
the practical but should also be thinking about divine things. Work is a duty, a spiritual 
discipline and a godly life that brings us closer to God. However, meditation also is a duty 
of every person.94 The Puritans also emphasize that there should be free time that is 
dedicated to the meditation of God and not spent in other non-meditative forms of 
leisure, but that recreation is something that everyone should engage in on a daily basis.  
This recreation and festiveness is at the very heart of leisure. As was discussed in 
Chapter 4, virtue for Aristotle, Aquinas and the Puritans is not the mastering of our 
natural inclinations, but the perfection of our natures so that we can follow our natural 
inclinations in a way that is appropriate to the kinds of natures that they are. Thus the 
greatest virtue is not difficult, but it is like ‘second nature.’ Josef Pieper’s discussion of 
leisure helps us to see the naturalness of leisure to the nature of humans, as well as its 
importance. He remarks that leisure “is a form of that stillness that is the necessary 
preparation for accepting reality; only the person who is still can hear, and whoever is not 
still, cannot hear.”95 Leisure is not just the absence of striving and work, but is the state of 
taking things into consideration in a celebrating spirit.96 The center of leisure is festival, 
which is the opposite of toil and effort. For the Puritans, the Sabbath is a time of leisure, 
contemplation, meditation, hearing and festival. It is a necessary part of the Christian life, 
not only because it accords with our natures but also because it is commanded by God. 
“Leisure stands opposed to the exclusiveness of the paradigm of work as social 
function.”97 What this means is that we need to make sure our priorities are in the right 
place. Leisure should not be done for the sake of work. In fact, as Brian Brock notes, 	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communal worship and, for our purposes, meditation are the “first and true work because 
it is the concrete forum in which our secular work finds its place.”98 Leisure allows us to 
come back to our labor, either contemplative or active, renewed and mentally refreshed. 
“The power to be at leisure is the power to step beyond the working world and win 
contact with those superhuman, life-giving forces that can send us, renewed and alive 
again, into the busy world of work.”99 For the Puritans, though, there is an emphasis on 
work and loving God and our neighbors through our work; we find the greatest 
fulfillment of our natures in the use of reason and in the worship of God. For the 
Christian, worship should be a priority, but rest and play are also of utmost importance to 
the Christian life.100 Just as the love of God takes priority over the love of our neighbors, 
so we do not leisure to work well, but rather work to leisure well. Man understands work 
and accepts it for what it really is, namely, the “‘tilling of the field,’ which always includes 
happiness and toil, satisfaction as well as the sweat of the brow, joy as well as the 
consumption of vital energy. If one element in these pairs is suppressed, the reality of 
work is falsified and festivity is ruled out.”101 
With the above in mind, the Puritans do not think that all of a person’s time 
should be spent in recreation. Under Curzer’s model of the dominant and inclusive ends, 
we see that the Puritans can emphasize the practical virtuous life of labor, and of loving 
one’s neighbor, while also giving credence to spending large amounts of time in 
undistracted concentration. This model, encouraged by the Puritans, allows for the 
relationship between theoria and praxis that Alasdair MacIntyre argues for, which is that 
the best city should direct people towards contemplation.102 
The third occasion Perkins gives for ‘vacation’ is disability,103 which consists of 
sickness, age, imprisonment, “or any other just impediment.”104 Baxter defines disability 
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as an “unresistable impediment”; other than this, no person is to be idle.105 “Outside of 
this, idleness is negligence to ones calling.”106 People who are prevented from working 
because of some disability need to have their basic health and life needs attended to “by 
the labour of other mens callings.”107 Perkins argues that Christians need to take care of 
their disabled and elderly. He writes that the “goods we have are not our owne, but the 
Lords: we are but keepers and stewards of them. And it is Gods will that the poore should 
have title to part of every mans goods: and for this cause it is a shame if they not releese without rousing, 
begging, or crying.”108 Here again, against Weber’s thesis, we see a concept of work that is 
neither capitalist nor utilitarian. The concern of the church is not simply with 
productivity and business but also with the care of the handicapped, sick and aged. 
Limited Atonement and the Secular Calling 
At this point, we need to draw together a few strands of thought from this and 
previous chapters, to discuss the reprobate and calling. We will do this by referring to 
Augustine’s two cities from which reformation political theology borrows heavily. The 
two cities model is concerned with the state’s relation to the church. Previous reformers 
such as Luther and Calvin, in their own ways, adopted this model. 
Augustine takes the city of God as an eschatological rather than visible reality and 
those in this city of God are those who have received the promise of redemption and the 
gift of the Spirit.109 Those who are ‘in Christ’ find their identity in the city of God, which 
is not co-extensive with any particular institution. The church transcends space and time 
and is outside the confines of history. Those who are citizens of the city of man are the 
political secular polis. The city of God exists within this world, but it is not of the world. 
Ultimately the two cities signify two loves that are concerned with the destination of 
human souls.110 	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Highlighting different aspects of Augustine’s two cities, Luther, Calvin and the 
Puritans make it a part of their political thought. The Puritans believe that reprobates, 
and thus the city of man, still play important and providential roles in the societies they 
make up. All callings, both secular and sanctified, are part of the political community. All 
vocations have social weight—they all contribute to a flourishing society—but only those 
that are done with right intentions are called ‘good,’ just as when the publican and the 
Pharisee went to the temple to pray and the publican left justified and the Pharisee did 
not.111 As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Bolton thinks that there are times when 
the “formall hypocriate” will have good vocations, but that this is like a “stage-plaier; who 
sometimes putteth on roabes and maiestie of a prince, himself being a base and neglected 
state.”112 Callings are a way to serve reprobates in that Christians can care of their basic 
and tangible needs. The fundamental difference, say, between the Christian shoemaker 
and the secular shoemaker is that the motivation behind human actions is different. As 
the poet George Herbert writes,  
 
A servant with this clause 
Makes drudgery divine: 
Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws, 
Makes that and th’ action fine. 
 
From the point of view of the observer, there is no substantive difference between the 
work of the Christian and the secular shoemaker, the difference is an internal, ontological 
and spiritual reality. But, as we have seen above, the sentiment just expressed by Herbert 
might make some Puritans uneasy. For example, we saw above that Perkins emphasizes 
that before the particular calling to specific task; there must be a stress on the general 
calling. For example a magistrate must be a ‘Christian magistrate.’113 However, there is 
not a consensus within the Puritans themselves on this issue. 
With this in mind, we have seen in Chapter 2 that within the western Christian 
tradition, as well as within most Puritan thought, there is the possibility of some amount 	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of penultimate happiness in this life, of which the unregenerate get a taste. They can get a 
taste of this through exercising their calling and experiencing enjoyment from it.  
Conclusion 
Brian Brock helpfully notes that the most “fundamental theological criterion” of a 
theological perspective of work is “that it coexist[s] in harmony with the satisfaction of 
others’ needs.”114 In this chapter, we have seen this very emphasis. In looking at the final 
portion of Perkins’ definition of calling and moving our gaze from the individual to the 
political, we saw that the community is exceptionally important for ethics as well as for a 
robust doctrine of calling as described in previous chapters.  
We looked at some of the nuanced specifics of a Puritan doctrine of calling, 
regarding how both Christians and non-Christians use their callings to benefit society. 
Drawing from our discussion in previous chapter on providence, we looked at the 
relationship between first and final causations, the first cause being related to God’s 
continual work in sustaining providence; the final cause is the political aspect of calling. 
We then focused on particular socio-political and economic issues like how one should 
enter into a calling, the social positioning that calling takes within the family, the good 
continuance in a calling and when it is appropriate to leave a calling. We finished by 
looking again at the relationship between rest and work. 
What this chapter has begun to show is that a Puritan eudaemonistic doctrine of 
calling is not solely about individual happiness. At a fundamental level, the doctrine of 
calling has far reaching political implications. These implications will be addressed further 
in the upcoming chapter. 
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 Chapter 7 
Community, Friendship and Law 
 
They say a person needs just three things to be truly happy in this world: someone to love, something to do, and something to 
hope for. Tom Bodett 
Introduction 
In this Chapter we will bring together multiple themes from throughout this thesis 
and look at the community’s role in the development of virtue for these Puritans. We are 
making the turn from the political, “common good” of calling back to the ethical “kind of 
life,” to ask the following question: how is it that the political life relates to the 
development of virtue and character? We will do this in two ways. The first is a discussion 
of friendship. There are two aspects of friendship that will be addressed here: friendship 
with others in the community and friendship with God. The second discussion concerns 
the role that law plays in making persons better, and it will be addressed later in this 
chapter. 
For the ancients, and all the way through western patristic and medieval 
Christianity, the topics of friendship and community were an essential moral 
conversation.1 However, friendship has been put aside in philosophical moral discourse,2 
as has the “widely ignored” relationship between ethics and the church.3 One fault of the 
enlightenment, under Bentham, Mill and Kant, was that it created a purely rational 
moral method that was accessible to any component individual, whereas, in the tradition 
prior to this time, there was no purely rational morality. Moral reasoning had to take 
place within a tradition and a community. 	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Stanley Hauerwas has written that he is convinced that “happiness, virtue, and 
friendship are crucially interrelated in a manner necessary for any adequate account of 
character”4 and that there should not be separation between character, happiness, and 
friendship.5 This section will explore these claims by looking at how friendship and 
community assist moral development. We have seen in previous chapters that all people 
seek happiness and that happiness, for the Puritans, is found in its most complete and 
perfect form in the vision of God in the next life. We have also seen that, for the Puritans, 
moral development is a process of possessing virtue. It is virtue that helps direct our lives 
and actions towards God and godly living. This third aspect of moral development is 
grounded in the conviction that community is essential for this process to take place. We 
will here begin to look at how this is the case. In focusing in on the community’s role in 
the development of its members, we will be drawing our gaze back to the connection 
between happiness, virtue and the calling to a kind of life, as well as the importance of 
community. We will now show the importance of friendship in Puritan moral 
development by looking at the relationships between virtue and earthly friendship in the 
community; then we will move to show the importance of friendship with God. 
Aristotle on Friendship 
Aristotle makes a distinction between three forms of friendship that are concerned 
with love and goodwill but vary in goodness:6 friends can be of utility, of pleasure or of 
good character. Friendships of utility are the majority of friendships and are for the sake 
of self-interest. These friendships are ‘incidental.’7 “Complaints and reproaches” arise out 
of relationships of utility. The second of Aristotle’s types of friendship is the relationship 
that is built on pleasure. These kinds of friendships “get at the same time what they 
desire,” because they want the same thing. Those who love and have friends for the sake 
of pleasure do so for what is “pleasant to themselves.”8 These types of friendships are 
typically found in young people. 
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Friendships of good character, for Aristotle, have the above two characteristics but 
differently. This friendship is not just concerned with pleasure and usefulness as it relates 
to self-interest but are, “anxious to do well by each other.”9 The best form of friendship 
has to do with mutual respect and virtue. It begins with goodwill and a friendly 
relationship, but goodwill itself is not actual friendship, because you can have goodwill for 
someone you have never met. For friendship, you must know the other person.10 The 
persons in a good friendship also need to be good men. 
 
Friendship being divided into these kinds; bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure and 
utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e. in 
virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends 
incidentally a resemblance to these.11 
 
The good friendship is not based on utility or pleasure, but on the good, and it requires 
good people who know how to love themselves well. Aristotle’s good friendship is 
beginning to resemble Augustine’s self-love, discussed in Chapter 2. Sarah Broadie 
explains, “I engage in the activity which is necessarily no one’s happiness but mine, but 
what I seek through so engaging is someone else’s.”12 The appropriate form of self-love is 
needed for the appropriate form of love for others. The best kind of friendship is when 
one person wishes for the other what they would wish for themselves, namely life, health, 
happiness and the fulfillment of desires.13 A person wishes for herself what seems good; 
she exerts herself for this end and does it for his own sake. With this in mind, John 
Cooper notes that φιλἰα, or friendship, for Aristotle, requires that a person desires the 
good for a friend for the friend’s own sake.14 
Aristotle makes a distinction between good and bad kinds of self-love. It is not a 
problem that people should view themselves as their own best friends and that they 	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should love themselves best, but it becomes a problem when self-love manifests itself in 
the taking of wealth, honors and bodily pleasures. These are considered objects of 
competition and are related to the lower parts of the soul. Positive self-love, on the other 
hand, is according to right reason and desiring what is “noble rather than what is 
advantageous.”15 The good person should obey her intellect and be a lover of self, for in 
so doing she will benefit herself and her fellows.16 
A good person has specific characteristics; friendship is one of these characteristics 
because another person is another self. Incontinent and vicious people cannot love 
themselves well and thus do not love others.17 Perfect friends wish good for each other. 
All friendship is for good or pleasure. These friendships are rare because these men are 
rare.18 Admittedly, for Aristotle, love is an emotion, but friendship, which must involve 
love, is a state.19 Love is passion, but mutual love is a choice, and the choice comes from a 
state. In loving a friend, I love what is good for them. Friends become good to and for 
each other. 
With friendships of utility and pleasure, a few are enough. But there is no fixed 
number of good friends, although it is hard to be intimate with a large number of people. 
Aristotle’s recommendation is to be a great friend to as many as it is possible to live with, 
which will also be a small number, but we must be content even if we find a few good 
friends. For friends, the most desirable thing is to live together. Friendship is a 
partnership. Friends share their interests and pursue them together and, because they are 
good, they make each other better.20 Now that Aristotle’s understanding of friendship has 
been set out, we turn to the Puritans. 
Puritan Friendship 
Friends are not just for security; they are also valued and enjoyed. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, Puritans enjoyed being in contact with fellow Christians and visiting 
with friends. Like Aristotle and Augustine before them, the Puritans think that spiritual 	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assistance means aiding each other in attaining the ideal state. In some cases, this means 
persuading the unconverted towards a life with Christ and thus beginning them on their 
quest towards full human development. In other cases, spiritual assistance means helping 
those who are already members of the household of faith to overcome struggles and 
achieve happiness.21 Either way, Puritan authors are generally quite happy with 
addressing their readers as friends.22 One of the features of Protestantism is an emphasis 
on talking about theology amongst friends, a feature that had formed generations of 
ministers. The community of friends is also the way in which people find their identity,23 
and thus the Puritans strive to see transformation in their families, churches and 
societies.24  
Rogers, who spoke highly of community and friendship for the Christian life, 
became influential in encouraging others to organize covenanted groups.25 In his diary he 
often writes about how important friendship is to him, describing his friend Ezekiel 
Culverwell as a help to him and to his studies. He credits his friends with renewing his 
desire to study and with helping him to write his book Seven Treatises.26 Rogers writes, 
“great hope we have by our private company amounge our neighbors to woorck as well 
more conscience in their whole course as knowledge.” He adds how “sweet conference I 
have had this time, especially with Newman and mr. Culverwel,” whom he counted as 
wonderful mercies.27 Rogers valued his time with his congregation and friends both inside 
and outside the church. 
One of the most helpful aspects of good friendship is that a friend can make one 
aware of one’s own sin—sin that one would not have been able to spot on one’s own. The 
18 August 1587 entry in Rogers’ diary, for example, describes how friends have helped 
him realize his sin by helping him to see that he cared too much for possessions. These 
realizations did not come from his personal study. As well as pointing out his sin, friends 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 M. M. Knappen, “The Puritan Character as Seen In The Diaries,” in Two Elizabethan Puritan 
Diaries (Gloucester: American Society of Church History, 1966), 4. 
22 Among many others, Richard Baxter seems to address both his Christian and non-Christian 
readers as friends; see Baxter, SER; 772. It was common practice for two thinkers from different 
denominations and divergent traditions to address each other as friends. For example, Luther and Erasmus, 
in their letters to each other, would address each other as “friend.” 
23 Ryrie, Being Protestant, 574. 
24 Bremer, Puritanism, 61. 
25 Ibid., 67. 
26 Rogers and Ward, Diaries, 58–61; 99. 
27 Ibid., 61; 63. 
	   196 
also helped him to prevent sin. Rogers notes in his diaries that the community of Christ is 
to delight with others in things that are good.28 Regular meetings are something that 
Rogers emphasizes.29 
The community was helpful for the development of virtue towards happiness, but 
the central role that friends and community play for the Puritans is that of moral 
exemplars, as discussed in more depth in Chapter 4 in our discussion of emulation and 
the person of practical wisdom (φρόνιμος). The theme of friends pointing each other 
towards the good, and thus towards God himself, continues in Roger’s published writing. 
“Friendly meetings,” he writes, “should be used for gaining one another towards God.”30 
In having “conversation in the world among men,” we “practice” virtues, like faithfulness 
and uprightness, and this practice helps us to perform “the duties which we know, [to] set 
our selves about them with more roundnes, and (as farre as they can be discerned) shall 
cause them to shew more beautie to others, and raise more admiration in them.”31 
Relationships in this life prepare us for the next by habituating virtues and making them 
practices that lead us to everlasting happiness with God in heaven.  
Edward Reynolds and Richard Baxter, like Rogers, see friendship as a help to 
move us towards heaven and to God. In Baxter’s view, it is a pity that some Christians do 
not meet together to talk about heaven and future rest. Being in community helps people 
move towards heaven by talking and thinking about it together.32 If we love our friends, 
we will talk with them about heaven and will help them to pursue rest.33 Friends should 
weep for lost friends and care about their moral and spiritual development enough to tell 
them about Christ.34 Reynolds, commenting on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, adds to this that 
community points us towards heaven and holy living through shame and accountability. 
Reynolds calls shame the fear of just disgrace from parents, rulers, counselors and friends. 
“We are apt to be ashamed with our friends, because their opinion wee value, and with 
our Enemies, because theirs we feare; with our friends because they are grieved; with our 
Enemies because they are delighted with that which shames us.” We fear the opinions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 56–7; 73; 90. 
29 Collinson, Religion of Protestants, 271. 
30 Rogers, PC, 132; 152. 
31 Ibid., 153. 
32 Baxter, SER, 643; 640. 
33 Ibid., 491–3. 
34 Ibid., 286; 395. 
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virtuous men because “their presence aweth us from liberty of sinning, and maketh us 
blush if they deprehend us in it, because Examples have proportionable Authority over 
the heart of man, as Lawes have, which wee doe not trespasse without feare.”35 
Though there are the negative or shameful aspects of community that help 
towards habituation and happiness, addressed above, community also positively and 
pleasurably contributes to earthly happiness. People are most happy, for Baxter, if they 
have a heavenly father and “heavenly Associates.” These associates are the “companions 
who will watch over thy ways; who will strengthen thee when thou are weak who will 
chear thee when though art drooping, and comfort thee with the same comforts, 
wherewith he hath been so often comforted himself, 2 Corinthians 1.4.” If you travel with 
this person on the way to heaven, they “will be directing and quickening thee.” 
Moreover, “if thou be angry, [a friend] is meek, considering the meekness of his heavenly 
Pattern; or if he fall out with thee, he is soon reconciled, when he remebereth that in 
Heaven you must be everlasting friends: This is the Christian of the right stamp.” These 
friends are rare, but what great societies we would have if we had friends like this.”36 
Baxter also notes that it is important to ask for help in uncertainties from friends who are 
more experienced. “Another help to this Heavenly Life, is, to be much in serious 
discourse of it, especially with those that can speak from their hearts, and are seasoned 
themselves with an heavenly Nature.”37 
Good friends of this kind unite themselves to each other and to God and have the 
return of the greatest delight. Reynolds writes that there is nothing more delightful than 
the real union of two minds. “If we mark it in all matter of Pleasure and ioy, the more the 
union is, the more is the Delight.” The union of two friends is the highest degree of 
fruition and pleasure that can be.38 
Reynolds discusses a “natural” or “habitual” love that is subordinate to the 
“greater, our love for God.” Habitual love first carries with it right respect, meaning, “we 
love a friend for himself, and not indirect ends, onely upon our own benefit.” True love is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Reynolds, TPFS, 301–2. Also see Aristotle, Rhet, 1383b13–1385a15. 
36 Baxter, SER, 606–7; Ryrie, Being Protestant, 575. 
37 Baxter, SER, 643; 640. 
38 Reynolds, TPFS, 210. 
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a “benevolent affection […] willing good unto another for his own sake.”39 This love must 
also be serene and not muddled with prejudice. The third aspect of habitual love is to love 
particular people in ways appropriate to their relationship with the lover. Though “we 
must love all men as ourselves,” this is not a love of “equality, but a fidelity and sincerity.” 
Reynolds, citing St. Paul, writes that the greatest degree of our love should be for those in 
the church and our families, “not excluding others, but preferring them.”40 Aristotle’s 
view is that proximity is an essential aspect of friendship. If friends do not converse for 
long periods of time, then their friendship begins to diminish.41 Reynolds disagrees with 
this because he wants to make room for friendship in the universal church. In this view, 
the exercise of love can be seen in both its absence and its presence. Reynolds knitted 
people together within the “mystery of the communion of the Church of Earth, both with 
in it self, in all dispersed members of it, and with Christ the Head, and that other part of 
it which triumpheth in heaven.”42 Using Aristotle’s three types of friendship, Joseph Hall 
writes that  
 
[N]othing in the world unites mens harts so firmly, as the bond of faith: for whereas there are three 
grounds of friendship, vertue, pleasure, profit, and by all confessions, that is the surest which is 
upon vertue, it must needs follow, that what is grounded on the best, & most heavenly vertue, must 
be the fastest; which as it unites man to God so inseparably.43 
 
In spite of all the agreements between Christian and Greek concepts of friendship, 
of which plenty have been seen above, there are some important discrepancies. Paul 
Ramsey notes three of them, the first being the sacrificing of one’s life for a friend, as 
exemplified in Johannine brotherly love. “There is no greater love than this, that a man 
lay down his life for his friends” (John 15.13). Aristotle’s views on friendship for the sake 
of the good would agree with this biblical statement.44 However, Christian love differs in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid., 91; Reynolds cites Aristotle as a source for this point. Aristotle, Rhet, bk. 4, ch. 4. However, 
there is no book 4, chapter 4 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, at least in modern editions. Reynolds may have been 
referring to bk 2 ch 12. 
40 Reynolds, TPFS, 92. 
41 Aristotle, EN, 1157b10–1. 
42 Reynolds, TPFS, 96. All of these forms of love and friendship Reynolds calls “amor amicitiae.” 
He does end this section on love by discussing the negative form of self-love, “amor concupisentie.” This 
kind of self-love is more like selfishness than is the self-love proposed by Aristotle and Augustine. Ibid., 93–
4. 
43 Joseph Hall, MV, 168–9; Hall prefers fewer, but good friends. Ibid., 24; 189. 
44 Aristotle, EN, 1169a. 
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that “while we were still sinners Christ died for us,” not as good people, but as sinners.45 
Secondly, as we have seen above, for Aristotle, one can stop being a friend to somebody if 
one has changed. In a Christian perspective, friendship “endures all things.”46 Finally, 
Aristotle’s best form of friendship has self-interest at its heart, while in Christian 
friendship, there is very little difference between loving a friend and loving an enemy, as 
self-interest is not the primary motivation for enjoyment of another.47 
However, as we have seen, Augustine and the Puritans would disagree with 
Ramsey on this final point. We will look at one of the most significant adaptations of 
Greek friendship later in this chapter, how sin corrupts community and friendship with 
God, but with all this in mind, there is still a strong communal aspect to the Puritans’ 
religious life. Patrick Collinson shows, through William Perkin’s Golden Chaine, that 
ecclesiastical and social disciplines naturally associate with “intellectual and moral 
constraint.”48 
The question remains as to the effect that sin has on earthly friendships. It must be 
the case, given the above discussion of friendship, that the Puritans would have some 
reservations about putting so much importance on depending on other frail human 
persons. It is to this that we turn our attention. 
Suspicions of Earthly Friendship 
As mentioned above, because of a doctrine of sin, Christian conceptions of 
friendship will take shape in ways that differ from those of the Ancient Greeks. Christians 
may be encouraged to engage with friends in order to become better and more virtuous 
people, but at the same time, there is going to be a tension between two sinful people. 
This tension will lead to reservations and suspicions because of the human inclination 
towards inappropriate forms of self-love. In this section, we will explore some of these 
qualms and the ways in which Christians in the past have dealt with this problem. 
Most of what we have seen thus far is a very positive reception of the idea of 
friendship in the western Christian tradition. There are, however, some concerns that we 
will need to address here. The problem of friendship, for Augustine, is how sin continually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 20. 
46 Ibid., 245. 
47 Ibid., 95–6. 
48 Collinson, Religion of Protestants, 249–51. 
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puts strain on friendships and leads to suffering. We will inevitably hurt each other. You 
can’t always trust someone, because you can’t “see his or her soul.”49 Even in the midst of 
this concern for the inevitable pain that friends will bring, there is still something positive 
about these close relationships. When Augustine’s friend dies, he writes in The Confessions 
that love for friends is good if they are loved in God, not for themselves alone.50 
In a similar fashion, the Puritans have plenty of positive things to say about the 
nature of friendship in the Christian life, but they also have suspicions. Because of their 
strong emphasis on the sinfulness of man, friendship with other sinners is suspect and at 
times highly discouraged.51 Joseph Hall, though very much in favor of an Aristotelian 
form of friendship, has his misgivings.52 Hall writes that he will use his friends “as Moses 
did his rodd; While it was a rodd, he helde it familiarly in his hand; when once a Serpent, 
hee ranne away from it.”53 Later in Meditation and Vowes Hall writes, 
 
That which is the miserie of Travailers, to finde many hostes, and few friends, is the estate of 
Christians in their pilgramage to a better life: Good friends man not therefore bee easily forgone; 
neither must they be used as sutes of apparell, which when wee have worne thred-bare we cast off, 
and call for new; Nothing but death or villanie shall divorce me from an olde friend: But still I wil 
follow him so farre, as is either possible or honest: And then I will leave him with sorrow.54 
 
Hall continues his cantankerous attitude towards friends when he writes, "great mens 
favours, friends promises, and dead mens shooes I will esteeme, but not trust to."55 “True 
Friendship necessarily requires Patience,” Hall states, because “there is no man in whom 
I shall not mislike somewhat; and who shall not as justly mislike somewhat in mee.”56  
It seems as if Hall is always in a tension. He appears to know the importance of 
Christian brothers and sisters in spiritual and moral development, but he is very 
untrusting of their motives and intentions, and his own motives and intentions for that 
matter. Even in the context of the above quote, where he is complaining that friendship 
necessarily requires patience because everyone gets irritated with each other, Hall goes on 	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50 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), IV.iv–
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1984, XIX.8. 
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to state that “my friends faults therefore, if little, I will swallowe and digest; if great, I wil 
smother them; how ever, I will winke at them to others, but lovingly notifie them to 
himselfe.” For Hall, it seems that friendship is very difficult and sometimes requires harsh 
but loving rebukes that move people towards holiness.  
 
A sharpe reproofe I account better then a smooth deceit; therefore when my friend checks me, I 
will respect it with thankfulnesse; when others flatter mee, I will suspect it, and rest in my owne 
centure of my selfe, who should bee more privie, and lesse partiall to my owne deservings.57 
 
Here we see Hall’s openness to friends’ helpfulness, but also his skepticism and, 
ultimately, his self-reliance. Hall later states that he will “honour good examples, but I will 
live by good precepts.”58 Though Hall may seem unhappy with moral examples and 
friends, he later writes that care for good company will either teach him or he can be the 
teacher. “Both these” he writes, “shall much pleasure me; one as an agent, the other as an 
subject to worke upon, neither knowe I whether more; for though it be an excellent thing 
to learn, yet I learn but to teach others.”59 We see here that community is still an essential 
tool for Hall. 
 The Puritan authors who seem to be less conflicted over the place of friendship in 
the Christian life still have some concerns. Rogers is concerned that some men will trade 
a friendship with God for earthly friendships by not giving their whole heart to God.60 
Baxter, in good Thomist fashion, argues that people will do evil because they think that it 
is a good. No one wills “evil as evil.” On the back of this comes a warning not to let good 
things become evils, and thus friends become a distraction from seeking the good.61 
“Rest” can only be found in the “full obtaining of our Ultimate end.”62 Wealth, and even 
friendship, is too low an end for happiness; what our souls find as true rest must not waver 
in satisfaction.63 Friendship is a good, as long as it has its proper place. This is also the 
case for Reynolds, who argues that there is a strong dependence upon the assistant means 
to the end that is hoped for. These means, which we rely upon to achieve the final end, 
“have more or lesse power or certainty in them.”Means such as “wealth, friends, wit, 	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59 Ibid., 27. 
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policy, power, or the like,” are the foundations of corrupt hopes. They can be the causes 
of “hope of probability,” but not of “certainty,” because they are subject to miscarriage 
and the providence of God who is the true arbiter of certainty of hope. These probable 
means are just tools to ultimate ends. Other aids have either wings that easily forsake us 
or thorns that will poke us if we lean too hard on them.64 
We see that friendship, for the Puritans, is a good thing, a good means and a help 
in pursuing God and eternal happiness. There are, however, strong concerns that these 
means might become ends in themselves, but as we have seen, it is not really the idea or 
concept of relationships between one or a few people that is the worry, but the making 
more of these ‘means’ than is appropriate. On the contrary, friendship, even according to 
the most skeptical thinkers, is a necessary and important aspect of moral and spiritual 
growth.65 
Friendship with God 
Friendship with God is an exceptionally important means of moral development, 
arguably the most important. We will begin by looking at Aquinas and his agreements 
and disagreements with Aristotle’s thought, in order to shape our discussion on the 
importance of friendship with God for the Puritans. 
From the Thomist position, which the Puritans generally adopt, true virtue only 
comes when one has friendship with God. Here we see some overlap with our discussion 
in Chapter 4 concerning the infusion of theological virtues. Aquinas saw being in right 
relationship with God through Christ as necessary in order to break beyond natural, 
rational and moral constraints and to truly flourish and be all that we as humans are 
meant and created to be. It is God’s very being to be happy and he shares this with us 
through friendship.66 This relationship of God and humankind is necessary for happiness 
because friendship and well-wishing require communication. Since there is a 
communication between God and humankind, in which God communicates his 
happiness to us, “some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same 	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communication.” Along with a new ability to cultivate virtues, charity brings with it 
‘communication’ with the divine, “wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of 
man and God.”67 God’s Trinitarian nature is the foundation of this friendship. A point 
that Aquinas makes is that God is love and that he also has a loving relationship that takes 
place within his everlasting Trinitarian self.68 However, there is still a problem as to the 
differences and similarities between earthly friendship and friendship with the Divine, and 
here Aquinas parts ways with Aristotle in order to make genuine friendship between God 
and humankind possible. 
Aristotle’s theory of friendship has very strict parameters for what kinds of 
relationships can be considered true friendship, which seemingly prevent a human being 
from having a friendship with God. In particular, Aristotle asserts the impossibility of true 
friendship between two unequal persons. Aquinas broadly agrees concerning human 
friendships between unequals,69 but he also makes a fascinating departure from Aristotle 
in his discussion of caritas and friendship with God.70 
It is charity that makes friendships between such supreme unequals possible; caritas 
extends to all regardless of status. It is in this love that we are able to be friends with God, 
who is clearly not equal with his creation. The friendship of charity, grounded on a 
“fellowship of happiness,” is essentially in God as the First Principle, “whence it flows to 
all who are capable of happiness.”71 According to Aristotle’s view, friendship between 
unequal parties is impossible because he has in mind friendly relations between two 
persons where ‘the good’ and the object of friendship reside in some restricted way, rather 
than “friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality”.72 
This unequal friendship works because we become friends with ‘the good’ itself. 
For Aquinas, “charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain 
friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual love, together with 
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mutual communion.”73 The invitation to partake in God’s loving activity “provides the 
dynamic sharing in virtue, so necessary to friendship.”74 Equality with God comes by his 
invitation; it is a gift, indeed a grace, which makes friendship possible without the distance 
from God ever being reduced.75  
As important as charity is, the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of 
the gifts of grace. As for Augustine, he believes that grace enables and then love achieves 
friendship with God that is by the mediation of the Holy Spirit.76 For Aquinas, there are 
two kinds of grace. The first kind of grace, among other things, heals corrupted human 
nature and is related to infused virtues. Believers do not need further help from this kind 
of grace. The initial infusion is sufficient.77 The second kind of grace helps us towards 
righteous acts. This grace enables us to abide in good to the end of life.78 “Caritas and 
amicitia [friendship] are both oriented outward, to the other.”79 The logic here is that God 
loves all people, the Christian loves God, and thus the Christian will love all people for 
the sake of God.80 
 Now that we have a broad picture of friendship with God, we can look more 
specifically at the Puritans. Baxter and Owen’s understanding of friendship with God is 
remarkably like that of Aquinas. Baxter, for example, makes an analogy between the pain 
we feel when a friend is absent and our relationship with God. A close relationship with 
God is a necessary aspect of genuine faith. We see here in Baxter’s writing a high view of 
earthly friendship as well as the importance of being in the presence of God as friend.81 
Baxter also remarks that contemplation is like talking to an old friend or countryman. 
Enjoyment of parents and of friends is a “sweet” pleasure; how much sweeter will it be to 
be in a perpetual love with God?82 It is also important for Baxter that we, as friends on 	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this earth, communicate with and worship our divine friend in heaven, and in the midst 
of this, that we make new friends through conversion.83 Conversion is a person not only 
joining a new community of earthly friends but also beginning a friendship with God. 
Owen’s writing on friendship also mirrors that of Aquinas quite closely. Owen 
distinguishes between two kinds of love: beneplacito (“good pleasure and destination”) and 
amicitia (“friendship and approbation”). Both of these loves are particularly assigned to the 
person of the Father, “in an eminent manner.” It is through the person of the Son that 
the Father shows these two loves, and it is through these loves that we are able to ‘dwell’ 
with the father through the Holy Spirit.84  
With regards to friendship, it is also through friendship with Jesus, who calls us 
friend, that we have the ability to be obedient,85 but when we are not obedient and do sin, 
we are grieving the Holy Spirit and thus grieving “a tender and loving friend.”86 We can 
see above that in both Aquinas and Owen there is an emphasis on the Trinity in 
friendship with God. 
There are other Puritans who have a place for a deep and intimate friendship with 
God, though it works itself out in different ways. For Richard Rogers it is through 
meditation that one finds that one is friends with God, and thus happy.87 Even Joseph 
Hall, with his generally negative view of earthly friendship, emphasizes that God is our 
friend, even when we do not deserve that friendship, and that God will treat his friends 
better than his enemies.88 
Friendship with God is an important aspect of Puritan moral and emotional 
development. In order for true virtue to be achieved, communion with God in friendship 
must be established. We can see a kind of chain of events. In order for one to gain control 
over the emotions by the use of reason and thus possess virtue, one must first have 
communion with God, which only comes through having this friendship. This is, 
however, not the end of the story with regard to moral development and friendship in 
Puritan thought. Our earthly friends and communities play important roles as well. In 	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this section we have looked at the role of friendship in moral development; we will now 
show the part that laws and rules play in developing us as persons.  
Rules and Law 
John Rawls takes it as the case that the Reformation was the cause of liberalism:89 
Furthermore, P.T. Forsyth writes that Puritan individualism led to political liberalism.90 
Forsyth’s comment may be slightly misguided. There is without question a new sense of 
individual spirituality in the Puritans, but community was also an essential aspect of their 
moral development. The Reformation doctrine of calling recognizes that there is a 
generous area of “relativity” in ethics.91 Not only, as we have seen in this thesis, are there 
particulars in virtue ethics generally, as each person has dispositions to one vice or 
another that need to be moderated, but there is also particularity with regard to gifting 
and obligation. This section, with regard to law and politics, will seek to answer the 
question of moral norms; that is, what are the particular normative moral obligations for 
certain individuals in particular situations? This is a continuation of our discussion in 
Chapter 4 on the development of virtue. The purpose of this section is to investigate how 
the Puritans see the relationship between the development of virtue and the State. This 
section continues to address issues that were addressed in the previous chapter.  
What we will see is that the place of divine commands in Puritan thought 
generally is not of the first type mentioned in chapter 5—all precepts that make up 
morality have their origin in God’s unconditioned will—because there is recognition of 
God’s created order. There is an elevation of divine commands for morality, but within 
these commands, there is not an absence of reason. The ordered world still has a grip on 
general moral commands. We can see statements from the Puritans, such as Owen’s 
statement, to the effect that our universal obedience to the will of God is our duty,92 but 
what we will find is that this seems to be secondary. It is the case that humanity has a duty 
to obey God’s commands, but this is a means to the end of habituating character-states 
that usher in earthly and heavenly happiness. In this way, the Puritans reflect their 
ancient and medieval counterparts’ political perfectionism more than other political 	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theorists do in England at the time, such as Thomas Hobbes or John Locke, in that the 
state can legitimately promote a certain conception of the good, even if this good is 
subject to disagreement by those who live and work within the community.93 However, 
the view of law and political order that will be given below does have its liberal moments. 
It does not resemble a standard construal of liberalism in that it is not voluntarist, 
contructivist or progressivist.94 The depiction of law and politics below does have a 
‘family resemblance’95 to liberalism, in that law is concerned with the protection of 
human frailty and there is an emphasis on the responsibility of rulers and the rule of law. 
This is a strand of liberalism that admits, “the human person is a creature incapable of its 
own perfection, although nonetheless called to and made for this perfection.”96 Also, as 
will be seen, an attribute of liberalism that is typically dominant but is not represented 
here is a conception of toleration or cultural relativism; there is a conception of the 
common good that is more than the sum of individual preferences.97 With this in mind, 
this section will look at the political implications of the Puritans’ eudaemonism in their 
Aristotelian-Thomist political perfectionism. We will begin with a brief analysis of 
Aristotelian-Thomist perfectionism and move on to show how the Puritans accept and 
implement it. 
Political Perfectionism 
This section will broadly describe Aristotelian-Thomist perfectionism and the 
ways in which it relates to the development of virtue. For Aristotle, political science has 
law (legislative wisdom) as its primary concern.98 He makes a distinction between kinds of 
laws, the first of which is ‘particular,’ related to a given place and community and able to 
change depending on place and circumstances. A second kind of law, ‘Universal law,’ is 
the law of nature and is not particular, but is “common to all” and is related to justice.99 	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Universal laws are to be made in accordance with virtue. Just acts produce happiness for 
society and the law binds us to do just acts.100 As we have seen, happiness requires virtue, 
virtue requires education, and, going a step further, education is managed by legislation. 
Thus Aristotle can say that it is hard for a person to be virtuous if they have not been 
brought up under the right kinds of laws.101 Moral training and education is the proper 
concern of the legislator,102 who must possess practical wisdom103 so that the people’s 
errors can be corrected, thus leading the individual, and by extension the community, to 
a state of happiness.104 The law helps people to form habits, as it allows for the 
employment of our capacity for deliberation and prudence, which would not be exercised 
if not in a community. 
Aquinas’ conception of the law is quite similar to Aristotle’s, with a distinctive 
theological emphasis that takes into account tradition, scripture and contemporary 
practice.105 The definition of law is an ordinance of reason for the common good, made 
and promulgated by those who have been given the responsibility of caring for the 
community.106 Reason is not just a general rational character; rather, it is a process that is 
concerned with ends. Law that is obeyed contributes to a life that is both ordered and well 
lived, which is by reason governing every level of human functioning towards an end.107 
Legislators are to make laws that are ordered to the common good and that promote 
virtue. 
Aquinas has a clear hierarchy of law that begins with the eternal and divine law. 
God is the ruler of the universe, and the world, being ruled by divine providence, is 
governed by divine reason. The end of the “divine government is God himself, and His 
law must needs be ordained.”108 The natural law directly relates to the divine and eternal 	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law. We share in the eternal reason, which gives humankind a teleological inclination and 
is the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law. Natural law relates to civil 
(positive) law, which conforms to the natural law.109 These different forms of law are all 
interrelated. The relationship of law, ethics and nature is that the moral life begins with 
rules or laws that are intended to help people towards the good by providing a standard 
of right direction. The laws are not ends in themselves and should not be valued in 
themselves, but they lead to the perfected will and perfected desires required for 
happiness. It is the intention of the law “to make good citizens.” Aquinas further writes, 
 
Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: 
and since virtue is “that which makes its subject good,” it follows that the proper effect of law is to 
make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the 
intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated according to 
Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply.110 
 
Law is to be given for the purpose of directing human action. Lawgivers make men good 
by habituating them to good works. For this reason, heresy is not only the concern of the 
church but of the state.111 
 For both Aristotle and Aquinas there is a necessary and integral relationship 
between nature and law. The law serves as an educator for perfecting persons. We will 
see below that the Puritans also are strongly perfectionist in their thought on rules and 
laws. 
 
Puritan Perfectionism112 
The Puritan conception of the purpose of law is a near adoption of both Aquinas’ 
and Aristotle’s conceptions, given above. Laws are not given for the sake of obedience; 
rather, obedience to laws is a means to the end of achieving happiness. Laws are a 
pedagogical tool to mold persons into the kind of people that they are created to be. What 
we will find in the Puritans is that they follow in a perfectionist tradition more than other 
English theologians and philosophers. They believe that the state should take on a much 
more active role in the moral development of citizens. Religion and politics are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid., I–II 95.1. 
110 Ibid., I–II 92.1. 
111 Ibid., II–II 11.3. 
112 It seems to be the case that the Puritan use terms like law, rule and commandment 
synonymously. 
	   210 
intrinsically tied. Puritans thought that moral commandments should be upheld by “laws 
of the realm,” arguing for public humiliation, fines and excommunication for sins.113 The 
doctrines of vocation of some smaller protestant movements were collectivist and given to 
a new social solidarity that tried to actualize God’s law and purposes on earth to the 
salvation of society.114 
In the following sections, we will start by looking at the relationship between law 
and nature in Puritan ethics. We will then look at the role of law as teacher and finish 
with special focus on civil government.  
Law and Nature 
I argued earlier for the explanatory power of an ethic that is based on created 
nature. If this is the case, then what is the relationship between a natural flourishing and 
the following of rules and laws? We will also see the answer the Puritans give for this 
connection. I will start by looking at two biblical scholars, Tom Wright and John Barton, 
in order to draw out distinctions in Puritan thought.115 
Alongside looking at the relationship between nature and law, another question 
that we will be asking of the Puritans is this: do they fall into the problem that Walter 
Schaller calls the ‘standard view,’ in other words, are virtues simply dispositions to follow 
moral rules?116 This is a question about the order and priority of virtues over rules, or 
rules over virtues. What we will see below is that the Puritans place a high value on the 
commands promulgated by God, but that these are means to other means, which are 
virtues. This question will first of all be addressed in this section and will continue to be 
addressed in the following section on the pedagogical components of the law. 
For Tom Wright there is an intrinsic connection between the created order and 
the commanding of a law by God. He describes how, just as a highway builder “builds a 
central barrier so that any car drifting towards the oncoming traffic will be stopped in its 
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tracks,”117 so the purpose of laws and rules is to keep those who are growing in virtue 
going in the right direction when they are distracted or an unexpected emergency 
happens. “Those building roads are not saying ‘there you are; there’s a nice crash-barrier. 
Bounce off that you’ll be all right.’” The point is that people are heading in the direction 
of their intended goal, and the barriers keep them on the road when something 
unexpected takes place. The best way to keep the rules is to build habits.118 
As we have seen in previous chapters, virtues are natural dispositions that are 
habituated and help to move us towards natural ends. What Wright is getting at here is 
that rules keep us moving in the direction of our created nature. The commands of God 
are not arbitrary but, as John Barton notes, “the biblical writers often argue not from 
what God has declared or revealed, but from what is apparent on the basis of the nature 
of human life and society.”119 Thus “‘wisdom’ is essentially the ability to live one’s life in 
accordance with such order, at both the physical and the moral level: to be skilful in one’s 
occupation, sensible and sagacious in one’s decisions, and moral in one’s whole way of 
life.”120 Obedience to divine commands and laws is only a small aspect of the whole 
system of ethics and politics, and where divine commands do emerge, they are 
specifications of how the cosmic order should be maintained in a particular sphere of 
activity, rather than overarching principles. Wright and Barton represent the view of the 
Puritans with regard to law and human flourishing. 
Rogers writes that unbelievers have knowledge of God through reason, but those 
who delight in the scriptures receive from them the wisdom that informs them “what [is] 
the happiest estate of life that here can be injoied, and even, which hath the promise of 
this life and of the which is to come.”121 The reading of the word of God in scripture 
instills a daily resolve against evil and sin. Rogers also notes that we know such duties in 
our conscience.122  
For Reynolds, there is an intimate relationship between nature and law. God is 
the end of natural agents. When someone is in discord with the law, and thus with their 	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proper end, there is “decay” and “dissolution.”123 It is in the soul that God “fastened a 
perfect knowledg of his Law and Will…”124 There are natural rules to which human 
nature needs to be habituated to follow, especially those rules that relate to the right use 
of the passions. Reynolds, many times in his treatise, refers to the “rules” that help 
moderate the passions, two examples being the ‘rule of God,’ loving God and his glory 
and commands, and the ‘rule of self,’ which resembles the self-love discussed in Chapter 2 
and friendship described earlier in this chapter.125 Also, as in our discussion of moral 
exemplars in previous chapters, instead of focusing only on rules, Reynolds shows that it 
is the opinions of others, especially those who are our examples, that shape us.126 These 
people function as a kind of rule. 
Thomas Goodwin writes in The Returne of Prayers that prayer is said to help us to 
keep our duties. Prayer keeps humankind upon the path, keeps her diligent in her duty.127 
This could sound like an endorsement of the ‘standard view’ mentioned above, but 
Goodwin continues on to say that prayer is not just a duty and a looking forward to the 
things that will be obtained. It is like a doctor who prescribes a patient medicine and a 
sick person who only takes it because the doctor said to do so, rather than to get better; 
patients should be concerned with good ends.128 If ordnance is just a duty, he notes, then 
just doing the action itself is good enough, but we should be continually looking for the 
outcomes of these duties. The law God gives consists of commands and duties not to be 
followed in themselves, but as a means to blessing and flourishing. Goodwin later states 
that in prayer there are two aspects that need to be considered. There is first the duty, or 
the command from God, and second, the need to see that duty as a means to bring about 
blessing.129 
 There are two parts of moral epistemology for Baxter. The first part is “the 
natural part; being from the beginning, and written in the Nature of every reasonable 
creature, and by an Eminency and Excellency it is of Natural Morality above all other 
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Laws whatsoever.”130 Jean Porter’s discussion of Aquinas helps draw out what Baxter 
seems to be getting at here. The cardinal virtues are universally recognized and admired 
in some form. “Almost everyone can see that restraint, courage, fairness, and good 
judgement have some point, given the exigencies and common aspirations which 
structure human life.” Thus natural cardinal virtues provide the “closest thing we have to 
universal moral language.”131 
The second part, Baxter calls the ‘supernatural parts of the conditions’: that which 
is “not known to any man by the meer light of nature: but is supernaturally revealed to 
the world by the Gospel,” much as we saw in Chapter 3 with sacra doctrina.132 For Baxter 
there can be good acts of virtue done by a heathen; this is related to the ‘natural part’ 
mentioned above and is purely natural. But it is only by the “precepts of Christ” that 
action or duty be truly virtuous. “By the Precept I mean any Divine determination 
concerning our duty, what we ought to do or avoid.” Precept is the same as “God’s 
Testament, his Covenant, and the New Law.” This law is broken into two parts: the 
‘precept’ and the ‘sanction.’ “The precept may be considered, either as by it self [do this 
or that] and so it maketh Duty: This constitutes the vertue of Action; (Regulating them).” 
So we see here that virtuous actions come from divine precepts. “So the second kind of 
sincerity [whether an Action be good or bad] must be tried by the Precept as Precepts. 
What God requireth is a vertue: what he forbiddeth is a Vice: what he neither requireth 
nor forbiddeth, is indifferent, as being not of Moral Consideration.”133 Sanction is an 
addition and stands in conjunction with the precept, “[Do this or that, and be saved, or 
else perish.]”134  
What we have seen above in Baxter is that there is a natural ability to possess 
virtue, but that the supernatural is only related to the precepts of Christ. It is natural, but 
something more, much in the sense looked at in Chapter 2 on natural and supernatural 
ends. Duty to law is not our ultimate end, but has its place in the spiritual life.135 We 
need to be careful to note that the command, though it comes from the precept of Christ, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Baxter, SER, 422. 
131 Porter, Nature, 181. 
132 Baxter, SER, 422. 
133 Ibid., 419. 
134 Ibid. For more on the relationship between duties and practice, see 331; 334; 336. For more on 
the use of sanctions with regards to Aquinas, see Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 72. 
135 Baxter, SER, 6–7. 
	   214 
is still based in nature. Happiness is the “natural part concerned with the pure 
Godhead.”136 
For John Owen, God is by nature loving,137 and commands not from an arbitrary 
will but from his nature. “Those who lay the necessity of satisfaction meerly upon the 
account of a free act and determined of the Will of God, leave to my apprehension to just and 
indespensable Foundation for the Death of Christ, but lay it upon a supposition of that 
which might have been otherwise.” This makes God’s “justice not a Property of his Nature, 
but a free act of his will: And a will to punish, where one may do otherwise injustice, is 
rather ill-will than justice.”138 Carl Trueman, regarding Owen, notes that “rational 
creatures must necessarily exist in a state of moral obligation to God as Creator, a moral 
obligation which will have a certain legal content which cannot be a matter of simple 
divine whim; it has to embody those elements such as obedience which reflect the 
ontological Creator—creature distinction and relationship which must necessarily exist 
once God has acted to create.”139  
Law as Teacher 
Above, we have seen that for the Puritans there is a direct connection between the 
commands of God and the created order. What we will look at here in this section is how 
the law and rules function as a pedagogical tool for the learning and practicing of virtues. 
Rogers argues against the accusation that the practice of daily direction leads to 
toil and inconvenience. Rather, he thinks that the daily practice of observing rules leads 
to “well ordering” and that there is “no pleasure nor comfort in the world like it.” The 
well ordering and framing that come from the daily practices of obeying God’s 
commands constitute the “greatest wisdome” and so lead to the greatest pleasure. We 
should note that the connection between wisdom and the practice of the law is a feature 
highlighted by John Barton above. Obeying God’s commands is a way of ordering our 
lives in such a way that we experience the most pleasure.140 The Ten Commandments 
are to be “formed” in us to help with our daily worship and to live with others; laws are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Ibid., 420. For the natural aspects of prayer and meditation, see Baxter, DHM, 12. 
137 Owen, Comm, 21. 
138 Ibid., 110–1. Emphasis mine. 
139 Carl R. Trueman, John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 70. 
140 Rogers, PC, 577–8; 313. 
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our guides.141 The law is to be preached to show people their sin, and to be corrective.142 
We should not only look to laws for moral development, but should also consult the 
wisdom of those who have “experience in them,” that is, the laws. We can see that there 
is a community aspect to following the law, in that we are dependent upon others for 
understanding what it requires of us.143 “The proper frame of mind was one which kept a 
man constantly fit and willing to fulfill his Christian obligations, whatever they might 
be.”144 
Perkins, as we have seen, has a very robust conception of happiness that is taken 
from his reading of the Sermon on the Mount. He states that this particular sermon is the 
key to the whole of the Bible and is given so that the disciples would know the will of the 
father.145 The first part of the sermon, verses two through thirteen, are concerned with 
the rules that bring about true blessedness and happiness.146 Obeying the commandments 
of God lead to Sabbath and “perpetuall happiness.”147 What we see in Perkins’ discussion 
of rules is that they are not the end in themselves. Rather, they are the means, leading a 
person towards the end: happiness. Unlike Perkins, Tom Wright thinks that the 
Beatitudes are not rules, but he would agree with Perkins that they are virtues concerned 
with ends. Wright argues that Jesus’ discussion of the kingdom in the Sermon on the 
Mount is not referring to some future kingdom, but rather the state of affairs in which 
God’s kingdom has come.148 “God’s future is arriving in the present, in the person and 
work of Jesus, and you can practice right now” the habits and character of a life which 
finds its goal in that coming future.149 The Beatitudes are not rules but virtues, habits of 
the heart that anticipate the new world now. “That’s how they work: grasp the end, the 
goal, the telos, the future, and go to work on anticipating it here and now.”150 The true 
human end is already given in Jesus. “Become what you will be” is to become what you 	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144 Rogers and Ward, Diaries, 3. 
145 Perkins, GLE, 1–2; This also seems to be the opinion of Yoder. See John Howard Yoder, 
Discipleship as Political Responsibility, trans. Timothy Geddert (Scottdale: Herald Press, 2003), 12.  
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actually are in Christ.151 “Be perfect as I am perfect” means to be a complete, genuine 
human. From a less obvious theological perspective, William Frankena agrees with 
Wright and the Puritans above. Morality cannot provide principles (laws and rules) of 
prima facie duty and cannot be content with the letter of the law, but it must foster in us the 
disposition that will sustain us in the hour of decision. Principles without the development 
of dispositions “to act in accordance with its principles” seem ad hoc.152 Morality cannot 
be content with simply obeying principles. 
In Baxter, we can see the same emphasis that is given by Rogers and Perkins: 
“[t]hat while we are guided by the fear of Castigation, we may be converted to the 
perfection which is through Christ.”153 What begins as the fear of punishment turns into 
the development of character to perform duties. We can also see in John Owen that the 
law is insufficient for the end and purpose of righteousness.154 
 What we have seen above is that, for the Puritans, the magistrates are to care for 
the souls of their citizens.155 Civil law is a corrective behavior and, “spiritual recovery and 
the rescue of the civil order go together.”156 The laws of God should be the laws of the 
state. However, the degree, means and execution of this relationship between ‘spiritual 
recovery’ and ‘civil order’ vary depending on the thinker. John Witgift thinks that human 
authority can decide a subject’s ‘adiaphora,’ because God does not ordain them, whereas 
Thomas Cartwright seeks to ground such matters only in scripture.157 What seems to be 
most consistent is the idea that the law is normative for all people because it accords with 
nature. But laws pertain to norms in the sense of the general calling. The law convicts 
people of sin and moves them towards repentance and eternal happiness. To again cite 
Baxter, “the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom; but the Law bringeth fear: Therefore 
the knowledge of the Law is the beginning of wisdom; and no man is wise without the 
Law. They therefore that refuse the Law, are Fools…”158 There is, however, enough 
room in the Puritan idea of law for particular instances of prudence and variation 	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between individuals. Obedience to laws and rules is part of, but not exhaustive of, what is 
required for a life characterized by the virtues.  
Conclusion 
This chapter along with the previous turned our gaze away from the discussion of 
particular ‘happinesses,’ back to the universal development of virtue and the community’s 
role in this process. We have done this first by looking at the importance of friendship in 
the Puritans. It could be thought that this emphasis on friendship would not have been 
sustained in Reformation England because of the emphasis on sin and a general distrust 
for humanity. Though there is a place for this worry, it does not dissuade English 
reformers from encouraging friendships as an essential part of moral and spiritual growth. 
Communities and friendship were important, especially for persecuted communities.159 
We have then finished our discussion of community involvement in moral development 
by looking at the role of the state. Here we saw that Puritan ethics does not necessitate an 
assent to political liberalism. 
What I hope to have shown here is that the community is an essential part of an 
individual’s moral development. Even with a strong emphasis on personal flourishing and 
happiness, the achievement of this is never beyond the reach of another who assists in this 
journey. Whether this ‘other’ is a community of believers, the secular state or God 
himself, it most certainly takes the help of others for one to achieve both natural and 
supernatural happiness. 
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 Chapter 8 
 Conclusion 
 
Money can't buy happiness, but it can make you awfully comfortable while you're being miserable. 
Clare Boothe Luce 
 
An unfulfilled vocation drains the color from a man's entire existence. Honoré de Balzac 
 
Introduction 
Steve Jobs at a graduation address for Stanford in 2005 said, “you’ve got to find 
what you love. And that is as true for your work as it is for your lovers. Your work is going 
to fill a large part of your life, and the only way to be truly satisfied is to do what you 
believe is great work. And the only way to do great work is to love what you do.” A recent 
article takes issue with Jobs’ statement, saying, “The 21st-century Jobsian view asks us to 
turn inward. It absolves us of any obligation to, or acknowledgment of, the wider world.”1 
The eudaemonism and doctrine of calling in the Puritans presented this thesis disagrees 
with this complaint, in that a person should turn inward to find their natural, innate 
talents and capabilities and that these very capabilities contribute to the ‘wider world.’ The 
account of the good argued for in this thesis does not subordinate the good of the 
individual to the good of the community or vice versa. The individual pursues and defines 
their good within the concrete context of the whole.  
 This chapter will briefly summarize the argument of this thesis and give some 
practical applications for contemporary theological ethics, politics and economics. 
Thesis Summary 
This thesis was fundamentally a discussion of eudaemonism in Puritan thought 
with a view to its wider implications for Christian ethics. We saw in Chapter 2 that there 
is a diversity of ways in which the Christian thinkers analyzed in this thesis, from 
Augustine through to Owen, conceive and put into practice eudaemonistic concepts and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Miya Tokumitsu, “In the Name of Love,” Slate, January 16, 2014, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/01/do_what_you_love_love_what_you_do_
an_omnipresent_mantra_that_s_bad_for_work.html. 
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principles. With that said, there are still two substantial continuities, which are the two-
fold natural and supernatural ends. We have seen that, for these Puritans, there are 
natural ends, and these ends contribute to earthly happiness. These natural ends allow for 
there to be a universal human ethic based on nature. However, the eudaemonism 
represented in Puritan thought can affirm that earthly happiness is a significantly 
diminished happiness in comparison to the final, and perfect, supernatural happiness that 
is conducive to our created natures. The Puritans emphasizes that earthly ends are not 
the final ends of mankind; the ultimate end is the supernatural. The possibility for 
supernatural happiness is only attainable by the grace that is provided through Christ. 
What does this mean for Christian ethics? There are natural ontologically and 
environmentally rich goods in which we can base our lives and actions here in this world, 
but these are only penultimate ends. In order for one to reach one’s full human potential, 
one must be seeking God. 
Chapter 3 extended the above discussion of supernatural happiness to look at the 
relationship between theoria and praxis in the Puritans. Based on a shared picture of 
humankind being rational animals set in a conception of the tripartite soul, we saw that 
post-Reformation thinkers attempted to hold together the tension of these two forms of 
life: the life of theoria and the life of praxis. What was emphasized was that we are rational 
animals and that, in order to flourish in a way that is appropriate to our beings, we need 
to engage our reason, which functions in two ways. 
The first way our reason functions as Christians is the study of theology, which 
can take place in a number of different ways, from intense academic engagement to 
prayer or short daily bible readings. It is part of our earthly flourishing to use our minds 
to engage with the world that God has created. Being rational animals does not conflict 
with our daily work and activity. The second way that we use our reason appropriately as 
rational animals is in the supernatural end. This ultimate end is achieved only in the next 
life and is a kind of existence that engages our intellectual capacities through seeing and 
knowing. The ultimate end, supernatural happiness, is related to reason in that to see 
God is to contemplate him. 
In Chapter 4, we began an analysis of William Perkins’ definition of calling and 
the moral ramifications of the Puritan doctrine of calling. For the Puritans, the 
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development a ‘kind of life,’ or a life that is defined by a character that exhibits the 
cardinal and theological virtues, is central to a conception of ethics that is based on divine 
calling. The main push of Chapter 4 was that divine commands do not necessarily need 
to be in conflict with the Puritan desire to speak to the development of character that is 
based on virtue and natural phenomena. 
Like their eudaemonist predecessors, the Puritans conceive of the virtues in a two-
fold manner, making a distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. This is 
alongside the near complete adoption of a conception of the passions as a focal 
contributor to moral development, since the sensual part of the soul relates to the rational 
part. We have also seen that the Puritans, in a very Thomist fashion, go beyond Aristotle 
to affirm that the ability for the development and habituation of virtue is tightly 
connected with the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. 
  Chapter 5 moved from a conception of the divine command in universal 
humankind through moral development to an examination of more particular commands 
in the doctrine of calling. This was done by expounding the second part of Perkins’ 
definition of calling concerning the personal and private imposition of callings on 
humankind. We saw that calling for the Puritans is ontologically, environmentally and 
situationally grounded and thus related to flourishing generally as well as particularly. 
This is where we were able to see specifically and most clearly the situationist account of 
ethics that had been developed in previous chapters. The particularization and 
situationally oriented duties come about because the means of achieving earthly 
happiness vary from person to person. The means to the general calling or telos—the 
infusion of virtues through charity and faith in Christ—are universal in that every person 
has access to them. In this way, this thesis attempted to integrate divine commands, 
specifically the idea of vocation or calling, into a naturalist eudaemonist framework. 
What this thesis has shown is that the Puritans arrive at an insight paralleled in 
Dorothy Sayers’ work. Sayers’ short essay on work argues that there is a connection 
between work and the pleasure that is had in hobbies, such that people need to see these 
as more closely related. Work is a way of service, and certain kinds of work are “fitted by 
nature.” Work should be enjoyed and we do not fight for simple employment but for a 
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quality of work.2 However, Sayers’ argument resembles more Weber’s utilitarian reading 
of Baxter in that “work is not, primarily, a thing one does to live, but the thing one lives 
to do.”3 To be clear, Sayers argues along with the Puritans looked at here that work is to 
be enjoyed and is fitting to our natures, but I also have shown, against Sayers, that for the 
Puritans we do not live to work. We live for something much more, that is, God himself 
not only in this life, but also in the next. There is room in the Puritan’s conception of 
work for rest, leisure and meditation; in fact it is a duty. This is something that Weber’s 
account of the Puritans does not take seriously. 
 With the above in mind, Chapter 6 showed that the community is an essential 
part of an individual’s moral development. Even with a strong emphasis on personal 
flourishing and happiness, which can never be achieved without the assistance of others. 
Whether this ‘other’ is a community of believers, friends, the secular state or God himself, 
it certainly takes others to achieve natural and supernatural happiness. We further saw 
the social and political aspects of the Puritan definition of calling and work. Drawing on 
Aristotelian final causation these thinkers were able to navigate the individual’s divinely 
ordained social positioning and the value that this positioning contributes to the whole.  
We then looked at some of the nuanced specifics of their doctrine of calling in 
respect to how both Christians and non-Christians should use, enter and progress in their 
calling. We also saw that ‘sabbath’ played as significant a part in their theology of work as 
did labor itself. And in Chapter 7 we looked at the importance of friendship for moral, 
spiritual and political development. Communities and friendship were important for the 
Puritans, especially for persecuted communities. We finished our discussion of community 
involvement in moral development by looking at the role of the state. 
In the sections to come, I will give a brief account of how eudaemonism in the 
Puritans along with the doctrine of calling has practical import for ecclesial and political 
life today especially with regard to work. I will do this by looking first at the continuities 
between what has been argued in this thesis and in Catholic Social Teaching, second the 
role of education on social flourishing, third the dangers of value judgments and market 
values, and finally at a further analysis of globalization and supererogation. 
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Happiness, Vocation and Contemporary Issues 
Bellah and associates in Habits of the Heart argue that work “is one of the central 
requirements for a revitalized social ecology.”4 Richard Layard has noted that happiness 
can be a social good, the “one ultimate goal that enables us to judge other goals by how 
they contribute to it.”5 The explanatory power of this thesis confirms both Bellah and 
Layard’s statements. Work is an important political discourse and happiness can be the 
organizing principle to determine overall social flourishing.  Layard, however, advocates 
a utilitarian conception of happiness. Utilitarian definitions of happiness should not be the 
basis of social goods. If pleasure is tied to buying and consumption, work can appear only 
as an endeavor necessary for securing pleasure and satisfying our greed and envy. The 
happiness looked at through this thesis offers a more full-bodied moral and political 
happiness. It is my intention at this point in the thesis to show some of the moral and 
political alternative to Layard’s description of happiness with the eudaemonism and 
doctrine of calling represented here.  
I suggest that there is a cyclical relationship between universal and particular 
happiness, whereby if citizens are happy and are experiencing well-being, the society as a 
whole will experience well-being. Just as Aristotle writes that the “true student of politics 
must study the soul,”6 so I suggest, that particular and universal happiness can be 
accomplished by placing value on those innate callings that are expressed in individual 
persons. I will first show that there is much continuity between the specifically protestant 
eudaemonist doctrine of calling expounded in this thesis and contemporary Catholic 
Social Doctrine. Leading on from this, we will look at what this unified perspective on 
work can say to broader social issues, market values and education. And finally, we will 
look at the positive global implications of the situationism described throughout this thesis 
and above. 
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Catholic Social Teaching 
What we should first draw attention to is the close relationship that the themes of 
this thesis have with Catholic social teaching. There are a number of strong continuities 
between the Puritan authors on human flourishing, work and economics and modern 
Catholic social teaching. I will be specifically comparing the concepts from this thesis with 
those in the Compendium of The Social Doctrine of the Church (CSD).7 
Firstly, both traditions focus more on the priority of “conversion and 
transformation of the conscience of believers than on the need to change the social and 
political structures of the day.”8 As we have seen in Chapter 2, the primary focus of ethics 
for the Christian authors investigated here is the supernatural happiness and the virtues 
and character traits that flow from this reality to make personal and social advancements 
in this life. This takes priority over penultimate ‘happinesses.’  
Secondly, with regard to gifts and talents, our gifts from God are for personal and 
social flourishing. This has the same emphasis as the CSD, which states, “economic 
activity is to be considered and undertaken as a grateful response to the vocation which 
God holds out for each person.” This section of the CSD continues, stating that good 
administration of the gifts received, and of the material goods, is a work of justice towards 
oneself and towards others.9 Furthermore, “everyone should make legitimate use of his 
talents to contribute to the abundance that will benefit all, and to harvest the just fruits of 
his labour,” and “talents should be considered in the redistribution of resources.”10 What 
we saw in Chapter 6 is explicitly stated by the CSD, “the dignity and complete vocation 
of the human person,” which is the creative dimension and is essential to human activity 
and “the welfare of society as a whole.” These are “to be respected and promoted.”11 
The model presented in this thesis by the Puritans, and by Catholic social 
teaching, can be extended beyond the local community to the global economy. As I have 
shown earlier, the good society is one in which particulars (individual callings) contribute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It could have been just as easy to draw upon John Paul II’s encyclical Laborem Exercens. CSD was 
chosen because it closely draws upon this encyclical as well as other earlier Catholic documents. See, John 
Paul II, “Laborem Exercens.” 
8 Catholic Church and Pontificium Consilium de Iustitia et Pace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of 
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to the good of the whole (socio-political order). The section of the CSD on globalization 
describes this well, when it states, 
 
[T]here is an ever wider awareness of the need for models of development that seek to take on the 
task not only of raising all peoples to the level currently enjoyed by the richest countries, but rather 
of the building up a more decent life through united labour, of concretely enhancing every 
individual's dignity and creativity, as well as his capacity to respond to his personal vocation, and 
thus God's call.12  
 
What this is communicating, in agreement with the argument of this thesis, is that callings 
at a global level contribute to the worldwide, interrelated network of economic 
participation that attends to the dependence of people on each other’s skills and giftings. I 
propose that those Protestants who consider themselves part of the Puritan tradition have 
more in common with Catholic social teaching than is perhaps thought. With this in 
mind, social and economic action can be agreed upon and promoted from both Catholic 
and Protestant perspectives on global and economic goals, some of which I will discuss 
briefly below. 
Callings and Markets 
Another fundamental agreement between the CSD and the argument of this 
thesis is that there is a “necessary relationship between economics and morality.”13 In this 
section, I will show the issues that arise when a doctrine of calling is directly related to 
free-market values. A report written for the Institute for Faith, Work, & Economics uses the 
concept of uniqueness and calling similar to that argued for in this thesis and the CSD as 
an attempt to biblically justify income inequality.14 Ann Bradley, the author of this report, 
associates uniqueness with the image of God, making it an ontological reality. She states, 
 
All of this comes down to the fact that each individual is born with unique skills and abilities. Our 
work on earth, pursued with a true understanding of how God has called us to use those gifts—our 
purpose—can further His Kingdom. And that can occur through owning a dry-cleaning business, 
playing professional football, being a professional evangelist and countless other vocations, even 
though those gifts can and do bring different earthly rewards. Tim Tebow has a net worth of $3 
million and Billy Graham’s is recorded at $25 million. Those dollars reflect the market return to 
their comparative advantage. The market rewards and punishes in dollars. 
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The above means of thinking about natural uniqueness and economics leads to a number 
of issues. First, the problem with the way in which it is construed is as follows: if 
uniqueness is ontological and the market dictates values then, by necessity, there arises 
the issue of one person being ‘valued’ over another because of supply and demand of 
innate abilities. The dry-cleaner becomes less valuable than the professional athlete. John 
Rawls is right to be concerned with a conception of justice that is based on ‘natural 
talents.’ Rawls’ concern is a legitimate one because of his awareness of the possibility that 
a lottery of natural talents may favor some people over others, simply based upon 
contingent cultural values.15 This seems to be the case with Bradley, who reads a 
conception of free-market capitalism back into scripture. The Church relates to the state, 
at least for St. Luke, a profoundly theological (and not simply pragmatic) question, 
requiring a hermeneutical frame of reference for right apprehension. Only from the 
position of the risen (and coming) Christ will one arrive at the epistemic commitments 
necessary to understand the concomitant overturning of, and situatedness within, the lex – 
and with it pax – Romana.16 Oἰκονομία is a term employed by Luke, in the Gospel as well 
as Acts, to depict the third way by which the Church may live. It is not a via media, it is 
important to note, charged with the task of forming a material negotiation between right 
and left. Its life of οἰκονομία – and thereby its handling of goods is the alia via (or alia 
omnino aliam viam)—an entirely different ‘way’ of life; and this is reason enough for Luke to 
call it, without any qualification, ‘the Way’ (Acts 9.2).17 In light of the above, it is hard to 
see how Bradley can separate functionality from ontology, and she seems to read 
contemporary economic systems back into scripture. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 62–4; 87; 91–2; 
137; 142; 265; 271–4; 354; 365; 271; 274; 354; 364; 376–7; 387. 
16 Hauerwas, in his own way, has made a similar point: ‘[t]here is, however, one characteristic of 
Christian convictions that, while not unique to Christians, is nonetheless a stumbling block to many who 
would assess whether Christian convictions are true…For I have argued that the very content of Christian 
convictions requires that the self be transformed if we are adequately to see the truth of the convictions – for 
example, that I am a creature of a good creator yet in rebellion against my status as such. Talk of our sin, 
therefore, is a claim about the way we are, but our very ability to know we are that way requires that we 
have already begun a new way of life. That is why the Christian doctrine of sanctification is central for 
assessing the epistemological status of Christian convictions”: Stanley Hauerwas, “Why the ‘“Sectarian 
Temptation”’ Is a Misrepresentation: A Response to James Gustafson,” in Hauerwas Reader, ed. John 
Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 99–100. 
17 Also see C. Kavin Rowe, World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the Graeco-Roman Age (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
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Secondly, the above report also does not take into account other canonical texts 
that discuss justice as taking care of the poor through some, at least minimal, form of 
wealth redistribution. Other Old and New Testament passages with regard to social 
behavior and the accumulation of wealth would most likely lead to one of two 
conclusions: (i) either individual callings are equal and should receive near-equal pay or 
(ii) the discrepancies between callings should be of no consequence because those who 
make more should care for those who make less, so much so that there can be no visible 
difference between the lifestyles of people with different callings. This form of capitalism 
“provides systematic incentives” for vices and for people to “develop a kind of character 
that has a propensity for injustice.”18 
Thirdly, the economic basis given by Bradley is driven only by rationalizing, 
capital and cooperative bargaining with no regard to sympathy and empathy for others. 
The inconsistency in this form of economics becomes apparent, as there is a 
dichotomizing of social relationships. “All social relationships are to be either relationships 
governed by bargaining undertaken for mutual advantage (market relationships provide 
the paradigm) or affective and sympathetic relationships.”19 There should be a general 
encouragement for persons to move away from pure self-interest and towards developing 
affections and sympathy for others. This requires that we invest ourselves in non-market 
relationships of “uncalculated giving and receiving.” Michael Sandel has recently pointed 
out the dangers of allowing markets to dictate morals.20 The value of natural talents 
should not be socially contingent, but talents should contribute to the good and 
flourishing of an entire society. With this said, the above should not be taken as a full-
frontal attack on markets. We will now look at one specific instance in which an 
inappropriate relationship between callings and market values has taken effect in Western 
culture. 
Also, if value is put on people based upon what they can produce, then there 
could be a problem with how a culture with the about economic presuppositions should 
treat the disabled and the elderly. As was made clear in chapter 6, under the doctrine of 
calling described in this thesis, care for those who are unable to care for themselves is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 MacIntyre, Ethics and Politics, 2:149. 
19 MacIntyre, Dependent, 115. 
20 Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (London: Penguin, 2013). 
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crucial part of vocation and community. This is not because of what these people are able 
to do, but because of what they are. These people have value not because of what they 
can produce, but because they have relationships with family and friends. 
Education 
 A saddening effect of the above extreme free-market mentality has made its way 
into education. In the last few decades, at least in the United States, there has been a 
constant struggle to keep art, music, humanities and ROTC courses in public schools. 
Based on the conception of work, and the broader economic effects that work has on 
happiness given in this thesis, taking these subjects out of schools injures social well-being 
because students with the above natural giftings are not given ample opportunity to 
develop these skills and apply them in adult life in their work. Wendell Berry notes, “[a] 
loser, by definition, is somebody whom nobody knows what to do with.”21 Those whose 
callings have no social political capital become losers simply because their natural 
interests are outside of what the market deems as valuable. Artists, writers and musicians, 
whose vocation is related to beauty rather than capital and value, become ‘losers.’ The 
above subjects in education are seen as extra-curricular, non-essential, and deemed not 
worthy of funding, while mathematics and sciences take center stage because of their 
quantitative and empirical impact. If a job does not meet a utilitarian purpose then it does 
not have societal legitimacy.22 Thus whole communities of people are left to employment 
that is not conducive to their innate character traits and experience frustration in their 
daily lives. 
 Having training as an artist does not necessarily mean that one must end up as a 
successful painter, sculptor or curator. There are plenty of vocations that allow people to 
draw upon a natural creativity and tend towards the visceral experience of ‘working with 
one’s hands. Matthew Crawford shows that the “potential for human flourishing” in the 
manual trades (e.g. mechanic, plumber, craftsman) is greater than in more computer, or 
machine-based trades (e.g. assembly lines and call centers) because of the “rich cognitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Wendell Berry, What Are People For? (London: Rider Books, 1990), 131. 
22 Ben Witheington, Work: A Kingdom Perspective on Labor (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 
2011), 48–9. 
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challenges and psychic nourishment” that comes with them.23 These manual trades 
cannot be outsourced to other countries due to the necessity of their close proximity, and 
they also offer chances to problem-solve in unique ways in the physical world. Such 
vocations usually require apprenticeships that look very much like an Aristotelian type of 
mentoring. Under his mentor, Chas, Crawford became a more “virtuous” mechanic. 
Being able to be mistaken and corrected by a mentor “is an ethical virtue.”24 
 From the above, we can see that the educational processes for some giftings do not 
require a university education, and thus not everyone should go to university, but rather, 
vocational schools encouraged. As a result of people being forced into universities, the 
economic web or balance has been thrown off, and there are fewer people to do the ‘dirty 
jobs’ that are necessary for socio-political flourishing.25 
This relates to the argument of the thesis in that if there is not adequate training 
for the variety of talents and character traits that are represented in humanity and within 
a society, then there is the potential that a large group of citizens may not be sufficiently 
educated to flourish; these people may then be pushed into careers that do not accord 
with their giftings. If such a significant portion of a polis is unable to flourish as individuals, 
it seems unlikely that the polis as a whole will be able to flourish. 
Globalization, Mission and Situationism 
 The eudaemonist doctrine of calling as represented in this thesis by the Puritans 
also has another added benefit for practical Christian ethics, which has been explored at 
various points through this thesis, which is situationism. This benefit allows for an 
explanation to the problem of supererogation. Julia Annas defines supererogation as “acts 
which the agent does which go beyond what he is obligated to do, which are admirable 
but in some way go beyond moral requirements.”26 In practical terms, this could look like 
God calling a person to leave the comfort of Western civilization to lead a life dedicated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Matthew Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2010), 32. 
24 Ibid., 99. 
25 I also, however, want to affirm that education, such as, the reading of texts like Shakespeare or 
Walt Whitman, shapes peoples’ characters. If I am advocating that some people should not go to university, 
won’t they miss out on this important part of character development? My response to this is to say that the 
reading of these texts should not be delayed until university but should be engaged with at younger ages 
and made a central part of school curriculums. 
26 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: OUP, 1993), 115. 
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to the poor in India, while another person may be called to work hard at their job and to 
care for their family in an exceptionally less harsh environment. Is there a significant 
moral difference between the two people described above? Susan Wolf puts the problem 
this way, “[I]f the moral saint is devoting all his time to feeding the hungry or healing the 
sick or raising money for Oxfam, then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, 
playing the oboe, or improving his backhand.”27 Within this eudaemonist doctrine of 
calling one action is no less morally praiseworthy than another, but if the person who 
God has called to care for their family abandons this call in order to go to India, then 
they are acting wrongly. Moral principles generally still apply by virtue of us discussing 
right actions for human nature, but individual situations allow for a variety of right 
actions that are not universalizable. A eudaemonist conception of calling allows for these 
kinds of particularities in ethics. Being virtuous is the ideal for every person. Because of 
the emphasis in Puritans, and in a reformation ethic of calling, there is a large emphasis 
on responding to a particular situation with prudence and not holding fast to rigid 
philosophies.28  
Not every life is required by God to be extraordinary in the way that popular 
media would define extraordinary; some are called to the ordinary, and this can be 
extraordinary in the context of the city of God. In the example given above, the person 
who is called to care for the poor in India should be recognized for their deeds, but the 
person who cares for their family should not be thought less of. The doctrine of calling, as 
it relates to ethics, helps us to navigate some of these questions. But it is predicated on 
those who are called to do the seemingly dirtier jobs or missions in the world stepping out 
and doing them. The social breakdowns caused by some persons not being obedient to 
their callings are sometimes the reasons why others are called to do ‘dirtier’ or ‘riskier’ 
vocations, for example, the person who feels called to care for orphans is sometimes 
necessary because parents have not taken their callings and responsibilities as parents 
seriously. Or the call to serve in impoverished countries arises because of the corruption 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 8 (1982): 421. How I am using Wolf 
here is not the main argument in her paper. However, the passage quoted above does contain the thrust of 
the inquiry I am making into deontological ethics. 
28 See, Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (Louisville: Westminster /John Knox Press, 1993), 188–
9; This concept can also be found in Augustine. See, Augustine, On Christian Teaching, trans. R.P.H. Green 
(Oxford: OUP, 1997), I.xxviii.  
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of political leaders who do not practice the virtues required to do their particular callings 
well. 
 What should be stated at this point is that everybody, by virtue of being human, 
has a calling. Every person regardless of age, gender or health, has a divinely oriented 
responsibility to fulfill this personally and socially whether that is as a mother, teacher, 
electrician or entertainer. What this does not mean is that every person has a ‘right’ to 
wealth, fame and riches. Not every calling leads to celebrity. Some callings require a 
faithful, humble and quiet commitment to family and community. These more humble 
callings can be, in the words of Friedrich Nietzsche, “a long obedience in the same 
direction; there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which 
has made life worth living.”29 
Conclusion 
 What I have drawn out in this chapter is how a Puritan eudaemonist doctrine of 
calling helps shed light on some modern-day socio-political issues. Firstly, though there 
may be deep differences in theology between Catholics and Protestants, there is much 
that can be agreed upon with regard to moral and political theology if this conception of 
a eudaemonist doctrine of calling is taken up. Secondly, the emphasis on natural, innate 
uniqueness is important, but it is severely damaged if an unfettered free-market capitalist 
perspective of values is prioritized. Thirdly, with regard to education, separating work 
from our natural loves and giftings ultimately leads to a dichotomy of work and 
happiness. ‘Non-work’ time becomes escapist. A solution to this would be to give more 
attention at the educational level to those who are gifted in the arts and humanities and to 
how they can implement these talents fruitfully in society. And finally, the situationism 
described in this thesis has wide implications for meeting global needs in relation to God’s 
providence. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ed. Michael Tanner, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin Classics, 2003), 111. 
	   231 
 
Bibliography  
 
Adams, Edward. The Stars Will Fall from Heaven: Cosmic Catastrophe in the New Testament and 
Its World. London: T & T Clark, 2007. 
Adams, Robert Merrihew. A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2006. 
———. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002. 
———. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. New York: OUP, 1987. 
Aertsen, Jan A. “Aquinas’s Philosophy in Its Historical Setting.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Aquinas, edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, First 
Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Annas, Julia. “Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness.” In Aristotle’s Ethics : Critical Essays, 
edited by Nancy Sherman, 35–56. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 
———. The Morality of Happiness. New York: OUP, 1993. 
Anon. A Short and Pretie Treatise Touching the Perpetuall Reioyce of the Godly, Euen in This Lyfe 
Seene and Allowed according to the Order Appointed. Early English Books, 1475-1640 / 
1086:02. Imprinted at London : By Henry Denham dwelling in Pater noster Row, 
at the signe of the Star, Anno. 1568., 1568. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (January 1, 
1958): 1–19. 
Applebaum, Herbert A. The Concept of Work: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992. 
Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics.” Translated by C. J. 
Litzinger. New edition of Revised edition. Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993. 
———. Compendium of Theology. Translated by Richard J. Regan. Oxford: OUP, 2009. 
———. Disputed Questions on the Virtues. Edited by E. Margaret Atkins and Thomas 
Williams. Cambridge: CUP, 2005. 
———. Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of 
Boethius. Translated by Armand Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1987. 
———. Summa Contra Gentiles: God. Translated by Anton Pegis. Vol. 1. 5 vols. Notre 
Dame: UNDP, 1956. 
———. Summa Contra Gentiles: Providence Part I. Translated by Vernon J. Bourke. Vol. 3. 5 
vols. Notre Dame: UNDP, 1956. 
———. Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of English Dominican Province. Notre 
Dame: Ava Maria Press, 1948. 
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1994. 
———. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Aristotle. Aristotle in XIX Volumes, Loeb Classical Library: The Nicomachean Ethics. Edited by 
G.P Gould. Translated by H Rackham. London: W. Heinemann; G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1926. 
	   232 
———. “Catagories.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford Translation, 
edited by Jonathan Barnes, translated by J.L. Ackrill, 1:3–14. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “Eudemian Ethics.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
edited by Jonathan Barnes, translated by J. Solomon, Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “Eudemian Ethics.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford 
Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, translated by J. Solomon. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “Fragments.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
edited by Jonathan Barnes, translated by Jonathan Barnes and Gavin Lawrence, 
Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
———. “Metaphysics.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford Translation, 
edited by Jonathan Barnes, translated by W.D. Ross, Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “On The Soul.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford Translation, 
edited by Jonathan Barnes, translated by J.A. Smith, Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “Politics.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford Translation, edited 
by Jonathan Barnes, translated by B. Jowett, Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “Posterior Analytics.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, edited and translated by Jonathan Barnes, Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “Rhetoric.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford Translation, edited 
by Jonathan Barnes, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
———. The Metaphysics. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. London: W. Heinemann ; G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1933. 
———. “The Nicomachean Ethics.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle : The Revised Oxford 
Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, translated by W.D. revised by J.O. 
Urmson Ross, Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Augustine. City of God. Edited by John O’ Meara. Translated by Henry Bettenson. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984. 
———. Confessions. Translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: OUP, 2008. 
———. Expositions of the Psalms 1-32. Edited by John E. Rotelle. Translated by Maria 
Boulding. Vol. 1. 5 vols. Brooklyn: New City Press, 2000. 
———. On Christian Teaching. Translated by R.P.H. Green. Oxford: OUP, 1997. 
———. The City of God against the Pagans. Edited by R. W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
Aumann, Jordan. “Appendices.” In Summa Theologiae: Action And Contemplation., Vol. 46. 
Cambridge: CUP, 2006. 
Ayres, Lewis. Augustine and the Trinity. Cambridge: CUP, 2010. 
Baldry, Christopher. The Meaning of Work in the New Economy. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007. 
Barrow, Robin. Happiness. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980. 
	   233 
Barth, Karl. The Heidelberg Catechism For Today. Translated by Shirley C. Guthrie. London: 
Epworth Press, 1964. 
Barton, John. Ethics and the Old Testament. 2nd ed. London: SCM Press, 2002. 
Bashor, P.S. “Plato and Augustine on Friendship.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 2 (1958): 
169–80. 
Baxter, Richard. A Christian Directory, Or, A Summ of Practical Theologie and Cases of Conscience 
Directing Christians How to Use Their Knowledge and Faith, How to Improve All Helps and 
Means, and to Perform All Duties, How to Overcome Temptations, and to Escape or Mortifie 
Every Sin : In Four Parts. Early English Books, 1641-1700 / 343:11. London: Printed 
by Robert White for Nevill Simmons., 1673. 
———. A Treatise of Conversion. Preached, and Now Published for the Use of Those That Are 
Strangers to a True Conversion, Especially the Grosly Ignorant and Ungodly. Early English 
Books, 1641-1700 / 2733:04. London : Printed by R. White, for Nevil Simmons 
bookseller in Kiderminster, 1657. 
———. “Christian Politicks.” In A Christian Directory, Or, A Summ of Practical Theologie and 
Cases of Conscience Directing Christians How to Use Their Knowledge and Faith, How to 
Improve All Helps and Means, and to Perform All Duties, How to Overcome Temptations, and 
to Escape or Mortifie Every Sin : In Four Parts. Early English Books, 1641-1700 / 
343:11. London : Printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons, 1673. 
———. The Duty of Heavenly Meditation Reviewed by Richard Baxter at the Invitation of Mr. Giles 
Firmin’s Exceptions in His Book Entituled, The Real Christian. Early English Books, 
1641-1700 / 200:20. London: Printed for Nevil Simmons ..., 1671., 1671. 
———. The Saints Everlasting Rest, Or, A Treatise of the Blessed State of the Saints in Their 
Enjoyment of God in Glory. Early English Books, 1641-1700 / 1140:13. London: 
Printed for Thomas Parkhurst, Ric. Chiswell, and Dorman Newman, 1688., 
1688. 
Bayer, Oswald. Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation. Grand Rapids: W.B. 
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2008. 
Becon, Thomas. The Flour of Godly Praiers [most Worthy to Be Vsed in These Our Daies for the 
Sauegard, Health, and Comforte of All Degrees, and Estates / Newlie Made by Thomas Becon]. 
Early English Books, 1475-1640 / 1784:06. Imprinted at London: By Ihon Day, 
dwelling ouer Aldersgate, a lytle beneth S. Martins, these bokes are to be solde at 
hys shop by the lytle cunduite in Chepesyde, [ca. 1550], 1550. 
Bellah, Robert Neelly, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swindler, and Steven 
Tipton. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1986. 
Benatouil, Thomas, and Mauro Bonazzi, eds. Theoria, Praxis, and the Contemplative Life After 
Plato and Aristotle. Leiden: Brill, 2012. 
Berry, Wendell. What Are People For?. London: Rider Books, 1990. 
Biggar, Nigel. “God in Public Reason.” Studies in Christian Ethics 19 (2006): 9–19. 
Blum, Lawrence. “Vocation, Friendship, and Community.” In Identity, Character, and 
Morality, edited by Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1990. 
Bobik, J. “Aquinas on Communicatio, the Foundation of Friendship and Caritas.” Modern 
Schoolman 65 (1986): 1–19. 
	   234 
Bolton, Robert. A Discourse about the State of True Happinesse Deliuered in Certaine Sermons in 
Oxford, and at Pauls Crosse. Early English Books Online. At London: Imprinted by 
Felix Kyngston, for Edmund Weauer, 1611. 
Borden Sharkey, Sarah. Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later Writings. 
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010. 
Bowen, James. History of Western Education: The Modern West Europe and the New World. Vol. 
3. London: Methuen, 1981. 
Bradley, Anne. Why Does Income Inequality Exist? An Economic and Biblical Explanation. 
McLean: Institute for Faith, Work & Economics, 2014. 
http://tifwe.org/resources/income-inequality/. 
Bremer, Francis J. Puritanism. Oxford: OUP, 2009. 
Brewer, Talbot. The Retrieval of Ethics. Oxford: OUP, 2009. 
Brink, David Owen. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
Broadie, Sarah. Ethics With Aristotle. Oxford: OUP, 1991. 
Brock, Brian. Christian Ethics in a Technological Age. William B Eerdmans Publishing, 2010. 
Brown, Malcolm. “Happiness Isn’t Working, but It Should Be.” In The Practices of 
Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing, edited by Ian Steedman, John R 
Atherton, and Elaine Graham. Taylor & Francis, 2010. 
Bunnin, Nicholas, and Jiyuan Yu, eds. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. O: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2004. 
Burkert, Walter. Greek Religion. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. 
Butler, Joseph. Butler’s Fifteen Sermons. Edited by T. A Roberts. London: SPCK, 1970. 
Calvin, John. Commemtary on the Harmony of the Evangelists. Vol. 2. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1949. 
———. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Edited by John McNeill. Translated by Ford 
Lewis Battles. 2nd ed. Louisville: Westminster Press, 2006. 
Cameron, Euan. The Sixteenth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Campbell, Ted A. The Religion of the Heart: A Study of European Religious Life in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries. Eugene: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2000. 
Catapano, Giovanni. “Leah and Rachael as Figures of the Active and the Contemplative 
Life in Augustine’s Contra Faustum Manichaeum.” In Theoria and Praxis, and the 
Conteplative Life after Plato and Aristotle, edited by Thomas Benatouil and Mauro 
Bonazzi, 215–28. Leiden: Brill, 2012. 
Catholic Church, and Pontificium Consilium de Iustitia et Pace. Compendium of the Social 
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